Incarnation in Time

[rkwright]

Well simply put, how? How can a God outside of time, 'change' and become inside of time? Is there any good proof for this? Or do we just leave it at the mystery of the Incarnation?

Thoughts?

[Paphnutius]

[quote name='rkwright' date='Feb 28 2006, 11:59 AM']Well simply put, how?  How can a God outside of time, 'change' and become inside of time?  Is there any good proof for this?  Or do we just leave it at the mystery of the Incarnation? 

Thoughts?
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[/quote]
God is both transcendent (outside of time) and eminent (inside of time). We see other acts like this such as the theophanies with Moses where God reveals His Name.

[cmotherofpirl]

I am sure you will get very long answers to this
God is the author, time is the book. the Author can do as He pleases.

[rkwright]

[quote name='Paphnutius' date='Feb 28 2006, 01:05 PM']God is both transcendent (outside of time) and eminent (inside of time). We see other acts like this such as the theophanies with Moses where God reveals His Name.
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[/quote]

Is this possible? To be an unchanging timeless diety, yet 'enter' into time at some point? Can He both unchanging and changing at the same time?

Maybe a bit more indepth Pap? You've got my attention...

[Paphnutius]

[quote name='rkwright' date='Feb 28 2006, 12:12 PM']Is this possible?  To be an unchanging timeless diety, yet 'enter' into time at some point?  Can He both unchanging and changing at the same time? 

Maybe a bit more indepth Pap?  You've got my attention...
[right][snapback]900022[/snapback][/right]
[/quote] Well I will have to be careful with the way that I word things. When we say that He enters into time (such as the Incarnation or the theophanies) this does not imply that God is changing ad intra. The doctrine of God's immutability does not mean that God is either always speaking or not speaking at all, it means that God is the same God (ie: omnipresent, omniscient, all-good) all the time. His divine will does not change. He is pure act, and therefore the most perfect being (or Being itself some would say). The immutability refers to God being pure act, and not at all potential.

Is it possible? Sure God did it didnt He?

I am sorry but I have to run into town and I will not be on until later this evening. I will try to write more then.

Edited February 28, 2006 by Paphnutius

[Jake Huether]

St. Augustine has much to say about this in his "Confessions".

You touch on the same question:

If God's will never changes, and He willed to create the earth... how is it that the earth is not infinite with God - or even God Himself?

If you answer this question, the other falls into place.

The answer has to do with God not "entering" time. It has to with Him creating time to begin with.

Therefore, God is not the phenominon. Rather, time is. What is time with respect to God, then?

Is it snapshots of God's eternal will unfolding for us?

St. Augustine likens the potential of creation and creation to music and sound. If asked the question, which comes first? It is obvious that sound does. And yet when one sings a song, they don't vocalize sound that later turns into music. Music is instantanious with sound in time.

So it is with the creation of the world. You can't say that God was there before creation - because "before" implies that time was happening before time was created. Creation was instantanious with God in time. And yet we understand that God is before creation. In that He was the one that created it.

And in this we can see that like sound and music, God the Son recieving His Flesh at a certain point in our time, does not imply that God has changed. Remember, there is a distinction to be made with respect to the Nature of God, which is God, and the Person of God, who is the Son. And it is true then also at this point that it is a mystery, just HOW God the Son is both God and Man 100%. Being God, the Son cannot change. Yet, being Man means that He does indeed grow and change. The mystery doesn't mean it cannot be understood. It just meens that in order for it to be understood God must reveal it to us.

God bless and I hope this helped a little.

[Socrates]

[quote name='rkwright' date='Feb 28 2006, 11:59 AM']Well simply put, how?  How can a God outside of time, 'change' and become inside of time?  Is there any good proof for this?  Or do we just leave it at the mystery of the Incarnation? 

Thoughts?
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[/quote]
This is the essence of the Mystery and Wonder of the Incarnation.

The Eternal Creator enters into time and history.

[Paphnutius]

[quote name='Jake Huether' date='Feb 28 2006, 01:39 PM'] God the Son recieving His Flesh at a certain point in our time, does not imply that God has changed.  Remember, there is a distinction to be made with respect to the Nature of God, which is God, and the Person of God, who is the Son.  And it is true then also at this point that it is a mystery, just HOW God the Son is both God and Man 100%.  Being God, the Son cannot change.  Yet, being Man means that He does indeed grow and change.   The mystery doesn't mean it cannot be understood.  It just meens that in order for it to be understood God must reveal it to us.
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Thank you for putting into words what I could not.

There was a question which overlaps some with this on the FBC board about God dieing. God as God did not die, God as man did die.

Edited March 1, 2006 by Paphnutius

[Guest JeffCR07]

It is also important to note the distinction that Anselm makes in his [i]Monologion[/i]: It is better to say that God is "everywhere" rather than "in every place" and that He is "always" rather than "in every time." This is true because God is not circumscribed either by place or by time. Rather, God circumscribes both.

It is not as if God was "outside" time before the Incarnation and "inside" time after it. God is present everywhere and always, the Incarnation is important because God took flesh, not because God all of a sudden became "within time." The Incarnation had no more impact on the Nature of God than the act of Creation.

[rkwright]

So God would be both a sempiternal and atemporal by your descriptions?

[Guest JeffCR07]

sempiternal is a bad word to use, given the fact that it does not distinguish between a thing circumscribed by time but enduring forever and a thing circumscribing time by whose presence time itself exists. Our Souls, Angels, and our Ressurrected Bodies are all as the former, only God is like the latter.

A pithy and dangerous way to say it, though also getting the point across, is to say that God is not in time, but time is in God. At every moment, God [i]is[/i], whole and indivisible, because it is by virtue of participating in God that all things, including time and place, exist. Wheresoever a thing exists, there also is God present.

[rkwright]

Which word is better for the idea I'm trying to get across?

Could you explain a little more on what you mean by God is everywhere by everything's particpation in Him? God's own Divine Nature in me?

[Guest JeffCR07]

No, rather, your nature is in God. Everything that exists was created by Him from nothing, and everything that remains in existence does so because He conserves it in its being. God [i]is[/i] Necessary Being, and all contingent being (like you me, and even time and place) exists only on account of Necessary Being.

It is for this reason that we say "God is always and everywhere" - because it is only through His presence that any other existence exists and remains in existence at all.

I will find Anselm's discussion of this and post it later.

[rkwright]

Does God have to be 'in time' to keep everything contigent existing? Does it follow that because everything must be held in existance by God that He must also be within our time?

This is new and interesting ground for me. I always figured there was a sharp distinction and either God was atemporal or temporal. After a little reading I wasn't too happy with having God hostage to time in the temporal sense, so I went with only atemporal. Yet that poses the problem of the topic.

Continue Jeff! or anyone else who can provide more insight...

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]CHAPTER TWENTY
The Supreme Being exists in every place and at all times.

It was concluded above that this Creative Nature exists everywhere,
in all things and through all things; and the fact that it neither
began to exist nor will cease to exist entails that it always was,
is, and will be. Nonetheless, I detect a murmur of contradiction
which requires me to investigate more closely where and when the
Supreme Being exists. Accordingly, the Supreme Being exists either
(1) everywhere and always or (2) only in some place and at
some time or (3) nowhere and never—in other words, either (1)
in every place and at every time or (2) [only] in a delimited way
in some place and at some time or (3) in no place and at no time.
But what is more obviously objectionable than [supposing] that
what exists supremely and most truly, exists nowhere and never?
Therefore, it is false that the Supreme Being exists nowhere and
never. Moreover, without this Being there would exist neither any
good nor anything at all. Hence, if it existed nowhere or never,
there would nowhere or never be anything good and nowhere or
never be anything at all. (It is not necessary to discuss how false
this [consequence] is.) (NOT 3) So it is false that the Supreme Being
nowhere and never exists. Hence, either it exists [only] in a delimited
way in some place and at some time or else it exists everywhere
and always. Assume that it exists only in a delimited way
in some place and at some time. Then, only where and when it
existed could anything exist; where and when it did not exist, no
being would exist—because without the Supreme Being there
would be nothing. Thus, it would follow that there is a place and
a time at which there would not exist anything at all. But this [consequence]
is false; for that place and that time would be something.
(NOT 2) Therefore, the Supreme Nature cannot exist [only]
in a delimited way in some place and at some time. Now, if it be
said that through itself this Nature exists in a delimited way in
some place and at some time but that through its power it exists
wherever and whenever something is—[this statement] would not
be true. For since, clearly, this Nature's power is nothing other
than itself, its power exists in no way apart from itself. (1) Therefore,
since [this Nature] does not exist in a delimited way in any
place or at any time, it is necessary that it exist everywhere and
always, i.e., in every place and at every time.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE
[The Supreme Being] exists in no place at no time.

But if [the foregoing conclusion] holds, then either [the Supreme
Being] exists as a whole in every place and at every time or else
only a part of it [occupies every place and time], with the result
that the rest of it exists beyond every place and time. But if it
partly were and partly were not in every place and at every time,
then it would have parts—[a consequence] which is false. Hence,
it is not the case that only a part of it exists everywhere and always.
But how does it exist as a whole everywhere and always? We
must understand this either (1) in such way that the whole of it
once occupies every place and time through its parts which are
present in each place and at each time, or else (2) in such way
that it exists as a whole even in each place and at each time. But
if through its parts it is present in each place at each time, [this
Nature] would not escape composition from parts and division
into parts—something which has been found to be totally foreign
to the Supreme Nature. Hence, it does not exist as a whole in all
places or at all times in such way that through parts it is in each
place and at each time. [So] the second alternative remains to be
discussed, viz., how the Supreme Nature exists as a whole in each
and every place and at each and every time. Now, without doubt,
this can occur [i.e., the Supreme Nature can exist in each and
every place and at each and every time] only at the same time or
else at different times. But since the law of place and the law of
time (which hitherto one procedure was able to examine, because
these [laws] moved forward together on the same footing) here
diverge from each other and seem to “shun” (as it were) disputation
by [taking] different routes, let each be examined distinctly
in a discussion of its own. So first let it be seen whether the
Supreme Nature can exist in each place as a whole—either at the
same time or at different times. Then, let the same question be
posed about [different] times [viz., the question whether at each
time the Supreme Nature can exist as a whole—either at each time
at once or else at each time successively].
If, then, [the Supreme Nature] were to exist as a whole in each
place at once, these wholes would be distinct in the distinct places.
For just as one place is distinct from another (so that they are different
places), so what exists as a whole in one place is distinct
from what at the same time exists as a whole in another place (so
that they are different wholes). For none of what exists as a whole
in a given place fails to exist in that place. And if none of a thing
fails to exist in a given place, none of it exists at the same time
anywhere besides in that place. Therefore, none of what exists
wholly in a given place exists at the same time outside that place.
But if none of it exists outside a given place, none of it exists at
the same time in some other place. Thus, that which exists as a
whole in any place does not at all exist at the same time in another
place. Accordingly, with regard to whatever exists as a whole in
some place, how would it likewise exist as a whole in another place
at the same time—if none of it can exist in another place? Therefore,
inasmuch as one whole cannot at the same time exist as a
whole in different places, it follows that in the distinct places there
would be distinct wholes—if in each place there were something
existing as a whole at the same time. Thus, if the Supreme Nature
were to exist as a whole in every single place at the same time,
there would be as many distinct supreme natures as there can be
distinct places—[a conclusion] which it is unreasonable to believe.
Therefore, it is not the case that [the Supreme Nature] exists as a
whole in each place at the same time.
On the other hand, if [the Supreme Nature] were to exist as a
whole in each place at different times, then while it existed in one
place no good and no being would be present in other places, because
without the Supreme Being not anything at all exists. But
these very places, which are something rather than nothing, prove
this [alternative] to be absurd. Thus, it is not the case that the
Supreme Nature exists as a whole in each place at different times.
But if it does not exist in each place as a whole either at the
same time or at different times, clearly it does not at all exist as
a whole in every single place.
I must now investigate whether this Supreme Nature exists as
a whole at each time—either [existing] at each time at once or else
[existing] at each time successively. But how would anything exist
as a whole at each time at once, if these [different] times are not
simultaneous? On the other hand, if [this Nature] were to exist as
a whole distinctly and successively at each time (as a man exists
as a whole yesterday, today, and tomorrow), then [this Nature]
would properly be said to have existed, to exist, and to be going
to exist. Therefore, its lifetime—which is nothing other than its
eternity—would not exist as a whole at once but would be extended
by parts throughout the parts of time. Now, its eternity is
nothing other than itself. Hence, the Supreme Being would be divided
into parts according to the divisions of time. For if its life-time were produced throughout the course of time, it would together
with time have a past, a present, and a future. But what is
its lifetime or its length of existing other than its eternity? Consequently,
since its eternity is nothing other than its essence (as
unhasty reasoning unassailably proved in the foregoing [discussion]),
if its eternity had a past, a present, and a future its essence
would also have to have a past, a present, and a future. Now, what
is past is not present or future; and what is present is not past or
future; and what is future is not past or present. Therefore, if the
Supreme Nature were different things at different times and if it
had temporally distributed parts, how would there remain firm
what was previously shown by clear and rational necessity—viz.,
that the Supreme Nature is in no way composite but is supremely
simple and supremely immutable? Or rather, if those [conclusions]
are true [viz., that the Supreme Nature is supremely simple
and immutable]—indeed, since they are clear truths—how are
these [conclusions] possible [viz., that the Supreme Nature is different
things at different times and has temporal parts]? Hence,
neither the Creative Being, its lifetime, nor its eternity admits in
any way of a past or a future. (But if [this Being] truly [i.e., really]
is, how would it fail to have a present?) Yet, “it was” signifies a
past; and “it will be” signifies a future. Therefore, it never was
and never will be. Consequently, it no more exists as a whole at
each different time successively than it exists as a whole at each
different time at once.
If, then, (as was argued), the Supreme Being does not exist as
a whole in every place and at every time (1) in such way that the
whole of it once occupies every [place and time] through its parts,
which are present in each [place] and at each [time], and [if it
does] not [exist in each place and at each time] (2) in such way
that it exists as a whole in each [place] and at each [time], then
clearly the Supreme Nature does not at all exist as a whole in every
place and at every time. And since we have also seen that [the
Supreme Nature] does not exist in every place and at every time
in such way that part of it occupies every [place and time] while
part of it is beyond every place and time, it is impossible that [the
Supreme Nature] exist everywhere and always. For it could not at all
be thought to exist everywhere and always except either as a whole
or as a part. Now, if it does not at all exist everywhere and always,
it [must] exist either in a delimited way in some place and at some
time or else in no [place and] at no [time]. But I have already argued
that it cannot exist in a delimited way in some [place] or at
some [time]. Therefore, it [must] exist in no place and at no time,
i.e., nowhere and never; for it could not exist except either in every
[place] and [at every time] or else in some [place] and at some
[time].
On the other hand, since it is uncontestably evident not only (1)
that [the Supreme Nature] exists through itself without beginning
and end but also (2) that if it did not exist nothing would ever exist
anywhere, it is necessary that the Supreme Nature exist everywhere and
always.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO
How [the Supreme Being] exists in every place
at every time and in no place at no time.

How, then, are these [two conclusions] (so contradictory according
to their utterance, so necessary according to their proof) consistent
with each other? Well, perhaps the Supreme Nature does
exist in place and time in a way which does not prevent it from so
existing as a whole in each place at once and as a whole at each
time at once that, nonetheless, (1) these are not many wholes but
are only one whole and (2) its lifetime (which is only its true eternity)
is not divided into a past, a present, and a future. For only
those things which exist in place or time in such way that they do
not transcend spatial extension or temporal duration are bound
by the law of place and the law of time. Therefore, just as for things
which do not transcend place and time it is said in all truth that
one and the same whole cannot exist as a whole in different places
at once and cannot exist as a whole at different times at once, so
for those things which do transcend place and time the foregoing
statement need not hold true. For the following statements are
seen to be correct: “A thing has a place only if a place contains
the thing's size by delimiting it and delimits the thing's size by containing
it”; and “A thing has a time only if a time somehow limits
the thing's duration by measuring it and measures the thing's duration
by limiting it.” Therefore, if something's size or duration has
no spatial or temporal limitation, then [that thing] is truly stated
to have no place and no time. For since place does not affect it in
the way that place does [affect things], and since time [does not
affect it] in the way that time [does affect things], we may reasonably
say that no place is its place and that no time is its time.
But what is seen to have no place or time is shown assuredly to
be not at all subject to the law of place or the law of time. Therefore,
no law of place or of time in any way restricts a nature which
place and time do not at all confine by any containment.
But which rational ref lection does not exclude, in every respect,
[the possibility] that some spatial or temporal restriction
confines the Creative and Supreme Substance, which must be
other than, and free from, the nature and the law of all things
which it made from nothing? For, rather, the Supreme Substance's
power (which is nothing other than its essence) confines, by containing
beneath itself, all the things which it made. How is it not
also a mark of shameless ignorance to say that place delimits the
greatness (quantitatem)—or that time measures the duration—of
the Supreme Truth, which does not at all admit of greatness, or
smallness, of spatial or temporal extension?
It is, then, a determining condition of place and of time that
only whatever is bounded by their limits cannot escape the relatedness
of parts—whether the kind of relatedness that its place undergoes
with respect to size or the kind of relatedness that its time
undergoes with respect to duration. Nor can this thing in any way
be contained as a whole by different places at once, nor as a whole
by different times at once. (But whatever is not at all bound by
the containment of place and of time is not bound by the law of
place or the law of time with respect to multiplicity of parts, or is
not prevented from being present as a whole at the same time in
many places or at many times.) Since this, I say, is a determining
condition of place and time, without doubt the Supreme Substance—
which is not bound by any containment of place and of
time—is not bound by the law of place and the law of time. Therefore,
since an inescapable necessity demands that the Supreme
Being be present as a whole in every place and at every time, and
since no law of place or of time prohibits the Supreme Being from
being present as a whole in every place at once or from being present
as a whole at every time at once, the Supreme Being must
be present as a whole in each and every place at once and present
as a whole at each and every time at once. Its being present at one place or time does not prevent it from being simultaneously
and similarly present at another place or time. Nor is it the case
that because it was or is or will be, something of its eternity (a)
has vanished from the temporal present along with the past, which
no longer exists, or (b) fades with the present, which scarcely exists,
or © is going to come with the future, which does not yet
exist. For the law of place and the law of time do not in any way
compel to exist or not to exist in any place or at any time (and
do not in any way prevent from existing or not existing in any
place or at any time) that which does not in any way confine its
own existence within place and time. For if the Supreme Being is
said to be in place or time, then even though on account of our
customary way of speaking [this] one utterance applies both to the
Supreme Being and to spatial and temporal natures, nonetheless
on account of the dissimilarity of these beings the meaning [of the
utterance] is different [in the two cases]. For in the case of spatial
and temporal natures the one utterance signifies two things:
viz., (1) that they are present in the places and at the times they
are said to be present; and (2) that [these natures] are contained
by these places and times. By contrast, in the case of the Supreme
Being only one thing is understood, viz., that the Supreme Being
is present—not, in addition, that it is contained.
Therefore, if our ordinary way of speaking were to permit, [the
Supreme Being] would seem more suitably said to be with a place
or with a time than to be in a place or in or at a time. For when
something is said to be in something else, it is signified to be contained—
more than [it is thus signified] when it is said to be with
something else. Therefore, [the Supreme Being] is not properly
said to be in any place or time, because [the Supreme Being] is not
at all contained by anything else. And yet, in its own way, it can
be said to be in every place and time, inasmuch as all other existing
things are sustained by its presence in order that they not
fall away into nothing. [The Supreme Being] is in every place and
time because it is absent from none; and it is in no [place or time]
because it has no place or time. It does not receive into itself distinctions
of place and time—as, for example, here, there, and somewhere,
or now, then, and sometime. Nor does it exist in the f leeting
temporal present which we experience, nor did it exist in the past,
nor will it exist in the future. For these are distinguishing properties of delimited and mutable things; but it is neither delimited
nor mutable. Nevertheless, these [temporal modes] can in a sense
be predicated of the Supreme Being, inasmuch as it is present to
all delimited and mutable things just as if it were delimited by the
same places [as they are] and were changed during the same times
[as they are]. And so, we see clearly (as clearly as is sufficient for
resolving what sounded contradictory) how according to the consistent
truth of [two] different meanings the Supreme Being exists
everywhere and always, nowhere and never—i.e., in every
place and time, and in no place or time.[/quote]

St. Anselm of Canterbury, Doctor of the Church, [i]Monologion[/i]

Edited March 2, 2006 by JeffCR07