Two Questions On Aquinas Thoughts On Evil

[rkwright]

First question: Aquinas, following Augustine would point that evil is not a thing - it is a privation of goodness.

Now corruptibility is a privation, is it not? It would be better that things did not "die" in a physical sense.

If this is true, is it also right to say that everything in the world is "evil" in a sense? Can anything in this fallen world be full of goodness?

Second question: Aquinas teaches that sin can reside in external acts. Moral wrongs, a subset of sin, lie in the will. Thus one can commit a "sinful" external act with good intentions (Aquinas uses the example of killing for sinners for God's glory - maybe something like an abortion bomber or something...). This is where the idea of intrinsically evil acts come into play.

But Aquinas is firm on the point that it is moral wrongs on which we are judged. He "imputes" the sinfulness of an intrinsically evil external act to the sinner, no matter the intention. My question is how... How does a sinful action with a good intention "transfer" to the person. Obviously God judges people not actions - God sends people to hell not actions (this may sound ridiculous, but it makes the point that sinful actions must be "transfered" to the sinner and not merely remain in the action). My question is how? This is addressed in the De Malo of Aquinas, which I have a copy of... but sadly don't fully understand it.

[rkwright]

bump bump... where are the scholars on this?

[Theoketos]

We really should have two threads because this is going to be confusing to keep track of both.

1. In the same sense that everything in this world, with a few exceptions like the Incarnate Word and the Blessed Virgin Mary, suffer some sort of privation, everything is also good in that it is sustained by God.


2. We need some Latin to help clearly answer these questions;

Mallum = evil

Culpa = Sinful

If some one commits an evil act (mallum), but out out of sincere or invincible ignorance, does not know it was evil then they have not sinned (culpa).

And so they have done evil without culpability.

This also works with one who is not willing when the do evil. Mallum sine culpa, evil without sin...

As to the transfer part, it might be useful to remember that we are spiritual beings and that our biological reality called a body has theological or spiritual meaning.

More later, I have to get to work.

[rkwright]

Good start...

I'll have to check but I think the book I'm using translates evil as sin, and culpa as moral wrong. Though the book has a third category called "evil" - evil as all bad acts or substances.

[rkwright]

I hate to bump it again... but I'm working on a paper due monday... insight appreciated!

[kafka]

[quote name='rkwright' date='22 October 2009 - 10:26 PM' timestamp='1256264779' post='1990002']
First question: Aquinas, following Augustine would point that evil is not a thing - it is a privation of goodness.

Now corruptibility is a privation, is it not? It would be better that things did not "die" in a physical sense.

If this is true, is it also right to say that everything in the world is "evil" in a sense? Can anything in this fallen world be full of goodness?

[/quote]

I'm not sure what you mean by 'things' and the 'world'

if you are refering to plants, animals, etc. they are not evil in that they corrupt since they are mortal by nature. It is fitting that they corrupt and die. It is God's plan for sustaining the Earth's environment.

if you are referring to the body of human nature, I would say that it is evil in a broad sense of the term. The corruptibility of the body is an imperfection, a lack of goodness and fulness. So it is evil in a broad sense but not intrinsically evil since it is a temple of the Holy (for those living in grace) and the vessel of good deeds of the just.


I am kind of confused by your second question could you clarify?

Edited October 24, 2009 by kafka

[kafka]

[quote name='rkwright' date='22 October 2009 - 10:26 PM' timestamp='1256264779' post='1990002']

Second question: Aquinas teaches that sin can reside in external acts. Moral wrongs, a subset of sin, lie in the will. Thus one can commit a "sinful" external act with good intentions (Aquinas uses the example of killing for sinners for God's glory - maybe something like an abortion bomber or something...). This is where the idea of intrinsically evil acts come into play.

But Aquinas is firm on the point that it is moral wrongs on which we are judged. He "imputes" the sinfulness of an intrinsically evil external act to the sinner, no matter the intention. My question is how... How does a sinful action with a good intention "transfer" to the person. Obviously God judges people not actions - God sends people to hell not actions (this may sound ridiculous, but it makes the point that sinful actions must be "transfered" to the sinner and not merely remain in the action). My question is how? This is addressed in the De Malo of Aquinas, which I have a copy of... but sadly don't fully understand it.
[/quote]
I thought of something.

I think Aquinas is a little off here on his moral theology.

A person chooses a sinful moral object even if he has a good intention and the good consequences outweigh the bad. The choice is set forth from the principle of freedom. The external sinful act does not transfer back into the sinner, it proceeds from the sinner. The sinner determines himself through his sin. The sinner actualizes himself through the sinful action. Not vice versa.

make sense or no?

I will be back tommorrow for a little bit.

[rkwright]

[quote name='kafka' date='24 October 2009 - 04:29 PM' timestamp='1256419740' post='1990788']
I thought of something.

I think Aquinas is a little off here on his moral theology.

A person chooses a sinful moral object even if he has a good intention and the good consequences outweigh the bad. The choice is set forth from the principle of freedom. The external sinful act does not transfer back into the sinner, it proceeds from the sinner. The sinner determines himself through his sin. The sinner actualizes himself through the sinful action. Not vice versa.

make sense or no?

I will be back tommorrow for a little bit.
[/quote]

That helps some. Your analysis might make Aquinas a little clearer, I'm not sure if hes off on the moral theology. Aquinas definitely states that the culpa or moral wrong lies in the will of the person.

So if a person has good intentions but a bad act comes from those intentions, the sinner "actualizes himself through the sinful action" to use your language. Thus we can say the intention was good but the act was evil (as Aquinas does). The act proceeds from the will so the evil can be attributed to the will as well.

Likewise if one has a bad intention but performs a good action we would not excuse culpability.

[kafka]

[quote name='rkwright' date='25 October 2009 - 05:07 PM' timestamp='1256504857' post='1991163']
That helps some. Your analysis might make Aquinas a little clearer, I'm not sure if hes off on the moral theology. Aquinas definitely states that the culpa or moral wrong lies in the will of the person.

So if a person has good intentions but a bad act comes from those intentions, the sinner "actualizes himself through the sinful action" to use your language. Thus we can say the intention was good but the act was evil (as Aquinas does). The act proceeds from the will so the evil can be attributed to the will as well.

Likewise if one has a bad intention but performs a good action we would not excuse culpability.
[/quote]
Yes and one who chooses to seriously sin damages his own freedom by driving out God's grace. So his free will is damaged or evil since it lacks the state of grace, however as long as he is alive he is free to repent, therefore his soul is not intrinsically evil.
The only other thing I can make of intrinsic evil 'transfering' to the sinner is a person who dies unrepent. In his act of unrepentant death he absolutely and irrevocably
determines his state of sin, thus in my theological opinion he is in a sense becomes intrinsically evil, even though he retains the goodness of being created by God.

This also might help you:


all human actions fall under three fonts of morality:

The three fonts of morality are:
1. the intention or purpose for which the act is done
2. the act itself with its inherent moral meaning as determined by the its moral object
3. the circumstances, especially the consequences of the act

If one of them is bad the entire act is immoral.

Veritatis Splendor
80. Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature "incapable of being ordered" to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church's moral tradition, have been termed "intrinsically evil" (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object [moral object], and quite apart from the ulterior intentions [first font] of the one acting and the circumstances [third font]. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that "there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object".

Edited October 25, 2009 by kafka

[rkwright]

[quote name='kafka' date='25 October 2009 - 04:35 PM' timestamp='1256506508' post='1991173']
Yes and one who chooses to seriously sin damages his own freedom by driving out God's grace. So his free will is damaged or evil since it lacks the state of grace, however as long as he is alive he is free to repent, therefore his soul is not intrinsically evil.
The only other thing I can make of intrinsic evil 'transfering' to the sinner is a person who dies unrepent. In his act of unrepentant death he absolutely and irrevocably
determines his state of sin, thus in my theological opinion he is in a sense becomes intrinsically evil, even though he retains the goodness of being created by God.

This also might help you:


all human actions fall under three fonts of morality:

The three fonts of morality are:
1. the intention or purpose for which the act is done
2. the act itself with its inherent moral meaning as determined by the its moral object
3. the circumstances, especially the consequences of the act

If one of them is bad the entire act is immoral.

Veritatis Splendor
80. Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature "incapable of being ordered" to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church's moral tradition, have been termed "intrinsically evil" (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object [moral object], and quite apart from the ulterior intentions [first font] of the one acting and the circumstances [third font]. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that "there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object".
[/quote]
Do you have a cite on that? I would like to use that in my paper if possible.

I think we're pretty much in agreement here, and from my understanding Aquinas is as well. My question dealt with how intrinsically evil acts "transfer" to the will. God does not "judge acts" - that is to say God does not send the act of murdering someone to hell. God judges the sinner - God sends the murderer to hell. But like you said the act proceeds from the will so that the sin is ultimately "found" in the will.

Let me pitch this hypo, because I'm stuck on this: Say A is about to kill B. You decide to defend B by shooting A. You shoot and A, kill A in defense of B. Seems like the intention was good and the act itself was not intrinsically evil since it was shooting someone to defend someone else. Now lets change it... what if you miss and hit the innocent B in the process killing B. Now the intention looks like defense, but the act looks like killing an innocent.

Within our framework, how do we get out of this dilemma?

[kafka]

[quote name='rkwright' date='25 October 2009 - 08:47 PM' timestamp='1256518068' post='1991249']
Do you have a cite on that? I would like to use that in my paper if possible.

I think we're pretty much in agreement here, and from my understanding Aquinas is as well. My question dealt with how intrinsically evil acts "transfer" to the will. God does not "judge acts" - that is to say God does not send the act of murdering someone to hell. God judges the sinner - God sends the murderer to hell. But like you said the act proceeds from the will so that the sin is ultimately "found" in the will.

Let me pitch this hypo, because I'm stuck on this: Say A is about to kill B. You decide to defend B by shooting A. You shoot and A, kill A in defense of B. Seems like the intention was good and the act itself was not intrinsically evil since it was shooting someone to defend someone else. Now lets change it... what if you miss and hit the innocent B in the process killing B. Now the intention looks like defense, but the act looks like killing an innocent.

Within our framework, how do we get out of this dilemma?
[/quote]
I'm sorry I dont have a citation. The three fonts are indirectly expressed in Veritatis Splendor. The theologian Conte has written about them on his webpage, but he hasnt finished his book on moral theology yet. I believe Germain Grisez http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germain_Grisez goes into them in someway in his moral theology work the Way of the Lord Jesus here http://www.twotlj.org/ however I dont have time to peruse his work.

As far as the scenario, the intention was still good (though he might have to prove so in court) the moral object was good, however perhaps he did not way the consequences well enough since he missed, perhaps he didnt take into account a poor shot, or the difficulty of the shot, however it would be hard to impute guilt on him since it would probably have been a split second decision.