Problem of Evil

[N/A Gone]

[quote name='rkwright' date='Feb 24 2006, 09:56 AM']Rev good to see you back! your thoughts on this?  Of course an open thiest can get around this problem very easily...
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how do you think we would get around it very easy? hehe...buyt yea, theodicy is a major reason I hold to openess principles

[Myles Domini]

I have always balked at the Problem of Evil because I do not regard it as a problem. I find the obsession with the problem of evil amongst people today to be a culturally conditioned phenomena mainly amognst people who have no direct experience of the most gratitious forms of suffering.

The places in the world where monotheism is growing fastest are the places where its agreed people are suffering most profoundly. Yet, it is generally agreed that those peoples are the most 'conservative' believers and find no problems accepting the traditional understanding of God's goodness in spite of their plight.

In my opinion I believe its symptomatic of Westerners being accustomed to instant gratitification at the wave of a dollar or a euro that causes Europeans and Americans find evil to be such a 'problem'. Case in point St Thomas Aquinas.

Some people say that Aquinas' answer to the problem of evil is unsatisfactory. But what gives them the right to say that? My answer to most modern critics of Aquinas is that when they've experienced the war torn, disease ridden, violent nature of medieval Europe whilst holding the vows of poverty, chastity and obidience I will begin to take note of their criticisms!

As to your question why world #2? Well if you follow Alvin Plantinga's free will defence then there is no way it could've been otherwise. Me I'm not so sure. Defining freedom as an act taken arising from nature uncoerced from outside with knowledge of the ends of one's choice I dont see that its inconceivable that God could've created man to always choose the good. Indeed, that is what Heaven is like. As you said rkwright the possibility need exist but there's no reason why it has to be actualised. Why allow it then?

Part of me has the inclination to ask: why not? The logical problem of evil is based around the notion that an all good God cannot be all powerful and there be evil in the world. As Aquinas shows when he treats the question [url="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/104900.htm"]The cause of evil[/url] there is a logically coherent answer to this charge thus making it null and void. We needn't go further, the charge has been answered we need only motion for a dismissal the state of our clients mind is not on trial. Yet, if you want to know why God made the world the way it is I believe Job 38-42 gives a great answer. Beyond that however I speculate that the reason God allowed us the freedom to do wrong was about love.

Love is known in sacrifice and best appreciated in sacrifice. God could've manipulated man to always choose the God but if we always chose the God could we really have understood the reality of forgiveness, of redemption, of the God who is abounding in steadfast love quick to mercy and slow to anger? Yes, conceptually of course we could've. But having no experience of these things would we truly be able to taste the reality? Without knowing what it meant to fall would we appreciate what it means to be helped to our feet again inspite of the fact that nothing we could ever do, even scaling the heights of created perfection, could ever make amends from the infinity penalty incurred against the infinite justice of the uncreated God? Had we not known loss and agony and pain could we have truly seen the passion for what it [b]is[/b]: the ultimate possible expression of the Divine Love for humanity?

At this point I quote St Augustine: "God would not allow evil lest he could draw from it a greater good" and direct you to the crucifix. [quote]16 ‘For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not perish but may have eternal life.[/quote]

Edited February 24, 2006 by Myles

[rkwright]

[quote name='Myles' date='Feb 24 2006, 03:06 PM']I have always balked at the Problem of Evil because I do not regard it as a problem. I find the obsession with the problem of evil amongst people today to be a culturally conditioned phenomena mainly amognst people who have no direct experience of the most gratitious forms of suffering.

The places in the world where monotheism is growing fastest are the places where its agreed people are suffering most profoundly. Yet, it is generally agreed that those peoples are the most 'conservative' believers and find no problems accepting the traditional understanding of God's goodness in spite of their plight.

In my opinion I believe its symptomatic of Westerners being accustomed to instant gratitification at the wave of a dollar or a euro that causes Europeans and Americans find evil to be such a 'problem'. Case in point St Thomas Aquinas.

Some people say that Aquinas' answer to the problem of evil is unsatisfactory. But what gives them the right to say that? My answer to most modern critics of Aquinas is that when they've experienced the war torn, disease ridden, violent nature of medieval Europe whilst holding the vows of poverty, chastity and obidience I will begin to take note of their criticisms!

As to your question why world #2? Well if you follow Alvin Plantinga's free will defence then there is no way it could've been otherwise. Me I'm not so sure. Defining freedom as an act taken arising from nature uncoerced from outside with knowledge of the ends of one's choice I dont see that its inconceivable that God could've created man to always choose the good. Indeed, that is what Heaven is like. As you said rkwright the possibility need exist but there's no reason why it has to be actualised. Why allow it then?

Part of me has the inclination to ask: why not? The logical problem of evil is based around the notion that an all good God cannot be all powerful and there be evil in the world. As Aquinas shows when he treats the question [url="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/104900.htm"]The cause of evil[/url] there is a logically coherent answer to this charge thus making it null and void. We needn't go further, the charge has been answered we need only motion for a dismissal the state of our clients mind is not on trial. Yet, if you want to know why God made the world the way it is I believe Job 38-42 gives a great answer. Beyond that however I speculate that the reason God allowed us the freedom to do wrong was about love.

Love is known in sacrifice and best appreciated in sacrifice. God could've manipulated man to always choose the God but if we always chose the God could we really have understood the reality of forgiveness, of redemption, of the God who is abounding in steadfast love quick to mercy and slow to anger? Yes, conceptually of course we could've. But having no experience of these things would we truly be able to taste the reality? Without knowing what it meant to fall would we appreciate what it means to be helped to our feet again inspite of the fact that nothing we could ever do, even scaling the heights of created perfection, could ever make amends from the infinity penalty incurred against the infinite justice of the uncreated God? Had we not known loss and agony and pain could we have truly seen the passion for what it [b]is[/b]: the ultimate possible expression of the Divine Love for humanity?

At this point I quote St Augustine: "God would not allow evil lest he could draw from it a greater good" and direct you to the crucifix.
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thanks myles for your post, I was waiting for your response. I'm working on Plantinga's essay right now, along with some others. Hopefully by the end of the weekend I'll have something on it.

The second to last paragraph is a very good response that I heard a few days ago from a close friend of mine. World #1 allows God to show His love and mercy more fully, and maybe there is more love in the world because of it.

I like what you said about experiencing evil, and honestly Hume's classic model of the problem of evil doesn't seem like much of an argument. Though this one (I think tihs is Macke's?) was a new twist on an old argument, interesting though.

[Guest JeffCR07]

Allow me a few philosophical reflections: I don't have a lot of time to spend on this, but it seems to me that all of the comments here, despite the intelligent points in some, are making a glaring mistake. All of them are assuming that "God could have done X or Y." But if we look at what we mean by "God" we see that this is clearly not the case.

Leibniz, in his attempt to deal with this problem, came to the conclusion that this is the "best of all possible worlds," by reasoning that because God is Wisdom and wisdom does not err, it follows that God does not err. If, he continues, God does not err, and God could have created this world or a different one, then we must conclude that this world is better than the other. Therefore, this world must be the best of all possible worlds.

Leibniz's error is the same that is being made by many people here. He is assuming that God could have made another world. But what follows from this conclusion? If we admit that God could have made another world, then we are admitting that God [i]could have made an unwise choice[/i]. But this is clearly not what we believe. Rather, we must conclude that [u]possibilities do not exist for God[/u]. This makes sense, given that a "possibility" is nothing more than the ability to actualize a potential, and we know that there is no potentiality in God.

Leibniz was wrong to say that this is the best of all possible worlds. It is the [i]only[/i] possible world with respect to God's act of Creation. In human action lies potentiality, and so possibility. It is possible for you or I to do other than we have done because we have the capacity for error, but God's action comes from Himself, and He is pure necessity, pure actuality. This necessity, this actuality, is nothing other than the necessity and actuality of Love.

So the answer to the "problem of evil" that I put forward is this: There is no problem of evil, only confused thinking on the part of the questioner. The moment someone states "God could have made..." is the moment someone starts thinking illogically about God. But without that premise, the supposed "problem" falls apart.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[N/A Gone]

i have to ask....

but why?

also, molinism is allowed within the church and the whole point of it was that there was multiple possibilities

[Myles Domini]

[quote name='Revprodeji' date='Feb 24 2006, 09:09 PM']i have to ask....

but why?

also, molinism is allowed within the church and the whole point of it was that there was multiple possibilities
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You're misunderstanding [url="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10437a.htm"]Molinism[/url]

Edited February 24, 2006 by Myles

[Myles Domini]

[quote name='JeffCR07' date='Feb 24 2006, 09:03 PM']Allow me a few philosophical reflections: I don't have a lot of time to spend on this, but it seems to me that all of the comments here, despite the intelligent points in some, are making a glaring mistake. All of them are assuming that "God could have done X or Y." But if we look at what we mean by "God" we see that this is clearly not the case.

Leibniz, in his attempt to deal with this problem, came to the conclusion that this is the "best of all possible worlds," by reasoning that because God is Wisdom and wisdom does not err, it follows that God does not err. If, he continues, God does not err, and God could have created this world or a different one, then we must conclude that this world is better than the other. Therefore, this world must be the best of all possible worlds.

Leibniz's error is the same that is being made by many people here. He is assuming that God could have made another world. But what follows from this conclusion? If we admit that God could have made another world, then we are admitting that God [i]could have made an unwise choice[/i]. But this is clearly not what we believe. Rather, we must conclude that [u]possibilities do not exist for God[/u]. This makes sense, given that a "possibility" is nothing more than the ability to actualize a potential, and we know that there is no potentiality in God.

Leibniz was wrong to say that this is the best of all possible worlds. It is the [i]only[/i] possible world with respect to God's act of Creation. In human action lies potentiality, and so possibility. It is possible for you or I to do other than we have done because we have the capacity for error, but God's action comes from Himself, and He is pure necessity, pure actuality. This necessity, this actuality, is nothing other than the necessity and actuality of Love.

So the answer to the "problem of evil" that I put forward is this: There is no problem of evil, only confused thinking on the part of the questioner. The moment someone states "God could have made..." is the moment someone starts thinking illogically about God. But without that premise, the supposed "problem" falls apart.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff
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I hadn't thought of that

Edited February 24, 2006 by Myles

[God Conquers]

Awesome answer Jeff.

However, I do object to the statement that "there is no problem of evil" because, even admitting that this world is the only possible world, evil is still a problem for the mind of man. Although you would be right on if you are simply coming to that conclusion for the "problem of evil" stated as is in THIS particular question.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote name='God Conquers' date='Feb 24 2006, 04:30 PM']Awesome answer Jeff.

However, I do object to the statement that "there is no problem of evil" because, even admitting that this world is the only possible world, evil is still a problem for the mind of man. Although you would be right on if you are simply  coming to that conclusion for the "problem of evil" stated as is in THIS particular question.
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When I talk about the "problem of evil" I am doing so strictly in the sense of the philosophical debate. Of course evil is a problem in the sense of the common usage, and that problem is not trivial. But when philosophers discuss "the problem of evil" they are discussing whether or not the existence of evil should cause us to doubt God's existence. The point of my previous post is that this philosophical "problem" is nothing more than a confused question.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote name='Revprodeji' date='Feb 24 2006, 03:09 PM']i have to ask....

but why?

also, molinism is allowed within the church and the whole point of it was that there was multiple possibilities
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I'm not sure what you are asking with your "but why?" question, however I can answer your question about molinism. Molinism, or any other libertarian system, does not contradict what I have said above. These systems concern themselves with [i]human[/i] acts, not the nature of the Divinity itself. As I said above, human acts have possibilities, Divine Act does not.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[Myles Domini]

Jeff I am curious about your answer. I'm sure its something I am overlooking but inspite of your impressive deduction something just isnt sinking in.

I'm probably misinterpreting you admittedly but your deduction seems to impinge upon the Divine freedom to create. You argued that God could not have created a different world because all potentiality is actualised in God and I absolutely agree that God is pure act. However, having mulled over your words I cannot see how you deduce from God's act of being that our world could not have been different?

Using the same arguments that you do in your presentation contra Leibniz one could deduce that the creation itself was a neccessary act. You argued that because there is no potency in God He had to make the world the way it is as possibility is not open to God. However, this line of reasoning would seem to threaten the freedom of God in His act of creation would it not?

Following the chain of logic you employ to justify God's creating the world by neccessity as it is, could one not also say that since there is no potentiality in God to choose between possibilities God must by neccessity be creator? This however, you would accept, is an errenous notion.

As is argued in [url="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/101910.htm"]Summa theol., I-I, 19, 10[/url] God must will nothing by neccessity apart from that which is neccessary, namely absolutely actualisation of all possible perfections: Himself.

Since all created goods exist in perfected form in God's act of being as self subsistent esse it is perfectly reasonable to imagine Him not having created at all. Likewise then since God had the choice not to create the world can we not also reason that God had the choice to make a different world than he actually did?

The fact God's self subsistent esse is pure act indeed appears to underscore the idea that God could've created a different world than the one we know rather than doing the opposite? Given that all possible potentialities existed as actualised in God it was surely God's choice to choose any of the goods existing in Himself and as the basis for all created essence?

As I said before, I maybe reading you wrongly (and I probably am : ) but I am worried that as your presenation stands it would be easy to use that manner of logic to make God into a neccessary creator. Your current formulation seems to blur what God must will by neccessity by being self subsistent esse and what He is perfectly free to make into created essence based upon His uncreated [i]isness[/i]--which of course would, in God's never passing instant, not happen subsequently to His own act of being but simultaneously in a manner incomprehensible for diastemic beings.

So, for clarity's sake, would you mind unpacking your argument against Leibniz a little more?

Thank you
Myles

Edited February 25, 2006 by Myles

[rkwright]

oo I knew when you guys got here this would take an interesting turn! carry on....

[rkwright]

[quote name='JeffCR07' date='Feb 24 2006, 04:03 PM']Leibniz, in his attempt to deal with this problem, came to the conclusion that this is the "best of all possible worlds," by reasoning that because God is Wisdom and wisdom does not err, it follows that God does not err. If, he continues, God does not err, and God could have created this world or a different one, then we must conclude that this world is better than the other. Therefore, this world must be the best of all possible worlds.

Leibniz's error is the same that is being made by many people here. He is assuming that God could have made another world. But what follows from this conclusion? If we admit that God could have made another world, then we are admitting that God [i]could have made an unwise choice[/i]. But this is clearly not what we believe. Rather, we must conclude that [u]possibilities do not exist for God[/u]. This makes sense, given that a "possibility" is nothing more than the ability to actualize a potential, and we know that there is no potentiality in God.
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Is this contradictory?

The claim in paragraph one:
God could not err, He is Wisdom

And conclusion in paragraph two:
God could have made an unwise choice

is there a difference between an unwise choice and a erronous choice?

[Semalsia]

[quote name='JeffCR07']If we admit that God could have made another world, then we are admitting that God could have made an unwise choice. But this is clearly not what we believe. Rather, we must conclude that possibilities do not exist for God. This makes sense, given that a "possibility" is nothing more than the ability to actualize a potential, and we know that there is no potentiality in God.[/quote]

If omnipotence means that God is capable of doing all those things that are possible to do, then does omniscience mean that God is capable of knowing all those things that are possible to know? Implying that some things are not possible for God to know.

Would that mean God might not know the future choices of free creatures? And thus might have created people without knowing whether they would sin or not?

[Myles Domini]

[quote name='Semalsia' date='Feb 25 2006, 03:07 AM'][quote name='JeffCR07']If we admit that God could have made another world, then we are admitting that God could have made an unwise choice. But this is clearly not what we believe. Rather, we must conclude that possibilities do not exist for God. This makes sense, given that a "possibility" is nothing more than the ability to actualize a potential, and we know that there is no potentiality in God.[/quote]

If omnipotence means that God is capable of doing all those things that are possible to do, then does omniscience mean that God is capable of knowing all those things that are possible to know? Implying that some things are not possible for God to know.

Would that mean God might not know the future choices of free creatures? And thus might have created people without knowing whether they would sin or not?
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Omniscience does not imply there are things not possible for God to know and cannot because of God's timelessness which gives him an adiastemic 'view' of our diastemic created reality. All Catholic theologians including Molinists believe that God has an infallible knowledge of the future and cannot but do so because of the manner in which He [i]is[/i] as Aquinas demonstrates in [url="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/101413.htm"]Summa theol., 1-1,14,13[/url].

Edited February 25, 2006 by Myles