The Will To Believe

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote name='Justified Saint' post='1115965' date='Nov 9 2006, 11:41 AM']
A valid meditation for a believer, but you would have to presuppose the existence of God for any of those categorical distinctions to hold water.

I suspect people don't go around thinking "I am hungry, therefore I am a contingent being. There must be something out there that isn't hungry, we will call that necessary being." Sure people can think like that, but only after they believe in God.
[/quote]

I disagree wholeheartedly.

One need not believe in God in order to make sense of the concepts of contingent or necessary being. Even the atheist can understand the meaning of the terms. Moreover, the atheist will readily admit that contingent beings exist. The point upon which the atheist disagrees is whether or not a necessary being exists. The purpose of the cosmological argument is to show that if one asserts the existence of contingent being, this assertion necessarily presupposes that a necessary being exists.

Now, if you think (as you seem to assert) that the cosmological argument begs the question, then the burden of proof lies with you. Rather than simply asserting that one must believe in God in order to make this a "valid meditation," perhaps you would like to point out where you think the fallacy in the actual argument lies?

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[SJP]

Where did Goetian go?

[Aloysius]

left because we were too stringent about stuff like incest being wrong

[Justified Saint]

[quote name='JeffCR07' post='1116446' date='Nov 9 2006, 08:33 PM']
I disagree wholeheartedly.

One need not believe in God in order to make sense of the concepts of contingent or necessary being. Even the atheist can understand the meaning of the terms. Moreover, the atheist will readily admit that contingent beings exist. The point upon which the atheist disagrees is whether or not a necessary being exists. The purpose of the cosmological argument is to show that if one asserts the existence of contingent being, this assertion necessarily presupposes that a necessary being exists.

Now, if you think (as you seem to assert) that the cosmological argument begs the question, then the burden of proof lies with you. Rather than simply asserting that one must believe in God in order to make this a "valid meditation," perhaps you would like to point out where you think the fallacy in the actual argument lies?

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff
[/quote]

It is question begging because the argument is suppose to have some kind of irresistible logic that puts the atheist in a contradiction, a contradiction that you have gone on to explain. Yet, one can affirm the phenomenon without falling into presuppositional metaphysical traps. Contingent and necessary are already metaphysical claims and thus essentially presuppositional (as you yourself seem to admit). That's great and fine, but I doubt you will be convincing many non-believers with that kind of reasoning.

[Guest JeffCR07]

First, I want to apologize for the combattive nature of the above post. I was re-reading it and it came off more harshly than it was intended to be. Second, I want to address the issue at hand:

First, we must distinguish between the defining of metaphysical categories and the [i]existence[/i] of those metaphysical categories. Definitions are not presuppositions, and that is a critical point to understand. Any philosopher is permitted to define terms without being accused of presupposing anything.

Now, with this understood, the argument is clearly [i]not[/i] question begging. The argument defines the terms "contingent" and "necessary" being. We then look around and see, through empirical evidence, that at least [i]one[/i] of those two categories exists: contingent being. The argument then goes on to show that, granted the existence of contingent being and the definition of contingent and necessary being, there must be a necessary being that exists.

If you really are committed to the assertion of question begging, you would do better if you took to a Kantian critique and argued that the cosmological argument depends on the ontological argument, and then argue that the ontological argument doesnt work.

Won't get much sympathy from me though, considering I think Kant is wrong and the ontological argument works

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[Justified Saint]

[quote name='JeffCR07' post='1116733' date='Nov 10 2006, 08:24 AM']

The argument is clearly [i]not[/i] question begging. The argument defines the terms "contingent" and "necessary" being. We then look around and see, through empirical evidence, that at least [i]one[/i] of those two categories exists: contingent being. The argument then goes on to show that, granted the existence of contingent being and the definition of contingent and necessary being, there must be a necessary being that exists.
[/quote]

But that is the essence of question begging. You haven't proven the valdity of that distinction of being (it is the same as the Platonic distinction of becoming and being) it is a philosophical speculation. You can't then take into the "real" world and say "A ha! That looks like what we call contingent being so there must be necessary being!" It's circular reasoning -- you presuppose the very thing that the empirical evidence is suppose to prove. And that is the fallacy, contingent being needs empirical evidence but necessary being doesn't because it is by definition presupposed -- I suppose you find that convincing but I just think its a double-standard.

To be sure, I am not saying that isn't a valid line of reason, indeed in a certain sense all our reasoning is circular, but you can't then back it up with that kind of metaphysical robustness.

There is a reason why theologians and committed believers come up with these arguments and "proofs".

[Guest JeffCR07]

and again, I disagree, primarily because you seem to be confusing what it is to define terms and what it is to make an existential assumption. The former is possible without the latter.

Perhaps an example will help:

****

Let us define a "galfirrd" as a member of a species of mammal that is utterly incapable of locomotion. Now by merely defining this term, I have made no existential claims regarding it. I am not saying that there are any galfirrd's in the world. Rather, I am saying that [i]if[/i] a galfirrd exists at all, then it will be a member of a species of mammal that is utterly incapable of locomotion.

Now, the next step is to see if a galfirrd actually exists, and that is done by empirically observing our world in order to see if there are any beings that fit this definition. We find that there are not, and so we conclude that a "galfirrd" - though certainly conceivable - does not actually exist.

****

What has been done above is different from the argument that I gave in previous posts only with respect to the fact that, unlike the "galfirrd," we find through empirical observation that "contingent being" really [i]does[/i] exist. There [i]are[/i] things that perfectly fit the definition of "contingent being." This is important, because the first time any existential claims enter the picture in my previous argument is at the point of empirical observation, not the point of definitions.

The process of defining terms is, by its very nature, not a process that contains or entails any existential claims. Thus, it seems puzzling to me that your objection rests on the perceived point that somehow defining terms like "contingent being" or "necessary being" is making an existential presupposition.





Oh, and PS, "all arguments are in some way circular" is only really true if you are a Hegelian and dont acknowledge self-evident and undeniable truths :

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[Justified Saint]

Jeff,

Thank you for your further clarification, perhaps I have not been as clear since I still see my original objection as roughly right.

The problem I see with your example is that it doesn't include an instance of a dichotomous relationship that contingent and necessary being constitute. Therefore, when you go looking for your real life examples of contingent being you see quite a few, but none of necessary being. But it turns out that doesn't matter since by definition contingent being presupposes necessary being. And you know how the argument goes -- we don't have any empirical evidence for necessary being but it [i]must[/i] exist since contingent being exists (through empirical observation).

Well, that is completely circular since you have presupposed the existential relationship between contingent and necessary being based off its defintional character (that is to say the existence of a collection of phenenomas that you identify as contingent being presupposes the existence of necessary being by definition). As I see it, there is no logical justification for asserting the existence of God based off that reasoning.

It would be like me thinking up of something in my head that looks similar to the human species. Yet, I find it hard to believe in my mind that humans are the only form of intelligent life so I reason that there must be some kind of other intelligent life form to counter and balance out intelligence between the two species (let's call that "supra-frill". I go out looking for real examples of my two species and I see that there are quite a lot of examples of these things called humans, but I have seen nothing of the other species. However, because of definitional and logical purity, this other species must exist in order to neutralize humans since humans exist.

Furthermore, the fact that the existence of God would first be conceived in a vacuum should be suspect enough. And that is the short of it -- it is naive to suppose that you could ever think and philosophize in a vacuum.

[Guest JeffCR07]

This further clarification helps a lot because it shows where I think your thinking has gone wrong, and perhaps that is my fault in not being sufficiently clear in my explanation of the argument. Contingent being in itself does not conceptually presuppose necessary being (i.e. there is no existential claim). However, when faced with the existence of contingent being, we see that it cannot provide a sufficient explanation of its own existence. Thus, the sheer fact of contingent being presents us with a [i]choice[/i]. Either contingent being as a whole is explained in reference to necessary being, or we simply say that there is no sufficient reason for contingent being.

Thus, it is not necessary for someone, when confronted with the reality of contingent being, to assert the existence of necessary being. This is true precisely because the definition and conception of contingent being does not logically entail or contain necessary being. However, to assert the existence of contingent being while denying the existence of necessary being will leave one in a position in which the existence of contingent being is utterly inexplicable at any level. Moreover, the point at which we simply stop looking for causes is the point at which philosophy proverbially throws up its hands and says "I quit."

Thus, the argument from contingency is not one in which the concept of contingency itself is rooted in the concept of necessity, but rather, the argument is that [i]if[/i] one believes that we ought not stop asking questions until we are provided with a sufficient answer, then it follows that the sheer fact of contingency will lead us logically to conclude that necessary being must exist.


****

I'll respond to your "philosophize in a vacuum" comment later

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[SJP]

The First Cause Argument

The most famous of all arguments for the existence of God are the "five ways" of Saint Thomas Aquinas. One of the five ways, the fifth, is the argument from design, which we looked at in the last essay. The other four are versions of the first-cause argument, which we explore here.

The argument is basically very simple, natural, intuitive, and commonsensical. We have to become complex and clever in order to doubt or dispute it. It is based on an instinct of mind that we all share: the instinct that says everything needs an explanation. Nothing just is without a reason why it is. Everything that is has some adequate or sufficient reason why it is.

Philosophers call this the Principle of Sufficient Reason. We use it every day, in common sense and in science as well as in philosophy and theology. If we saw a rabbit suddenly appear on an empty table, we would not blandly say, "Hi, rabbit. You came from nowhere, didn't you?" No, we would look for a cause, assuming there has to be one. Did the rabbit fall from the ceiling? Did a magician put it there when we weren't looking? If there seems to be no physical cause, we look for a psychological cause: perhaps someone hypnotized us. As a last resort, we look for a supernatural cause, a miracle. But there must be some cause. We never deny the Principle of Sufficient Reason itself. No one believes the Pop Theory: that things just pop into existence for no reason at all. Perhaps we will never find the cause, but there must be a cause for everything that comes into existence.



If there is no first cause, then the universe is like a great chain with many links; each link is held up by the link above it, but the whole chain is held up by nothing.

Now the whole universe is a vast, interlocking chain of things that come into existence. Each of these things must therefore have a cause. My parents caused me, my grandparents caused them, et cetera. But it is not that simple. I would not be here without billions of causes, from the Big Bang through the cooling of the galaxies and the evolution of the protein molecule to the marriages of my ancestors. The universe is a vast and complex chain of causes. But does the universe as a whole have a cause? Is there a first cause, an uncaused cause, a transcendent cause of the whole chain of causes? If not, then there is an infinite regress of causes, with no first link in the great cosmic chain. If so, then there is an eternal, necessary, independent, self-explanatory being with nothing above it, before it, or supporting it. It would have to explain itself as well as everything else, for if it needed something else as its explanation, its reason, its cause, then it would not be the first and uncaused cause. Such a being would have to be God, of course. If we can prove there is such a first cause, we will have proved there is a God.

Why must there be a first cause? Because if there isn't, then the whole universe is unexplained, and we have violated our Principle of Sufficient Reason for everything. If there is no first cause, each particular thing in the universe is explained in the short run, or proximately, by some other thing, but nothing is explained in the long run, or ultimately, and the universe as a whole is not explained. Everyone and everything says in turn, "Don't look to me for the final explanation. I'm just an instrument. Something else caused me." If that's all there is, then we have an endless passing of the buck. God is the one who says, "The buck stops here."

If there is no first cause, then the universe is like a great chain with many links; each link is held up by the link above it, but the whole chain is held up by nothing. If there is no first cause, then the universe is like a railroad train moving without an engine. Each car's motion is explained proximately by the motion of the car in front of it: the caboose moves because the boxcar pulls it, the boxcar moves because the cattle car pulls it, et cetera. But there is no engine to pull the first car and the whole train. That would be impossible, of course. But that is what the universe is like if there is no first cause: impossible.

Here is one more analogy. Suppose I tell you there is a book that explains everything you want explained. You want that book very much. You ask me whether I have it. I say no, I have to get it from my wife. Does she have it? No, she has to get it from a neighbor. Does he have it? No, he has to get it from his teacher, who has to get it. . . et cetera, etcetera, ad infinitum. No one actually has the book. In that case, you will never get it. However long or short the chain of book borrowers may be, you will get the book only if someone actually has it and does not have to borrow it. Well, existence is like that book. Existence is handed down the chain of causes, from cause to effect. If there is no first cause, no being who is eternal and self-sufficient, no being who has existence by his own nature and does not have to borrow it from someone else, then the gift of existence can never be passed down the chain to others, and no one will ever get it. But we did get it. We exist. We got the gift of existence from our causes, down the chain, and so did every actual being in the universe, from atoms to archangels. Therefore there must be a first cause of existence, a God.



If there is no independent being, then the whole chain of dependent beings is dependent on nothing and could not exist.

In more abstract philosophical language, the proof goes this way. Every being that exists either exists by itself, by its own essence or nature, or it does not exist by itself. If it exists by its own essence, then it exists necessarily and eternally, and explains itself. It cannot not exist, as a triangle cannot not have three sides. If, on the other hand, a being exists but not by its own essence, then it needs a cause, a reason outside itself for its existence. Because it does not explain itself, something else must explain it. Beings whose essence does not contain the reason for their existence, beings that need causes, are called contingent, or dependent, beings. A being whose essence is to exist is called a necessary being. The universe contains only contingent beings. God would be the only necessary being—if God existed. Does he? Does a necessary being exist? Here is the proof that it does. Dependent beings cannot cause themselves. They are dependent on their causes. If there is no independent being, then the whole chain of dependent beings is dependent on nothing and could not exist. But they do exist. Therefore there is an independent being.


[url="http://www.peterkreeft.com/topics/first-cause.htm"]http://www.peterkreeft.com/topics/first-cause.htm[/url]

[Justified Saint]

[quote name='JeffCR07' post='1118221' date='Nov 12 2006, 11:31 AM']
This further clarification helps a lot because it shows where I think your thinking has gone wrong, and perhaps that is my fault in not being sufficiently clear in my explanation of the argument. Contingent being in itself does not conceptually presuppose necessary being (i.e. there is no existential claim). However, when faced with the existence of contingent being, we see that it cannot provide a sufficient explanation of its own existence. Thus, the sheer fact of contingent being presents us with a [i]choice[/i]. Either contingent being as a whole is explained in reference to necessary being, or we simply say that there is no sufficient reason for contingent being.

Thus, it is not necessary for someone, when confronted with the reality of contingent being, to assert the existence of necessary being. This is true precisely because the definition and conception of contingent being does not logically entail or contain necessary being. However, to assert the existence of contingent being while denying the existence of necessary being will leave one in a position in which the existence of contingent being is utterly inexplicable at any level. Moreover, the point at which we simply stop looking for causes is the point at which philosophy proverbially throws up its hands and says "I quit."

Thus, the argument from contingency is not one in which the concept of contingency itself is rooted in the concept of necessity, but rather, the argument is that [i]if[/i] one believes that we ought not stop asking questions until we are provided with a sufficient answer, then it follows that the sheer fact of contingency will lead us logically to conclude that necessary being must exist.
****

I'll respond to your "philosophize in a vacuum" comment later

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff
[/quote]

Jeff, I appreciate the precision you give to your distinctions, however, I feel that in this case they fail overturn my own suspicions -- in fact they tend to confirm them. You are saying that surely one who accepts the existence of contingent being doesn't have to accept the existence of necessary being -- they have a choice as you put it. But the whole force of the argument is to say that if you make that choice then you are being illogical and are caught in a contradiction. From the start the argument is complicated by an inherently dichotomous relationship that makes the term "contingency" itself very problematic. The whole point of the argument is to validate the definitional relationship by force of reason and without sufficient empirical data. That is to say, in the absence of the necessary empirical proof, the definitional explication grounds the existential claim. You may deny this, but I remain convinced that this is its rhetorical disposition.

Since I believe in God, I might fight that a rather useful way of thinking about God, but again, if you are trying to "prove" the existence of God to a non-believer then it remains hopelessly circular much in the same way I have been describing.

Furthermore, I had thought it good socratic wisdom to remember that the more we know the more we don't know. Personally, I don't conceive of the world in a series of progressive logical axioms that we discover as we investigate the "chain of Being." Of course it matters to always ask questions, but that presupposes that you are asking the right questions. Poor questions lead to poor answers.