Eternal Creator, eternally creating?

[Myles Domini]

[quote name='Theoketos' post='1010490' date='Jun 22 2006, 09:31 PM']
I was going to ask the same question, would that not mean there was a time when the Son was not? Do I hear Athanzius spinning in his grave?
[/quote]

I agree that creation is not subsequent to God, there cannot be a subsequent from God's point of view because God does not experience time. This is why St Augustine ridiculues the query "what was God doing before He created the world". A timeless God does not experience before. Yet for the sake of the created intellect we have to express what happened in these terms because we cannot possibly imagine how God can eternally be anyway ne'er mind eternally act.

My initial query hinges upon the fact that creation as I understand it is not one of God's act ad intra its one of God's act ad extra. Essentially God is self subsistent being which gives Him an absolute potency. All potentiality is actualised within the Divine essence. It is natural for God to be these things and indeed impossible for Him not to be these things. Creator is not something that God is ad intra nor is it something God needs to be. God by His nature needs to will goodness to the uttermost extent because He is omnibenvolent. In other words He must will His own existence not the existence of anything else as I think St Thomas Aquinas makes clear in [url="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/101910.htm"]Sum.Theol.1.19.10[/url]. There is absolutely no neccessity in God creating the world even though from His timeless perspective it happened as soon as He was/is/will be. Creator is something God choose to be by His own free will and God would still be God without having created anything since He need only will Himself and He cannot fail to do so since on His part its involuntary.

--------------------------------------------
[url="http://catholictradition.blogspot.com/2005_03_01_catholictradition_archive.html#111126589836989156"]On divine simplicity: an answer to Perry Robinson by Dr Philip Blosser[/url] covers all this in a clearer and more curt manner than I am capable of.

[mortify]

I read somewhere that God does not have things, He is the thing itself in perfection; thus, He does not have love, He is Love.

I'm wondering whether this is true for anger, hate, etc...Is God anger and hate? Or is it only certain things that can claim to be His nature.

[Justified Saint]

The JPII quote provided by Era Might is truly beautiful.

Jeff,

Your points about nature and natural are just a little too subtle for me which I think only shows the impossibility of speaking of man's nature in any kind of exhaustive sense. I think JPII's point couldn't be more exact, that work is one of the most important (if not the only) thing that separates humanity from the rest of creation, and thus "constitutes its very nature." If the Holy Father meant something different by nature than the scholastics, I don't doubt it and all the better for it.

[Myles Domini]

[quote name='mortify' post='1010627' date='Jun 22 2006, 11:26 PM']
I read somewhere that God does not have things, He is the thing itself in perfection; thus, He does not have love, He is Love.

I'm wondering whether this is true for anger, hate, etc...Is God anger and hate? Or is it only certain things that can claim to be His nature.
[/quote]

God cannot be evil since evil is a privation of some good, that is the absence of some substance (thing) that should be present. Making evil in reality 'no thing'.

[rkwright]

[quote name='Justified Saint' post='1010653' date='Jun 22 2006, 05:40 PM']
The JPII quote provided by Era Might is truly beautiful.

Jeff,

Your points about nature and natural are just a little too subtle for me which I think only shows the impossibility of speaking of man's nature in any kind of exhaustive sense. I think JPII's point couldn't be more exact, that work is one of the most important (if not the only) thing that separates humanity from the rest of creation, and thus "constitutes its very nature." If the Holy Father meant something different by nature than the scholastics, I don't doubt it and all the better for it.
[/quote]

When you start to tackle difficult topics like 'Eternal Creator, eternally creating' its important to make sure everyone is talking the same language and on the same page. If what you mean by 'nature' when talking about God or man or anything in creation isn't the usage that Jeff, Myles, Aquinas, or the other scholastics are using you will run into problems.

The difference seems subtle, but again its important. The common defination of nature leads to things like 'Creator is His Nature' (see Myle's post above on Creator by Nature)

Now Myles would Anselm say that it is 'necessary'(still a free choice) that God creates? In order to maintain uprightness for the sake of uprightness? Creation following from His goodness?

Sorry if thats a bit incoherent, its late, I'm on the road, and can't think very well after these long days...

[Justified Saint]

[quote name='rkwright' post='1010785' date='Jun 22 2006, 08:41 PM']
When you start to tackle difficult topics like 'Eternal Creator, eternally creating' its important to make sure everyone is talking the same language and on the same page. If what you mean by 'nature' when talking about God or man or anything in creation isn't the usage that Jeff, Myles, Aquinas, or the other scholastics are using you will run into problems.

The difference seems subtle, but again its important. The common defination of nature leads to things like 'Creator is His Nature' (see Myle's post above on Creator by Nature)

Now Myles would Anselm say that it is 'necessary'(still a free choice) that God creates? In order to maintain uprightness for the sake of uprightness? Creation following from His goodness?

Sorry if thats a bit incoherent, its late, I'm on the road, and can't think very well after these long days...
[/quote]

I don't doubt the distinctions you make, perhaps I only meant to make a provocation that there is not simply one form of discourse that exhausts the issue, even if the topic was framed in Aristotelian/Thomistic language. Should the Holy Father be of a similar mind then I would consider myself in good company.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote name='Myles Domini' post='1010566' date='Jun 22 2006, 04:07 PM']
I agree that creation is not subsequent to God, there cannot be a subsequent from God's point of view because God does not experience time. This is why St Augustine ridiculues the query "what was God doing before He created the world". A timeless God does not experience before. Yet for the sake of the created intellect we have to express what happened in these terms because we cannot possibly imagine how God can eternally be anyway ne'er mind eternally act.

My initial query hinges upon the fact that creation as I understand it is not one of God's act ad intra its one of God's act ad extra. Essentially God is self subsistent being which gives Him an absolute potency. All potentiality is actualised within the Divine essence. It is natural for God to be these things and indeed impossible for Him not to be these things. Creator is not something that God is ad intra nor is it something God needs to be. God by His nature needs to will goodness to the uttermost extent because He is omnibenvolent. In other words He must will His own existence not the existence of anything else as I think St Thomas Aquinas makes clear in [url="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/101910.htm"]Sum.Theol.1.19.10[/url]. There is absolutely no neccessity in God creating the world even though from His timeless perspective it happened as soon as He was/is/will be. Creator is something God choose to be by His own free will and God would still be God without having created anything since He need only will Himself and He cannot fail to do so since on His part its involuntary.
[/quote]

Myles, this is a good analysis of the Thomistic response. The following, from the Prima Pars, Question 19, Article 3 will also help:

[quote]I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.[/quote]

Now, here is the difficulty that I pose. I do not pretend to have an answer, but rather, I offer it up for reflection and debate:

Let us assume, contrary to Augustine, Anselm, and the other Christian Platonists, that God could have done otherwise than make the world. If this is true, then "Creator" is not God's Nature. However, if "Creator" can be predicated of God, but is not identical with God's Nature, then it follows that "Creator" is predicated of God accidentally, but not essentially. But there are no accidents in God. So, how is this problem to be solved?


Let the Quodlibet begin :

[Myles Domini]

[quote name='JeffCR07' post='1010857' date='Jun 23 2006, 12:28 PM']
Myles, this is a good analysis of the Thomistic response. The following, from the Prima Pars, Question 19, Article 3 will also help:
Now, here is the difficulty that I pose. I do not pretend to have an answer, but rather, I offer it up for reflection and debate:

Let us assume, contrary to Augustine, Anselm, and the other Christian Platonists, that God could have done otherwise than make the world. If this is true, then "Creator" is not God's Nature. However, if "Creator" can be predicated of God, but is not identical with God's Nature, then it follows that "Creator" is predicated of God accidentally, but not essentially. But there are no accidents in God. So, how is this problem to be solved?
Let the Quodlibet begin :
[/quote]

Let me have a think about that...

[Guest JeffCR07]

hahaha, I love it, this is when it starts getting fun :

[Myles Domini]

I'm still in the middle of the calculative process but something just occured to me Jeff that I felt pressed to ask. Are you saying that anything that God does by neccessity must be essential to Him? What about his acts within the economy? Are you saying that God could not possibly be God had He not, for instance, given man a supernatural ends? It seems to me that you're saying that whatever God has done defines Him essentially. This places a great deal of neccessity upon God and makes even the formal knowledge of something like a natural beatitude illogical and incoherent. Not to mention making redemeption and, above all, sanctification loose an element of their gratitutousness.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote name='Myles Domini' post='1011031' date='Jun 23 2006, 01:45 PM']
I'm still in the middle of the calculative process but something just occured to me Jeff that I felt pressed to ask. Are you saying that anything that God does by neccessity must be essential to Him? What about his acts within the economy? Are you saying that God could not possibly be God had He not, for instance, given man a supernatural ends? It seems to me that you're saying that whatever God has done defines Him essentially. This places a great deal of neccessity upon God and makes even the formal knowledge of something like a natural beatitude illogical and incoherent. Not to mention making redemeption and, above all, sanctification loose an element of their gratitutousness.
[/quote]

Two thoughts jump out at me, though I definately like where your critique is going.

1.) We must always remember that, as the Pseudo-Dionysius, St. Thomas, and most other Christian Theologians will affirm, the [i]via negativa[/i] is more fundamental than the [i]via positiva[/i]. As such, while we say that "God's Essence is His Existence or His Knowledge, or His Power, or His Will, etc." we are simultaneously predicating Hyper-Essence, Hyper-Existence, Hyper-Knowledge, Hyper-Power, Hyper-Will, etc.

Admittedly, this does not have huge relevance to the discussion at hand, since all those things which we predicate of God are true predications, but we must admit that they are necessarily [i]insufficient[/i] predications. God is always more than what we can say about Him, and keeping this in mind will keep us from undue rationalism.

2.) You ought to reflect on your notion of free will. It seems that you are struggling with the possibility of a Divine action being both gratuitous and necessary at the same time, and I think this stems from your view that free will is merely the potential to have done otherwise. I fundamentally disagree. I define free will as St. Anselm defines it: The ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake.

Now, God [i]is[/i] uprightness, and does all things for His own sake. Thus, God is necessarily free. Because I locate freedom not in the determination between multiple choices, but rather, in the capacity to do what ought to be done for its own sake, I am perfectly comfortable saying that everything God does is necessary and that everything God does is radically free.

Though I have been arguing along Anselmian lines, let me leave you with a question that is phrased in Thomistic lines:

If we assume, as it seems you do, that in order for an action of God's to really be gratuitous God must have been able to do otherwise then He had done, this leaves you in a sticky position. I am unsure if St. Thomas answered such a query as mine, and if he has, I welcome his answer! But it seems to me that this position forces you to say that God must have had the potential to do otherwise. But this means that there was in God a potentiality that was not actualized. But there is no potentiality in God, as God is Pure Act.

So, how does the Thomist respond?

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[Myles Domini]

[quote name='JeffCR07' post='1011054' date='Jun 23 2006, 09:46 PM']
Two thoughts jump out at me, though I definately like where your critique is going.

1.) We must always remember that, as the Pseudo-Dionysius, St. Thomas, and most other Christian Theologians will affirm, the [i]via negativa[/i] is more fundamental than the [i]via positiva[/i]. As such, while we say that "God's Essence is His Existence or His Knowledge, or His Power, or His Will, etc." we are simultaneously predicating Hyper-Essence, Hyper-Existence, Hyper-Knowledge, Hyper-Power, Hyper-Will, etc.

Admittedly, this does not have huge relevance to the discussion at hand, since all those things which we predicate of God are true predications, but we must admit that they are necessarily [i]insufficient[/i] predications. God is always more than what we can say about Him, and keeping this in mind will keep us from undue rationalism.

2.) You ought to reflect on your notion of free will. It seems that you are struggling with the possibility of a Divine action being both gratuitous and necessary at the same time, and I think this stems from your view that free will is merely the potential to have done otherwise. I fundamentally disagree. I define free will as St. Anselm defines it: The ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake.

Now, God [i]is[/i] uprightness, and does all things for His own sake. Thus, God is necessarily free. Because I locate freedom not in the determination between multiple choices, but rather, in the capacity to do what ought to be done for its own sake, I am perfectly comfortable saying that everything God does is necessary and that everything God does is radically free.

Though I have been arguing along Anselmian lines, let me leave you with a question that is phrased in Thomistic lines:

If we assume, as it seems you do, that in order for an action of God's to really be gratuitous God must have been able to do otherwise then He had done, this leaves you in a sticky position. I am unsure if St. Thomas answered such a query as mine, and if he has, I welcome his answer! But it seems to me that this position forces you to say that God must have had the potential to do otherwise. But this means that there was in God a potentiality that was not actualized. But there is no potentiality in God, as God is Pure Act.

So, how does the Thomist respond?

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff
[/quote]

The potentiality to do otherwise does not mean there is some possibility unactualised in God. Again I do not believe the line is being rightly drawn between God's acts ad intra and ad extra. There are many features of the created universe that could have been given a different from the fact that one can imagine a possible world where features of our world appear differently however does not impact upon God. That is because all possible potentiality finds its actualisation in the Divine essence itself. Saying God has absolute potency means that within Himself He already possesses to surpassing measure the potentiality that becomes [i]becoming[/i] in the act of creation. There are many things God may have done differently but that doesnt matter because no matter what He realised in creation would only be a pale reflection of its archetype, that is, Himself. The features of the world make becoming what in God is Being for God Himself is Being.

My notion of free will is that an action is free if it arises from nature uncoerced from outside with knowledge of the ends of that action. In that case I would be perfectly happy to say that God is freely omnibenevolent even though He couldn't possibly be anything other than all good willing. However, I hold that the economy itself is indeed a matter of choice for God which is not driven by something essential. Being [i]Being[/i] I see no reason why God should be pushed to create and St Thomas seems to agree in saying God must will only the Good, that is, Himself. The neccessity I see placed upon God by His nature is that He desire His own existence not that He create things that are being by participation.

I have no problem with an action being freely given yet unavoidable e.g. Christ Jesus' perfect correspondance with the will of the Father. What I do think though is that the way you are envisioning the economy as being determined by the nature of God rather than His will does in some way lessen the impact of the unexpectedness of the saving economy. I do not believe formal knowledge of a natural beatitude is incoherent hence it strikes me all the more that God chose to make man supernatural, reedem Him after He fell and sanctify Him thereafter.

[Guest JeffCR07]

That last paragraph for me is telling, as you seem to argue that there is an [i]ontological[/i], and not merely a conceptual, distinction between the Divine Nature and the Divine Will. But this, again, would admit of composition in God, who is simple.

Moreover, regarding your comments in the first paragraph, I still feel as if your response is not sufficient to defend your position. You are correct to point out that whatever world may or not be actualized, that world has its exemplar fully actualized within the reality of the Word. However, mere exemplarism is not an adequate account of Thomas' doctrine of God as Pure Act. Thomas (I believe rightly so) denies that there is any potentiality whatsoever in God. But you are attributing a potentiality to Him, namely, the unactualized potential of creating a world that is not this world. As long as you maintain that God [i]could have[/i] _____, it seems to me that you are necessarily and unavoidably attributing to God a potentiality.

Now I might have a tentative solution, but I need to you really tear into it so that we can work out any flaws:

It seems to me that the trouble comes from asking the question "could God have____" As you pointed out, we can coherently imagine a world that is not this one, so clearly this world is not [i]necessary[/i]. But, as I have pointed out, if God "could have" made another world, then this ascribes potentiality to God, which is impossible. Now perhaps a solution can be found in bringing to mind the eternal existence of God. With regards to God, who exists outside of time, or in an "eternal present" so to speak," we can meaningfully say that this world is necessary and there could be no other because God, who is identical to His Will and Power, in that eternal present wills this world to exist. As God is unchanging, so too is His Will and, given that there is only the "eternal present" for God, it follows that this world has eternally been the object of His Will. However, with regards to the world itself, which exists in time, we can meaningfully say that it is [i]not[/i] necessary, because there was nothing other than God's Will that caused this world to come into being, and nothing within the world itself necessitates its existence.

In a sense, my argument hinges on the distinction between subsequent and preceeding necessity. Subsequent Necessity being the necessity of "If x, then necessarilly, x" while Preceeding Necessity is the necessity of "Y necessarily causes X." Because God is eternal and outside of time, it is meaningless to talk about preceeding necessity with regards to God. In fact, it would even be wrong to attribute the Divine Knowledge as being the cause of the Divine Will, because that would make the former logically prior to the latter. Rather, the Divine Knowledge [i]is[/i] the Divine Will. Thus, there is only subsequent necessity with reference to God Himself, and, as such, we must say that everything God does is necessary - not because something makes it so, but rather, just because it is, in fact, so.

With this in mind, I will have to correct my previous posts of that error. It is true that everything God does is necessary, but not [i]because of[/i] the Divine Nature, or Divine Knowledge, or Divine Will. Rather, all God does and all God is is one, simple Act, and it is necessary simply because it [i]is[/i].

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[rkwright]

[quote name='Myles Domini' post='1011070' date='Jun 23 2006, 04:26 PM']
My notion of free will is that an action is free if it arises from nature uncoerced from outside with knowledge of the ends of that action. In that case I would be perfectly happy to say that God is freely omnibenevolent even though He couldn't possibly be anything other than all good willing. However, I hold that the economy itself is indeed a matter of choice for God which is not driven by something essential. Being [i]Being[/i] I see no reason why God should be pushed to create and St Thomas seems to agree in saying God must will only the Good, that is, Himself. The neccessity I see placed upon God by His nature is that He desire His own existence not that He create things that are being by participation.
[/quote]

If God neccessarily only desires His own existence, and so really has a freedom of indifference towards this world or creating another one, or creating me the way I am vs a piece of dust, how are we to better understand God's love? Does this point away from theism and more towards a purposeless action?

From Katherin Roger's article Jeff posted in another thread...

[quote]...divine freedom of indifference with regard to creation reintroduces unreason at the very source of things... If God’s love might equally have issues in a world of dust or nothing, then it is hard to see what that love means to us...[/quote]

[Guest JeffCR07]

rkwright, it is important to remind ourselves that God being His own end does not mean that we must attribute freedom of indifference to God. Indeed, Kate's article (or, Dr. Rogers' article, if we are going to be proper) does not deny the fact that God has no desire outside of Himself. In fact, she makes this point explicitly clear in another work of hers: [u]The Neoplatonic Metaphysics and Epistemology of Anselm of Canturbury[/u].

What she means by "freedom of indifference" is the assertion that God "could have" created a world besides our own just as easily. She maintains that God [i]must[/i] have created this world because He is Omniscient and Omnipotent, and, as such, if there is a best-possible-world to create, He must create it - otherwise, He would not be God. She then argues that if this is [i]not[/i] the best possible world, then either God could have created a better one, but did not, or there were a number of equals that God arbitrarily picked from. She finds both of these alternatives unacceptable because, in the case of the first, it means that God willed to do less-than-the-best (violating his omnibenevolence) and in the second case it means that God acted without Reason, which is impossible. Thus, she concludes that God created this world because it was the best world and, since He always does what is best, then this was the only world He could have created.

Now, the argument I have laid out above would reject both her and the typical Thomistic/freedom-of-indifference response, precisely because she is arguing that God's Divine Will is acting "according to" or on account of" the Divine Reason or Divine Knowledge. If we remember that God is outside of time, and that He is ontologically One, then we see that the Divine Reason and Divine Will are actually the same, and so one cannot precede the other, even logically. Thus, there is no "could have" or "might have" with God, only what He does and is. This, perhaps, could lead to some interesting insight regarding the Divine Name: I AM WHO AM

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff