Greek Orthodox relations question

[Laudate_Dominum]

[quote name='Myles Domini' post='979269' date='May 12 2006, 11:41 AM']
Hey ya Todd can you please outline the Triadological and Christological problems that a failure to make the essence/energies distinction entails?

Thanks
-M-
[/quote]
This weekend I'd like to outline the Triadological and Christological problems that the essence/energies distinction brings about (assuming someone doesn't beat me to it). The point is that you won't find a theological synthesis that has no problematics (and the validity of Todd's problems outlined above is yet to be discussed). Historically east and west have grossly misunderstood and misjudged each others theological traditions. If a latin critiques eastern theology the canned answer seemed to be that "they don't understand it in the first place". I'd say this can go both ways. Many orthodox seem to think that Catholic theology is still in the 13th century and that the theological problematics they bring to the table are somehow beyond anything a western theologian, stuck in the shackles of Aristotle, had ever have conceived.

Ok, I'm done being snide.. and I'm out of here for real this time.. I just had to come back for a second..

(btw, I'm only doing this because I miss your posts Todd.. yer the man. )

[Apotheoun]

The continuation of [url="http://www.phatmass.com/phorum/index.php?s=&showtopic=52356&view=findpost&p=979371"]Post number 29[/url]:

(5) The failure to make a distinction between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] in Christology can -- depending upon the case -- lead to Nestorianism or Monophysitism and Monothelitism.

Now, if one posits the idea that [i]hypostasis[/i] and essence ([i]ousia[/i]) are identical, it follows that because Christ has both a human nature and a divine nature He would also be two [i]hypostaseis[/i], and this of course is the heresy of Nestorius. In opposition to this idea the Church at Chalcedon taught that Christ is one divine [i]hypostasis[/i] in two natures, and -- as a result of this teaching -- it follows that essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] cannot be identical.

Now, as I pointed out in an earlier post in this thread, one [i]hypostasis[/i] cannot participate in another [i]hypostasis[/i], because that would involve the destruction of one or both of the [i]hypostaseis[/i], or the "creation" of some kind of hybrid [i]hypostasis[/i]. But in the decree of the Council of Chalcedon, the holy Fathers taught that the one divine and uncreated [i]hypostasis[/i] of the eternal Logos assumed from the Holy Theotokos a full and complete human nature, but without becoming a human [i]hypostasis[/i] at the same time, because this would involve falling into the heresy of Nestorius. That being said, if essence and [i]hypostasis[/i] are really identical, it follows that the union of the two natures in Christ would be reduced to a mere union of grace no different from that which is received by a follower of Christ, and -- as I noted above -- this is simply another form of the Nestorian heresy.

Now, the failure to make a distinction between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] can also lead to the heresy of Monophysitism, because if one identifies essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] the union of the two natures in Christ cannot occur in the [i]hypostasis[/i] of the eternal Logos, but must somehow occur in the essence (or nature) of the Logos and the human nature assumed by Him. This of course would involve a blending of the two natures, which involves the bizarre notion of some type of "composite" nature that is both divine and human at that same time. Thus the failure to distinguish between [i]hypostasis[/i] and essence ([i]ousia[/i]) involves the absorption of Christ's human nature by His divine nature; and as a consequence, Christ is not fully human, because His humanity would be a mere phantasm or appearance absorbed into His divine nature, while He would also not be fully divine, because He would have a mixed human and divine nature, and that would mean that His divine nature -- as altered by this substantial mixing -- would be different from the divine nature of the Father and the Holy Spirit. Thus, this Christological error leads also to a Triadological error, because it makes the Son of God less than and essentially different from the Father and the Holy Spirit.

(6) The failure to make a distinction between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] in Christ has the additional difficulty of making human nature itself somehow "essentially" corrupt after the ancestral sin of Adam. Sin -- by definition -- is a personal (hypostatic), not a natural or essential reality, but if one fails to distinguish between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] sin must be held to be natural to man, i.e., it must be held to be a part of his nature, rather than being a defect present within his hypostatic mode of willing. This distinction highlights the fact that essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and energy ([i]energeia[/i]) are also distinct, because the will -- as a capacity -- is an essential energy of a nature, while the "mode of willing" is proper only to a [i]hypostasis[/i], i.e., the "mode of willing" is an enhypostatic enactment of that natural capacity. Moreover, a nature (or essence) never wills anything, only a person ([i]hypostasis[/i]) can will to do something or not do something.

Now in Christ there are -- as the Sixth Ecumenical Council taught -- two natural (or essential) wills and energies corresponding to His two natures, but of course if energy is identical with [i]hypostasis[/i] it follows that the human nature assumed by Christ in the incarnation would become sinful, because sin would be a property of the hybrid human nature / [i]hypostasis[/i] composite. But as St. Maximos pointed out, sin is found only in the "mode of willing," i.e., in the [i]hypostasis[/i] of man, while it is not to be found in the will as a capacity of nature, and this means that Christ, in assuming human nature, does not assume sin itself (which as I noted earlier is found only within the hypostatic "mode of willing"), and so, Christ -- as the Chalcedonian decree (quoting scripture) says -- is like us in all things except sin.

This section can be summarized in the following manner:

[a] If essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] are identical, it follows that -- if one emphasizes the reality of the two natures in Christ -- the incarnation would involve not only the assumption of human nature, but also the assumption of a human [i]hypostasis[/i], and this is simply a form of the Nestorian heresy.

[b] If essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] are identical, it can also lead -- as ironic as it may sound -- to the heresy of Monophysitism, because if one emphasizes the reality of the unity of Christ's [i]hypostasis[/i], without distinguishing between essence ([i]ousia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i], it follows that Christ's human nature, since it has no connatural human [i]hypostasis[/i], would be absorbed into His divine nature, and as I already noted above, that is simply the heresy of Eutyches, which is called Monophysitism.

[c] If energy ([i]energeia[/i]) and [i]hypostasis[/i] are really identical it follows that Christ must have only one will, because He is only one [i]hypostasis[/i], and this is simply the heresy of Monothelitism, i.e., the heresy of positing only one will and natural energy in Christ after the incarnation.

I will deal with some of the Soteriological problems that result from the failure to make distinctions in connection with essence ([i]ousia[/i]), energy ([i]energeia[/i]), and [i]hypostasis[/i] in a future post.

Steven Todd Kaster, Th.M.

[Laudate_Dominum]

Dude, you're writing a paper.. I really appreciate the effort you put into your posts.. That's so awesome.

[Myles Domini]

I concur with L_D's sentiments Appy thank you for summarising your misgivings with Occidental Theology in such a clear and concise manner. It makes it much easier to absorb exactly what it is you find troublesome about the West's formulation of the Trinitarian doctrine. As an exercise in deductive logic your presentation is flawless and accordingly I am thankful that it is not an accurate representation of the way the West generally conceives of the Trinity but, in the word of Aidan Nichols OP:

[quote]of an alternative tradition of thought moving from Anselm via Aberlard to Peter Lombard. In these...theologies, what we call 'the Persons' are relations all right, but these relations are so presented as, apparently, to issue from the essence, or even belong to it as quasi-attributes thereof: [b]an approach which would merit the strictures of the Christian East[/b] (my emphasis) and finds exemplification in a statement in Aberlard's De Unitate: to say God consists of three Persons is to say that the divine substance is at once powerful, good, and wise.--Nichols A., Discovering Aquinas p 67[/quote]

The Trinitarian tradition most Latin theologians are rooted in arose, of course, in the work of St Thomas Aquinas foreshadowed at the Medieval school of St Victor. All of the problems you've cited both Theological and Christological could only arise if the West had accepted the kind of thinking that the Victorines and Aquinas divorced themselves from. It is however easy to misread St Thomas as being a member of this issing from the essence stable:

[quote]This is perhaps because, in the prologue to this topic in the great [i]Summa[/i] - namely, question 27 of the [i]Prima Pars[/i] - so as to link his theology of the Holy Trinity to what he has said of God in his unique being, knowing and willing, Thomas considers first the divine procession - that is, the origins of the Persons; next, the divine relations; and only in last place, the Persons themselves. He pleads that this is, in context, a good pedagogical order. But it can lead the student to misrepresent the strongly personalist cast of his Trinitarian thinking. --Nichols A., op cit p 67[/quote]

Looking to St Thomas himself we can see that the credal clause 'God from God' only makes intelligble sense when God in this instance refers to the Father and not to the Divine essence:

[quote]Hence as this word "God" signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man" signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person,--Sum.Theol.1.38.4.[/quote]

The keywords to note here wherein the distance between St Thomas and a thinker like Peter Lombard become clear are 'more truly', 'proper sense' and of course 'person'. In these words we can see that:

[quote]in Thomas theology, the notion of the divine nature -- subtly different in his usage from that of the divine essence -- is a basis for a more fully personalised theology of the Trinity...the concepts of nature, on the one hand, (and) essence on the other, overlap but do not coincide. 'Nature' has to do with the active life of the essence, and hence, in the context of the treatise on God, already carries a tacit reference to personality since, in the maxim of Thomas...'actions belong to subjects'. In the origination of the Holy Trinity the role of the divine essence is simply that of an operative principle by which a subject acts. The actual acts of generation and spiration, terminating as they do in the unique reality of Son and Spirit, can only arise from a Person --Nichols A., op cit 69[/quote]

Thomas' tri-une personalism makes the Persons their relations. He speaks of relations in two ways the first is 'relation as relation', that is, as a formal notion, which logically pressuposes a procession but also of 'relation as constitutive of (a) divine person' which logically precedes procession. Herein the relation of filiation or spiration produces the Person in the actualisation of the divine nature signified by its name. Keeping in mind that Aquinas' concept of personhood includes Richard of St Victor's teaching of what is 'incommunicable by nature' then in is in their relations to each other that the Father, Son and Spirit are irreducibly personal.

I'd say more but a) Mass starts soon and b) I think that what I've said is enough to illustrate that the West does not roll together nature, person and the like in such a way that it would cause the serious problems of Theology that you outlined. I can understand your misgivings and indeed you can point out the thinkers Fr Nichols highlights as having taken Trinitarianism in the wrong direction but that was before Aquinas. Nowadays there isnt the need for such worries.

[Apotheoun]

My misgivings about the West's philosophically based doctrine of the Trinity are connected to the Sabellian modalism inherent in its reduction of the [i]hypostaseis[/i] to mere "relations of opposition" within the divine essence. Instead of a theory of "relational opposition" the Eastern Fathers teach that the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Trinity are truly subsistent and distinct by their particular hypostatic "mode of origin" ([i]tropos hyparxeos[/i]).

Let me put it this way, in the [u]Summa Theologica[/u] (Prima Pars, Q. 39, A. 1 and A. 2; and Q. 40, A. 1), St. Thomas denies that there is a real distinction between essence (or nature) and [i]hypostasis[/i]; thus, the [i]hypostasis[/i] of the Father is identical with the divine essence (or nature), and the same holds with the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Son and the Spirit. As a consequence, the essence of God is the Father, but since the Son and the Spirit possesses the same divine essence as the Father, it follows that they are both the Father as well, since the divine essence is identical with the hypostatic property of paternity. That being said, the subsistent reality of the Father is also undermined, because He possesses the divine essence too, and since the divine essence is held in the Scholastic theory to be identical with the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Son and the Spirit, it follows that the Father is also the Son, while He is simultaneously the Spirit; and so, the triad of divine [i]hypostaseis[/i] collapses into a monad.

As Christopher Hughes puts it in his critique of the Scholastic theory of the Trinity:

"Surely if (a) the essence of x = the essence of y, and (b) the essence of x = x, and the essence of y = y, it follows as the night does the day that x = y. And Aquinas maintains both that the divine persons are not distinct from their essences, and that they all have the same essence." [Christopher Hughes, [u]On a Complex Theory of a Simple God[/u], (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), page192]

In other words, the Father (x) is the Son (y), and the Son is the Father, and the same holds in relation to the Spirit. Now it should be noted that the first point (a) of Aquinas' theory conforms to the teaching of the Cappadocian Fathers, but that the second point (b) does not; in fact, the second point conforms to the teaching of Sabellius and not to the theological doctrine of the Cappadocian Fathers.

Moreover, the Scholastic error on this issue is confirmed by what St. Basil the Great said in [i]Letter 236[/i], where he called those who fail to distinguish between essence (or nature) and [i]hypostasis[/i] in God, "Sabellians"; for as St. Basil said, "On the other hand those who identify essence ([i]ousian[/i]) or substance and [i]hypostasis[/i] are compelled to confess only three [i]prosopa[/i], and, in their hesitation to speak of three [i]hypostaseis[/i], are convicted of failure to avoid the error of Sabellius, for even Sabellius himself, who in many places confuses his notions, yet, by asserting that the same [i]hypostasis[/i] changed its form to meet the needs of the moment, does endeavour to distinguish [i]prosopa[/i]." [St. Basil, [i]Letter 236[/i]] The Scholastics, in certain sense, are even more modalistic than Sabellius, because Sabellius could at least admit that there are prosopic distinctions in God, while the Scholastic theory of divine simplicity does not admit of any real distinctions, because the Scholastics saw all real distinctions as necessarily dialectical in nature.

[Laudate_Dominum]

I'm very sleepy at this moment but I'll try to keep polemics to a minimum (even though they're fun). In fact, I'll stick to question asking as its a fun discipline.

Ok, I'm aware of the neo-palamite bag (Lossky, Ware, Meyendorff, etc..) and I have certain suspicions and impressions which you might be interested in addressing.
I have yet to see anyone convincingly demonstrate that what the pre-palamite theologians had in mind with the essence/energies distinction is really the same thing that Palamas has in mind.
For one thing, the categories of "real" distinction vs. "notional" distinction are scholastic and while I certainly admit that Palamas clearly make this distinction I find it hard to believe that the sense of the Cappadocians' philosophical underpinnings is quite the same and thus many of the quotes that are often thrown out there have anachronistic baggage included if you know what I mean.
That quote from one of Basil's letters falls particularly flat with me whenever I see you use it. It has absolutely no value in my eyes as a charge against Thomas. The context and content is radically foreign to the discussion of Thomas' theology.

But anyway, I'd prefer to stay away from engaging you on all that just yet.
So what do you make of the various criticisms of Palamism by both Catholic and Orthodox scholars? Fresh on my mind is Wendenbourg.. For example, against the claim that Palamas is simply a completion of the Greek Fathers it has been noted that the sense in which the fathers distinguish essence and energies is quite different in many essential ways (no pun intended.. ok it was intended a little bit). The big example to me being that the Cappadocian fathers do not anchor the oikonomia in an intradivine distinction between essence and energies.

Byzantine theologian Endre von Ivanka actually holds that a "real" distinction of essence and energies contradicts the thought of the Greek Fathers. I believe the reasoning pertains to the Cappadocians intent to avoid formulations which suggest that the creature participates in God's being by virtue of a Neo-Platonic emanationism, which is precisely what some in the east have viewed Palamism to be. Palamism is a reversion to the Platonic idea of participation by the creature in successive levels of God's being.

And interestingly, unlike Palamas, when the Cappadocians speak about the divine energies they do not talk at all about the trinitarian persons but remain completely within the field of the classical problem of the one and the many.

One interesting result of the alleged neo-platonic emanationism of Palamas is that now the opera ad extra of God pertain to the divine energies and not the divine persons, the proprium of each person, and of the Holy Spirit in particular as the one who deifies, fades into the background. Wendenbourg says that in the end Palamism is strongly reminiscent of Augustine’s theology because the economy of redemption ceases to be the place where the uniqueness of the divine persons, as well as their taxis with respect to each other—from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit—is revealed. This is particularly far removed from the thought of St. Maximos as well. Palamas utterly and hopelessly divides theologia and oikonimia.

Cardinal Schonborn also views Palamism as destructive of the Patristic and authentic triadology and soteriology in that the divine persons are denied distinctive roles in the oikonomia. He cites from the Capita in which Palamas explains that the act by which God is related to the world does not belong to God’s essence but God’s energies. He then goes on to elucidate how this is a radical departure from the standard doctrine within patristic thought regarding the Father’s monarchy. Schonborn’s conclusion is that the Trinitarian relations in Palamas' thought belong to an unknowable sphere quite beyond the oikonomia.
This neglect of the differentiation within the oikonomia of salvation according to the divine persons is perhaps the greatest scandal of Palamism.
Podskalsky raises the question of how it is then possible for us to have knowledge of the innertrinitarian relations if not from the acts of the Father, Son and Spirit in the economy of salvation.

And why do people often act as though Palamas is this pillar of truth? If his thought is really the pinnacle of Orthodoxy then why was he all but forgotten after the fourteenth century? As I understand it it wasn't until the 20th century that people started paying attention to him, and there were camps for and against his thought, there was controversy. Now all of a sudden anything the guy said is dogma. Orthodox often criticize the latins for doing this sort of thing with Thomas, or Augustine.. Seems like a double-standard.

Just some thoughts/questions if you'd be interested in clarifying.. These are just points/objections that I've encountered.. Plenty more where that came from if you actually enjoy doing this.

Peace.

P.S. Regarding my first paragraph, the sense I have with the Cappadocians that I've read is that they have a different flavour of apophatic methodology. This strikes me as the basis of safeguarding against neo-platonic emanationism, not the ousia/energeia distinction in itself. It's one thing to recognize a distinction between ousia and energeia, but it is another things altogether to construct a somewhat scholastic framework which claims to describe "real" ontological distinctions within God's being. Palamas himself even admitted a certain irreconcilable antinomy in his system of thought.. But I wonder.. when does an antinomy simply become an absurdity, or a falsehood? I'm still weary of Palamas because his system says too much about God and in the same breath stresses the via negativa in a way that strikes me as more akin to the neo-platonists. The Cappadocians were wise to not bury their theology in a scholastic distinction.

[Laudate_Dominum]

[quote name='Apotheoun' post='979782' date='May 13 2006, 02:34 AM']
My misgivings about the West's philosophically based doctrine of the Trinity are connected to the Sabellian modalism inherent in its reduction of the [i]hypostaseis[/i] to mere "relations of opposition" within the divine essence. Instead of a theory of "relational opposition" the Eastern Fathers teach that the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Trinity are truly subsistent and distinct by their particular hypostatic "mode of origin" ([i]tropos hyparxeos[/i]).

Let me put it this way, in the [u]Summa Theologica[/u] (Prima Pars, Q. 39, A. 1 and A. 2; and Q. 40, A. 1), St. Thomas denies that there is a real distinction between essence (or nature) and [i]hypostasis[/i]; thus, the [i]hypostasis[/i] of the Father is identical with the divine essence (or nature), and the same holds with the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Son and the Spirit. As a consequence, the essence of God is the Father, but since the Son and the Spirit possesses the same divine essence as the Father, it follows that they are both the Father as well, since the divine essence is identical with the hypostatic property of paternity. That being said, the subsistent reality of the Father is also undermined, because He possesses the divine essence too, and since the divine essence is held in the Scholastic theory to be identical with the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Son and the Spirit, it follows that the Father is also the Son, while He is simultaneously the Spirit; and so, the triad of divine [i]hypostaseis[/i] collapses into a monad.

As Christopher Hughes puts it in his critique of the Scholastic theory of the Trinity:

"Surely if (a) the essence of x = the essence of y, and (b) the essence of x = x, and the essence of y = y, it follows as the night does the day that x = y. And Aquinas maintains both that the divine persons are not distinct from their essences, and that they all have the same essence." [Christopher Hughes, [u]On a Complex Theory of a Simple God[/u], (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), page192]

In other words, the Father (x) is the Son (y), and the Son is the Father, and the same holds in relation to the Spirit. Now it should be noted that the first point (a) of Aquinas' theory conforms to the teaching of the Cappadocian Fathers, but that the second point (b) does not; in fact, the second point conforms to the teaching of Sabellius and not to the theological doctrine of the Cappadocian Fathers.

Moreover, the Scholastic error on this issue is confirmed by what St. Basil the Great said in [i]Letter 236[/i], where he called those who fail to distinguish between essence (or nature) and [i]hypostasis[/i] in God, "Sabellians"; for as St. Basil said, "On the other hand those who identify essence ([i]ousian[/i]) or substance and [i]hypostasis[/i] are compelled to confess only three [i]prosopa[/i], and, in their hesitation to speak of three [i]hypostaseis[/i], are convicted of failure to avoid the error of Sabellius, for even Sabellius himself, who in many places confuses his notions, yet, by asserting that the same [i]hypostasis[/i] changed its form to meet the needs of the moment, does endeavour to distinguish [i]prosopa[/i]." [St. Basil, [i]Letter 236[/i]] The Scholastics, in certain sense, are even more modalistic than Sabellius, because Sabellius could at least admit that there are prosopic distinctions in God, while the Scholastic theory of divine simplicity does not admit of any real distinctions, because the Scholastics saw all real distinctions as necessarily dialectical in nature.
[/quote]
Very briefly, my understanding of Thomas as well as latin dogma renders the central premises of this critique absurd.
For example, Thomas and presumably neo-scholasticism fail to distinguish Essence and Hypostasis?
To clarify, the relations are said to be only mentally or notionally distinct from the Divine Essence, but these are not the persons or hypostases. It is in fact dogma per the fourth lateran council, with which Thomas agrees, that the subject of of the Divine Processions are the Divine Persons, not the Divine Essence. In other words it is the Father who generates, not the Divine Essence, etc.. This dogma is at odds with your claim about the west collapsing everything into the Essence.
But this isn't really the heart of the matter. I think the real issue is the meaning of a virtual distinction with regard to the persons of the Trinity and the Divine Essence.
For starters what Thomas is saying there is not that there is a notional distinction. And it wouldn't be fair to say that the meaning of virtual distinction in this context is some ambiguous intermediary between a real distinction and a notional distinction.
My understanding of what Thomas is trying to say is informed by the Organon, Boethius and Augustine.. I'm not trying to convince you of Thomas' position I'm merely trying to clarify it so that we are being fair here.

Thomas is essentially developing Aristotle's categories and importing a bit of insight from Boethius. Again, I'm rusty but perhaps I can put it in my own words. In the categories Aristotle lists the accidentals (quantity, quality, time, etc..) among them he lists relation. Aquinas is borrowing from Boethius when he reflects upon something akin to relation as a transcendental. I am absolutely certain that Thomas is not saying that the persons are only notionally or logically distinct. My understanding is that he is trying to say, like Boethius, that in contingent being relation is an accidental and as such is refers to a substance outside of that in which it adheres, however, in the case of God, if one chooses to reflect upon it in this matter, we cannot say that there is a separate substance toward which an intradivine relation refers since God is one. Therefore, all he is really saying is that the persons are distinct but without being separate. We are dealing with a transcendent sort of relationality. Call it absolute or substantial relationality. Hence, to say it is merely a mental distinction is false, but also to say it is an actual distinction would be false for Thomas because the sense of this would imply more than one substance based on Aristotle's categories. Therefore it is a virtual distinction, they are truly distinct in their relations, but there is a certain apophatic dimension here in that it is not relationality as we are capable of comprehending it. It is in fact the pure perfection of relationality. I see absolutely not collapsing of the Persons into some sort of monad here. That's not how I understood Thomas years ago before I was even aware of these issues either. I simply don't believe that he is saying what you're suggesting. See also: Summa Theologica (Prima Pars, Q. 28, A. 2)

Besides Aristotle and Boethius, Thomas is very much developing Augustine. To be honest, I think your assessment of Thomas is quite the opposite of the truth. The really specific stuff is in other words besides the Summa, such as De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino. For Thomas the self-subsistent reality of God is not only supremely actual and simple, but He is supremely personal and relational. And certainly Thomas differentiates between the Persons. In fact, relationality is the supreme ontological predicate for Aquinas. In Thomas' though God's relation to us is a logical or notional relation. Our relation to God is actual or real. In profoundly elucidating these points Thomas in fact sets the stage for the bomb that he drops in establishing the metaphysical basis for intratrinitarian relations which is an intrinsic relatedness, not an accidental relatedness or a notional type thing. This is actually at the heart of Thomas' theological reflections on God's freedom in creating the cosmos. Thomas says that if the Persons of the Trinity were merely derived from logical relations then the Persons would be accidents of the Divine Essence. Divine simplicity precludes accidents in God, therefore relations are identical with the Divine Essence. Also (I wish I had quotes handly), he explains precisely how the Persons are NOT merely different manifestations of the Essence because this would be Sabellianism. The persons are of one substance and they are distinct subsistences or hypostases. And De Potentia Dei has some useful stuff for grasping what Thomas is trying to say about God.. There are some cool quotables too such as "the more simple, the more relational". He completely blows away the assertion that he does away with hypostasis to preserve some kind of monad god. What he's actually saying is pretty much the opposite of that.
Your claim that Thomas reduces the Trinity to some kind of monad couldn't be further from the truth. And I've looked at Hughe's book before and from what I've seen its outrageous.
What's funny is that in some ways Zizioulas seems like a Thomist to me.. Anyway, I don't want to annoy you too much.

As you know Thomas' thought is pretty far removed from Palamas and I'm not going to pretend that they're compatible. Like I said I'm not trying to convince you to become a Thomist, I just think that the accusation of modalism or whatever is way off, to say the least.

[Laudate_Dominum]

And my reading of Aquinas doesn't ask anymore than the Eastern position you defend. Namely that we cannot understand procession, etc. but we know that the Persons are distinct. Similarly, my reading of Aquinas is like that, it explains to a point, but then one must accept that we cannot grasp how it is so. Hughe's goofy syllogism is just capitalizing on the fact that God's inner life is beyond logical representation. If we could wrap our minds around substantial relationality I suppose we'd be Divine.

[Laudate_Dominum]

[quote name='Apotheoun' post='979782' date='May 13 2006, 02:34 AM']
My misgivings about the West's philosophically based doctrine of the Trinity are connected to the Sabellian modalism inherent in its reduction of the [i]hypostaseis[/i] to mere "relations of opposition" within the divine essence. Instead of a theory of "relational opposition" the Eastern Fathers teach that the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Trinity are truly subsistent and distinct by their particular hypostatic "mode of origin" ([i]tropos hyparxeos[/i]).
[/quote]
The latins teach that the hypostases of the Trinity are truly subsistent and distinct but to call it "mere" relations of opposition is to betray a lack of appreciation for the richness of the west's ponderings on this mystery. Quite frankly the Paternity, Sonship, Spiration approach that the west takes includes the mode of origin but is a better foundational metaphor for describing the mystery because it is more personalistic and isn't married to a temporal or sequential motiff. As Bonaventure says it is the more spiritual and the more proper of God who is Love.


[quote name='Apotheoun' post='979782' date='May 13 2006, 02:34 AM']Moreover, the Scholastic error on this issue[/quote]
There are quite a few scholastics and they are all pretty different. This is an outlandish statement. There were scholastics who weren't far from Palamas in some regards. And I still utterly reject the idea that Sabellian modalism is a fair characterization of Thomas or scholastic triadology in general. If one was looking for things to pick at perhaps they could come up with that, but if one was being fair I don't think this is a realistic assessment. Many of the scholastics were extremely conservative and well aware of the doctrinal controversies of the past so I think it could be surprising to discover in fact that they critique Sabellianism and certainly were no oblivious to the issues you are bringing up. Their syntheses were not the system that you're down with, and their solutions to the problems may not be to your liking, but the accusation of heresy is a bit presumptuous if I may say so.

And let's assume for a second that Thomas' theology lends itself toward modalism. Ok, since when is Thomas the latin Church? To restrict one's critique of Roman Catholic theology to the 1200's is absurd. What about Congar, Von Balthasar, De Lubac, Rahner, La Grange, Longergan, Danielou, Bouyer, and so on.. from our times alone. Do you really think that Catholic theology for the past 800 years has simply been parroting Thomas? I don't think the Scotists would appreciate that. If you really want to "debunk" Roman Catholic triadology it'll have to take into account the current state of theological developments and great theologians. Heck, some of the greats of the 20th century were buddies with your guy Lossky, so I imagine they aren't completely oblivious to the final word in theology that is Palamas.

[Myles Domini]

[quote name='Laudate_Dominum' post='979819' date='May 13 2006, 01:42 PM']
Very briefly, my understanding of Thomas as well as latin dogma renders the central premises of this critique absurd.
For example, Thomas and presumably neo-scholasticism fail to distinguish Essence and Hypostasis?
To clarify, the relations are said to be only mentally or notionally distinct from the Divine Essence, but these are not the persons or hypostases. It is in fact dogma per the fourth lateran council, with which Thomas agrees, that the subject of of the Divine Processions are the Divine Persons, not the Divine Essence. In other words it is the Father who generates, not the Divine Essence, etc.. This dogma is at odds with your claim about the west collapsing everything into the Essence.
But this isn't really the heart of the matter. I think the real issue is the meaning of a virtual distinction with regard to the persons of the Trinity and the Divine Essence.
For starters what Thomas is saying there is not that there is a notional distinction. And it wouldn't be fair to say that the meaning of virtual distinction in this context is some ambiguous intermediary between a real distinction and a notional distinction.
My understanding of what Thomas is trying to say is informed by the Organon, Boethius and Augustine.. I'm not trying to convince you of Thomas' position I'm merely trying to clarify it so that we are being fair here.

Thomas is essentially developing Aristotle's categories and importing a bit of insight from Boethius. Again, I'm rusty but perhaps I can put it in my own words. In the categories Aristotle lists the accidentals (quantity, quality, time, etc..) among them he lists relation. Aquinas is borrowing from Boethius when he reflects upon something akin to relation as a transcendental. I am absolutely certain that Thomas is not saying that the persons are only notionally or logically distinct. My understanding is that he is trying to say, like Boethius, that in contingent being relation is an accidental and as such is refers to a substance outside of that in which it adheres, however, in the case of God, if one chooses to reflect upon it in this matter, we cannot say that there is a separate substance toward which an intradivine relation refers since God is one. Therefore, all he is really saying is that the persons are distinct but without being separate. We are dealing with a transcendent sort of relationality. Call it absolute or substantial relationality. Hence, to say it is merely a mental distinction is false, but also to say it is an actual distinction would be false for Thomas because the sense of this would imply more than one substance based on Aristotle's categories. Therefore it is a virtual distinction, they are truly distinct in their relations, but there is a certain apophatic dimension here in that it is not relationality as we are capable of comprehending it. It is in fact the pure perfection of relationality. I see absolutely not collapsing of the Persons into some sort of monad here. That's not how I understood Thomas years ago before I was even aware of these issues either. I simply don't believe that he is saying what you're suggesting. See also: Summa Theologica (Prima Pars, Q. 28, A. 2)

Besides Aristotle and Boethius, Thomas is very much developing Augustine. To be honest, I think your assessment of Thomas is quite the opposite of the truth. The really specific stuff is in other words besides the Summa, such as De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino. For Thomas the self-subsistent reality of God is not only supremely actual and simple, but He is supremely personal and relational. And certainly Thomas differentiates between the Persons. In fact, relationality is the supreme ontological predicate for Aquinas. In Thomas' though God's relation to us is a logical or notional relation. Our relation to God is actual or real. In profoundly elucidating these points Thomas in fact sets the stage for the bomb that he drops in establishing the metaphysical basis for intratrinitarian relations which is an intrinsic relatedness, not an accidental relatedness or a notional type thing. This is actually at the heart of Thomas' theological reflections on God's freedom in creating the cosmos. Thomas says that if the Persons of the Trinity were merely derived from logical relations then the Persons would be accidents of the Divine Essence. Divine simplicity precludes accidents in God, therefore relations are identical with the Divine Essence. He gets into this in his commentary on the Gospel of John. Also in his commentary on John (I wish I had quotes handly), he explains precisely how the Persons are NOT merely different manifestations of the Essence because this would be Sabellianism. The persons are of one substance and they are distinct subsistences or hypostases. And De Potentia Dei has some useful stuff for grasping what Thomas is trying to say about God.. There are some cool quotables too such as "the more simple, the more relational". He completely blows away the assertion that he does away with hypostasis to preserve some kind of monad god. What he's actually saying is pretty much the opposite of that.
Your claim that Thomas reduces the Trinity to some kind of monad couldn't be further from the truth. And I've looked at Hughe's book before and from what I've seen its outrageous.
What's funny is that in some ways Zizioulas seems like a Thomist to me.. Anyway, I don't want to annoy you too much.

As you know Thomas' thought is pretty far removed from Palamas and I'm not going to pretend that they're compatible. Like I said I'm not trying to convince you to become a Thomist, I just think that the accusation of modalism or whatever is way off, to say the least.
[/quote]

And that phamily is how a real Church Scholar answer questions. Thanks L_D you said everything I did...just better : (gotta love it). From L_D's post and my citations from Aidan Nichols I think its clear that you're attributing to St Thomas the school of thought that he was fighting against in line of the Victorine tradition. The citations you've given from Q39 of the 1st part, for instance, need to be read in light of the way St Thomas conceives of essence and nature in subtly different ways which has the result as L_D (deftly) illustrated of making the relations natural, irreducible and insperable and eternally so.

However, in spite of the fact I believe you're misinterpreting St Thomas lets not move the goal posts too much. Whilst I'm very comfy talking about St Aquinas this discussion is not about him primarily. Its about Latin Theology en general. Even if hypothetically your critique of St Thomas were true (and I dont think it is) what would that mean? Even were your understanding of Thomas right and Aidan Nichols' incorrect what difference would it make so long as the Latin Church actually teaches the interpretation of Doctor Angelus that doesn't fall into the problems you outlined? As it stands I cannot see, for instance, how L_D's presentation of Thomas' thought would be rightly censured by the Christian East. Forgetting for a second that I believe that it does accurately reflect what St Thomas was trying to do even if it doesn't all that is important is that L_D's presentation of the Trinity according to St Thomas is en general how Latinity has recieved it. As much as I love St Aquinas I see no reason to get sucked into a debate about him alone since we're not discussing him alone. So what if hypothetically Thomas' Trinitarian thought was not entirely accurate if subsequent Latin theologians took the portrait he drew and cleaned it up so that it could take on the form L_D has presented to you today? Even if St Thomas was unsound (and I dont think it can be argued he was but even were that the case) the fact is what the Latin Church presents about the Trinity is not unsound. Her account (and I would and have argued St Thomas' with her) as summarised by L_D does not and cannot reduce the persons to pseudo-attributes of the essence.

Lastly, as interesting as I am finding this thread I would ask why there is even a need to raise the charge that Latin theology is errant in its Trinitarian and Christological understanding. Nobody here is arguing that Palamas should be condemned (though L_D has cited authors who believe he could be). From where I am sitting the rest of the Phamily were quite happy to have you back--myself included--and we're equally happy to have you be a Palamite and to profess the aforesaid understanding of the Trinity is it too much to ask you to extend the same courtesy to us? Since, I do not believe that any conclusive proof of error can be shown (an error which if true would make the Roman Catholic Church basically heretical or at least responsible for canonising heretic after heretic) why can you not bring yourself to believe the best of us? Why are you so seemingly determined to ignore the very straightforward responses given to you as to how Latin Theology (whilst admittedly at one stage through the Anselmian variant) did see certain figures e.g. Aberlard fall into error managed to overcome the difficulties you outlined. I really cannot see anything fundamentally wrong with the citations I provided from Nichols or the in depth answer given by L_D so why has this discussion taken on such a darkended tone? I certainly cannot see the Sabellianism in L_D and since Holy Mother Church allows us both to hold different doctrinal formulations of the Trinitarian Dogma why the need for argument?

I'm all for a light hearted discussion--which is why I started out my post with all those light hearted remarks about L_D (not that I didnt mean 'em dude )--but if this is going to turn into something else I dont want to be part of it and that is the reason I left it so long to say anything in the first place and tried to be as diplomatic as possible when I did finally say something. In spite of the fact I thought you were being unfair to St Thomas I tried to empathise with your standpoint by admitting there were Latin theologians of note and merit in the past who had been guilty of the charges you listed. Indeed, I have tried to do the same thing now. Is it too much to ask for you to show us the same empathy especially since I really cannot see what is wrong with the doctrinal presentation of the Trinity presented by the Latins exemplified in the citations from Nichols and the detailed response given by L_D?

As members of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church are we not able to agree to disagree within the bounds that the Church allows us to?

[Laudate_Dominum]

[quote name='Myles Domini' post='979976' date='May 13 2006, 08:09 AM']
I'm all for a light hearted discussion--which is why I started out my post with all those light hearted remarks about L_D (not that I didnt mean 'em dude )--but if this is going to turn into something else I dont want to be part of it and that is the reason I left it so long to say anything in the first place and tried to be as diplomatic as possible when I did finally say something. In spite of the fact I thought you were being unfair to St Thomas I tried to empathise with your standpoint by admitting there were Latin theologians of note and merit in the past who had been guilty of the charges you listed. Indeed, I have tried to do the same thing now. Is it too much to ask for you to show us the same empathy especially since I really cannot see what is wrong with the doctrinal presentation of the Trinity presented by the Latins exemplified in the citations from Nichols and the detailed response given by L_D?

As members of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church are we not able to agree to disagree within the bounds that the Church allows us to?
[/quote]
Amen Myles... I can't believe you're like buddies with Aidan Nichols!

I hope I haven't come off mean, I'm just playing along with the slightly polemical style. Todd, just so you know I always wait eagerly for your posts because they're always so thought provoking. I hope I'm not ticking you off or anything.

I'm just trying to be provocative for the sake of fun theological dialogue and I'm really curious about how you might respond to this stuff.

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='Laudate_Dominum' post='979873' date='May 13 2006, 06:30 AM']
The latins teach that the hypostases of the Trinity are truly subsistent and distinct but to call it "mere" relations of opposition is to betray a lack of appreciation for the richness of the west's ponderings on this mystery. Quite frankly the Paternity, Sonship, Spiration approach that the west takes includes the mode of origin but is a better foundational metaphor for describing the mystery because it is more personalistic and isn't married to a temporal or sequential motiff. As Bonaventure says it is the more spiritual and the more proper of God who is Love.
[. . .]
[/quote]
The East rejects the notion that the [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Trinity are mere "relations of opposition" within the divine essence, and it does so: first because it is not possible to know anything about the divine essence, and second because this reduces the [i]hypostaseis[/i] to relations, but they are more than that. In fact the "relations" that the West speaks of are the logical consequence of the different "modes of origin" ([i]tropos hyparxeos[/i]) of the three divine [i]hypostaseis[/i], and so they cannot be the focus of man's experience of God, because God is beyond human intellection and logical deduction. One other problem with the Scholastic teaching is that it reduces the [i]hypostaseis[/i] to "mental" distinctions within the mind of man, because as St. Thomas said:

[quote]. . . relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, [i]but only in our way of thinking[/i]. [St. Thomas, [u]Summa Theologica[/u], Prima Pars, Q. 39, A. 1][/quote]

The East rejects this idea for the reasons I mentioned above, i.e., because it reduces the [i]hypostaseis[/i] to "relations of opposition," and because it reduces the [i]hypostaseis[/i] to mere epistemic concepts, i.e., since they only differ "in our way of thinking." Moreover, the Eastern Fathers assert the very thing that St. Thomas denies, because they say that the [i]hypostaseis[/i] "really" differ from each other, but without necessarily involving opposition. The East rejects the dialectical approach of the West.

Now it is important to note that the East rejects not only this part of Thomas' philosophical concept of the Trinity, but also what he says about the Trinity just before the quotation I gave above. Here is what St. Thomas said:

[quote]. . . some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be 'adjacent'; considering only in the relations the idea of 'reference to another,' and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. [St. Thomas, [u]Summa Theologica[/u], Prima Pars, Q. 39, A. 1][/quote]

First, as is clear from my earlier posts, the East accepts the very idea that Thomas rejects, i.e., the East believes that ". . . in God essence and person differ," and so, the two sides really do teach something substantially different about the doctrine of the Trinity. Second, the hypostatic distinctions in God are not "oppositional relations" they are true "modes of origin" independent of human thought. In fact God in His essence is beyond any category of human thought or predication. That being said, the Eastern Fathers teach that God the Father is "cause" (Greek: [i]aitia[/i]), while the Son is [i]generated[/i] by the Father, and the Spirit is [i]processed[/i] from the Father, and both "generation" and "procession" are hypostatic properties of the Father, which cannot be shared by the other two [i]hypostaseis[/i]. In other words, the Father is distinct as "cause" within the Trinity, while the Son is distinct as being "generated," and the Spirit is distinct because He is "processed." Thus, it is true to say that God the Father is the sole source, principle, origin, and font of divinity, and the Son and the Spirit derive their origin from Him, not through a mere "oppositional relation," but through distinct and subsisting hypostatic "modes of origin" ([i]tropos hyparxeos[/i]). As a consequence, any "oppositions" that arise within God are the result of the distinct hypostatic properties, and this means that the [i]hypostaseis[/i] cannot be reduced to "relations of opposition," since these relations are derived from the different "modes of origin" and not vice versa. In other words, the West is reducing the Trinity to a philosophical speculation where man moves through rational categories in order to try and "prove" that God is a triad of divine [i]hypostaseis[/i], while the East holds that it is not possible to "prove" such a thing, because it is in fact a [i]datum[/i] of divine revelation that must simply be accepted by the gift of faith, which transcends reason. The Eastern Fathers are unanimous in teaching that the human mind cannot rise up to, nor discover anything about, the essence of God, because the human mind is a [i]diastemic[/i] reality and the divine essence is [i]adiastemic[/i]. As St. Gregory of Nyssa explains:

[quote]The whole created order is unable to get out of itself through a comprehensive vision, but remains continually enclosed within itself, and whatever it beholds, it is looking at itself. And even if it somehow thinks it is looking at something beyond itself, that which it sees outside itself has no being. One may struggle to surpass or transcend [i]diastemic[/i] conception by the understanding of the created universe, but he does not transcend. For in every object it conceptually discovers, it always comprehends the [i]diastema[/i] inherent in the being of the apprehended object, for [i]diastema[/i] is nothing other than creation itself. [St. Gregory of Nyssa, [i]Homilies on Ecclesiastes[/i], 7:412][/quote]

What St. Gregory is emphasizing here, is the ontological gap that exists between uncreated and created essence, and this gap is permanent, which means that there can be no participation by man in the divine essence, because the divine essence is utterly transcendent. Moreover, because of the [i]diastemic[/i] nature of creation the Eastern Fathers reject the idea that there is an "analogy of being" between the uncreated and the created, because as Fr. Florovsky said, Creation 'comes into being, made up from outside.' [i]And there is no similarity between that which bursts forth from nothing and the Creator Who verily is, Who brings creatures out of nothing[/i]." [Fr. Florovsky, [u]Creation and Redemption[/u], (Nordland Publishing Company: Belmont, Massachusetts, 1976), page 48] Thus, the East rejects as impossible the very thing that St. Thomas tries to do in the quotation I gave above, i.e., to compare "relations" in creatures, and "relations" in God, and then come to a conclusion about the what relations are in the divine essence. This kind of comparison is contrary to the teaching of the ancient Fathers, and that is clear if one remembers that the divine essence is beyond intellectual comprehension; and so, through his intellectual concepts, St. Thomas is trying to do the very thing that St. Gregory of Nyssa condemned and said was impossible, i.e., St. Thomas tries to intellectually transcend the [i]diastema[/i]. Sadly, St. Thomas thought he had "learned" something about the essence of God, but of course the Church Fathers hold that that is impossible; in other words, St. Thomas has fallen into the very same trap that Eunomius fell into centuries earlier, because he mistakenly believed that he has learned something about the divine essence by comparing it to creatures, but as St. Gregory of Nyssa said, ". . . in every object it [i.e., the human mind] conceptually discovers, it always comprehends the [i]diastema[/i] inherent in the being of the apprehended object," and so, all that St. Thomas has done is fool himself into thinking that he has transcended the created order. Moreover, to believe that the epinoetic conceptions that man forms about God rise up and transgress the [i]adiastemic[/i] boundary is the height of hubris and borders on a form of idolatry.

Finally, Laudate_Dominum said:

[quote]Quite frankly the Paternity, Sonship, Spiration approach that the west takes includes the mode of origin but is a better foundational metaphor for describing the mystery because it is more personalistic and isn't married to a temporal or sequential motiff.[/quote]

The problem with the West's position is -- as I have noted above -- that it has reduced to Trinity to a philosophical speculation based upon rational reflection, but God is beyond rational reflection; in fact, God is beyond being, and He is beyond essence (i.e., He is [i]hyperousios[/i]), and the West, by reducing the [i]hypostaseis[/i] to relations within the unknowable divine essence, has made two mistakes: first, it has made the unknowable and utterly transcendent divine essence knowable; and second, it has reversed the order of knowledge in connection with the triad of divine hypostaseis, i.e., it has taken what is a logical conclusion arising from the distinct "modes of origin," and has made those "oppositional relations" the foundation of its philosophical theory of the Trinity. The [i]hypostaseis[/i] of the Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) are not distinct because they are in some type of "oppositional relation"; instead, they are distinct because of their different subsisting properties. The error of the Scholastic leads them to posit "four" oppositional relations, yet only three [i]hypostaseis[/i], but the Eastern Fathers never taught this, and in fact they would find it very strange to say the least.

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='Laudate_Dominum' post='979792' date='May 13 2006, 04:18 AM']
[. . .]

I have yet to see anyone convincingly demonstrate that what the pre-palamite theologians had in mind with the essence/energies distinction is really the same thing that Palamas has in mind.
For one thing, the categories of "real" distinction vs. "notional" distinction are scholastic and while I certainly admit that Palamas clearly make this distinction I find it hard to believe that the sense of the Cappadocians' philosophical underpinnings is quite the same and thus many of the quotes that are often thrown out there have anachronistic baggage included if you know what I mean.
That quote from one of Basil's letters falls particularly flat with me whenever I see you use it. It has absolutely no value in my eyes as a charge against Thomas. The context and content is radically foreign to the discussion of Thomas' theology.

[. . .][/quote]
No offense, but I doubt you have read many of St. Gregory Palamas' writings.

In the [i]Capita Physica[/i] he says quite clearly that there are three "realities" in God, i.e., essence, energy, and a triad of divine [i]hypostaseis[/i]. Thus, Palamas teaches, both in the [i]Capita Physica[/i] and in the [i]Triads[/i], that the distinction between essence and energy, the distinction between [i]hypostasis[/i] and energy, and the distinction between essence and [i]hypostasis[/i], are real, and not merely "formal" or "notional." In fact, [i]theosis[/i] is not possible if one fails to make these real distinctions. The denial of a "real" distinction is a common failure of Western Scholars who desperately try to see the Cappadocian / Maximian / Palamite distinction between essence and energy in Neo-Platonic or Aristotelian terms.

As far as the Cappadocian Fathers are concerned, if a man denies that they make a "real" distinction between essence and energy he destroys their argument against the heretic Eunomius. The divine essence is [i]adiastemic[/i] and that means that man cannot have any knowledge of it, nor can he participate in it in any sense, because to do so would involve the annihilation of created essence. Salvation involves an existential change in man, not an essential change.

Now as far as St. Thomas' philosophical speculations are concerned, the East rejects them because they are founded upon the thought of Aristotle, and the Eastern Church condemned Aristotle's philosophical theories centuries ago. In fact those condemnations are celebrated in the divine liturgy on the Feast of the Triumph of Orthodoxy.

Finally, if the quotation from St. Basil falls flat with you, it simply means that you have failed to grasp the true nature of the ontological gap between uncreated and created essence. I must admit that I was truly sad when I read your comments, because it tells me that our instant message conversations on the [i]diastema[/i] have been fruitless.

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='Laudate_Dominum' post='979873' date='May 13 2006, 06:30 AM']
[. . .]

There are quite a few scholastics and they are all pretty different. This is an outlandish statement. There were scholastics who weren't far from Palamas in some regards.

[. . .]
[/quote]
I would put it this way: when you compare St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure it is like comparing two oranges, one with a "sunkist" sticker on it, and the other without a sticker, while the East is an apple.

But seriously, the Scholastics approach theology from a speculative philosophical perspective and this is simply foreign to the Eastern Church.

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='Laudate_Dominum' post='979792' date='May 13 2006, 04:18 AM']
[. . .]

Byzantine theologian Endre von Ivanka actually holds that a "real" distinction of essence and energies contradicts the thought of the Greek Fathers. I believe the reasoning pertains to the Cappadocians intent to avoid formulations which suggest that the creature participates in God's being by virtue of a Neo-Platonic emanationism, which is precisely what some in the east have viewed Palamism to be. Palamism is a reversion to the Platonic idea of participation by the creature in successive levels of God's being.

[. . .]
[/quote]
Well, there are of course a few Byzantine Christians who misunderstand Palamas, but the fact that Endre von Ivanka is in error does not alter the reality that the distinction between essence and energy is "real," and not merely "notional." If the distinction is not "real" the Cappadocian argument against Eunomius collapses. The [i]diastemic[/i] nature of creation is written into its very nature, and that is why creatures cannot transcend, either in thought or in reality, their own dimensional and kinetic being. Salvation, as I have pointed out before, is existential change, not essential change.

Anyone who thinks that Palamas, who attacked explicitly Neo-Platonic thought in connection with [i]theosis[/i] has either never read Palamas, or has misread him. The West commonly makes these types of misreadings, and not only of Palamas, but of Pseudo-Dionysios as well, and Dr. John Jones -- who was formerly the head of the philosophy department at Marquette -- has written some excellent critiques in connection with St. Thomas' misreading of Pseudo-Dionysios (See his articles entitled: [i]Misreading the Divine Names as a Science: A Scholastic Framework for Reading the Divine Names of Pseudo-Dionysios[/i], and [i]Manifesting Beyond-being Being (Hyperousios Ousia): The Divine Essence / Energies Distinction for Pseudo-Dionysios the Areopagite[/i]).

It is important to note that only some of the problems between East and West have there origin in the West's use of philosophy in theology (e.g., the West's acceptance of a concept of divine simplicity built upon the thought of Plotinus, the reduction of the divine [i]hypostaseis[/i] to an Aristotelian and Platonic dialetic of "relations of opposition," etc.), while other problems are founded upon basic theological differences in connection with how the two sides understand grace and even salvation itself.

The article in the link below gives a good explanation of the Eastern position on the essence / energy distinction:

[url="http://www.geocities.com/trvalentine/orthodox/yannaras.html"][u]The Distinction between Essence and Energies and its Importance in Theology[/u][/url]