Sheed and God experiencing

[toledo_jesus]

[quote name='Revprodeji' date='Jan 23 2006, 02:40 AM']toledo...

The nature of a mystery is a great answer when discussing the essence of something relating to a greater than us thing doing what is doing. Basically because God is so much greater than us we should easily accept that things about Him are beyond what we can understand. The light that is darkness. now, the problem here is that this question directly is based on the implication of our "future" actions not yet happened, or determined by us. So the question is not about God, but rather about the nature of our free will and its determinability.

Now, considering that we have a better chance to understand our own decision making than we would have a chance at understanding the nature of God in relation to us I find it suprising that we insist on an affirmative about the essense of a mystery when a very possible answer is regarded as false. For the event to happen before we caused it does not imply we are determining it. Now, in my reading I see God as eternal and not in the realm of change. But instead of taking God out of the lake and saying he sees all of ripples at once why not say he stands in the water and the ripples flow around him? Why say that seeing change weakens God? Even if you do someone justify that our future can be determined within this time you still have an event like the fall or even creation itself which shows God in a sequence. Why is this a bad thing?

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My philosophy is to leave the philosophy to the philosophers. My only mission in life is to arrive -unencumbered with finer theological points- in Heaven. So, my perspective about complicated issues that regular laypeople (like me) don't [i]need[/i] to understand is...it's a mystery.

Are you planning to be a theologian/priest/religious?

[N/A Gone]

L_D,
you are very wise friend, yet I would not say you are quite familiar with open theism. No offense, but it takes more time. Plus, it is a principle that is turned into a doctrine/metaphysic. Not a true doctrine in the way there is univeral agreement. I side with boyd on much but not everything. I think that speaking in person would help. But that is not an option right now.

paphy,

language is a huge problem in any postmodern dialogue. Between protestant and catholic concepts it is a major problem. As we see in the joint declaration between the catholic and lutheran on faith/works the bases of the argument was the language. but I disagree with the term "settled" or "knows" let me explain.

You are right that when I say it is settled it means that it is determined by someone else, because we are not the determing agent. Now, if God is "out of time" naturally the "future" (as we know it) has already happened, thus is settled-determined. And a big problem of mine.

Now, if you say he "knows" that sounds more like foreknowledge which would say God isnt "effected by time" but we are still dimensional in progression(past has happened, now is now, future will happen) that claims that God knows the future for certain based that he "knows us" and the way we will react to different factors. Now, the concept of "time" and God-time changes greatly here. So which one is it friend?

also, by saying he "knows" as settled truths, not as possiblilities that are not truth until we determine it, would make us an equation. I did a big talk-writing on this before where we look at the variables in this, whether it is eviroment, our essence or influence that determines if we accept salvation. But, as the proper christian metaphysic would assume our free willed choice to choose is the fact that we are able to be judged because we make the choice. Now, in that "free" will it is not utterly predictable. Thats a big problem I am having too. We have the free will to determine our choices, we are not reading off a script otherwise the writer would be judged.

Your analogy on 2d-3d is interesting, but not really were I am going with this. I have no problem saying God is uneffected by time. The problem isnt about the nature of God at all. We agree there. The thing is that we determine our futures in order to exercise our free will. Thus, it isnt about God..rather us and free will and perhaps the nature of time.

I have no problem saying God is "uneffected" by time. Or saying he is immutable. I have a problem with the logic that experience is all at once. Or that experience can hurt god. That bothers me cause I see him as experiencing in sequence as it happens. With perfect complete knowledge of all possibiliities. But he speaks to the prophets in "as ifs" and other "maybes" as I have pointed out. even christ in the garden speaks as if the future is not yet determined by saying "if this cup can pass" the concept of a fall in heaven, or a creation of an imperfection(the world, thus a start and end point) even the incarnation all assume that God acts, thus there is sequence.

Jeff...
I was hoping you would write back. I was hoping you would answer my comments on prayer, and the anthropromorphic talk as well as living as if possibilities.
But, I know time is short and I am greatful for what you have written. Let me look thru this and the st. thomas quote right here.

Moral culpability.
I worry we are going to disagree here the same as when you talked about contengencies before.
The idea that God "out of time" sees all time at once assumes all of time is available at once, yet we determine our actions in the future and thus it isnt determined yet. Thats my point brother. Him seeing it at once, when it doesnt happen at once is inaccurate. and not about God, but rather about us.
The reason we would not be morally responsable is because we dont have the ability to change it. God knows all the possibilities, but saying God knew for certain that you would type on your computer states that you didnt freely make the decision, rather it was made because of some determination that God saw as if an equation. In the equation a numbe doesnt have free will, it simply has value and responds determined to a sequence. Similar to the physist and the 8-ball. The 8-ball doesnt have a free will. It cant be hit and than sit and decide and debate what it will do, choosing between options. Rather it is determined what it will do because it lacks a free will and simply does based on variables set in motion. Your right that the physisist doesnt cause the ball to move based on his knowledge, but rather he knows because the ball has no options, and the true responsability is in whatever determined the ball(thus the cue, and ironically the physicist)

now about evil people.
You use the term "might do" excluding to the concept that the evil they could do is because they could do the greater good. This is often called the "risk" God took in love. Now, the problem is yo speak in possibilities which is fine for me, but doesnt work in your view.

toledo,
I have never spoke to you before, my background was as a protestant theologian in the realm of theodicy, thus open theism. As a revert i have been trying to sort out the two conflicting sides. But I am a theologian. Not a bad one according to some. not to toot my own horn, but as Joeyo pointed out. My ticket was written to anywhere in the protestant community.

I was going to be a pastor-theologian. But I cant be a priest because of the celebacy issues(many people keep trying to suggest it) but I will work in ecumenenism and general theology

Edited January 23, 2006 by Revprodeji

[Guest JeffCR07]

rev, as I said, time is short and again, but I hope that you will read a quick response to your two comments.

First, regarding moral culpability, the only reason you think that God's knowledge is "innacurate" is because you are assuming that His knowledge needs to be a human knowledge, which is within time and discursive. But this couldn't be further from the truth. God's knowledge is perfect knowledge, and that means that it is [i]unlike[/i] our own. Our knowledge, which is discursive and bound within time, cannot be what conditions God's knowledge, which is perfect and outside of time, which is what you are trying to do.

Now connected to this, you have made the point over and over again that we can only have free will if God doesn't know the future as static. But you again are making the same logical fallacy by equivocating between subsequent and preceeding necessity. God knows what happens, past, present, and future, according to [i]subsequent necessity[/i] (i.e. in light of the fact that it is what does, in fact, happen). He does not know the future according to [i]preceeding necessity[/i], which is causal necessity.

I apologize, but I don't have time to talk more about evil, I will hopefully get a chance later today

[toledo_jesus]

[quote name='Revprodeji' date='Jan 23 2006, 04:20 PM']toledo,
I have never spoke to you before, my background was as a protestant theologian in the realm of theodicy, thus open theism. As a revert i have been trying to sort out the two conflicting sides. But I  am a theologian. Not a bad one according to some. not to toot my own horn, but as Joeyo pointed out. My ticket was written to anywhere in the protestant community.

I was going to be a pastor-theologian. But I cant be a priest because of the celebacy issues(many people keep trying to suggest it) but I will work in ecumenenism and general theology
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word bon homme.

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Jeff,
I enjoy talking to you in these dialogs. Thank you for whatever time you can put into helping me.

sadly, I feel we are going in circles.


[quote]First, regarding moral culpability, the only reason you think that God's knowledge is "innacurate" is because you are assuming that His knowledge needs to be a human knowledge, which is within time and discursive. [/quote]

not really, my concern is the classic concern of this theology which is that the future is not decided or determined yet thus it can not be known as a truth because it is not there to be known. This is a classic complant against this that is either approached by 1.) redetermining what future is 2.) leaving it in tension 3.) determinism. I have picked 1.) you and have picked 3.)

[quote]But this couldn't be further from the truth. God's knowledge is perfect knowledge, and that means that it is [i]unlike[/i] our own. Our knowledge, which is discursive and bound within time, cannot be what conditions God's knowledge, which is perfect and outside of time, which is what you are trying to do.[/quote]

no friend, once again., I am not arguing over the nature of God's knowledge. But rather the nature of what is to be known. As someone who believes in determinism you can say that all knowledge is settled as in an equation I believe this is not free will. 1+3=4, we can predict that, because it has no other options. it is an equation. EVERY example that you have tried to give me about the future has involved an equation. Typically physics related. But there is no options involved there.

[quote]Now connected to this, you have made the point over and over again that we can only have free will if God doesn't know the future as static. But you again are making the same logical fallacy by equivocating between subsequent and preceeding necessity. God knows what happens, past, present, and future, according to [i]subsequent necessity[/i] (i.e. in light of the fact that it is what does, in fact, happen). He does not know the future according to [i]preceeding necessity[/i], which is causal necessity.[/quote]

I remember your argument on subsequent and preceeding necessity and I think it is a very faulty argument. All it would end up saying is that we are dominos in a line started by a God millions of dominos ago. The examples you gave me in our talk before were not involving free will. Rather it was once again an equation. If we dont have free will and are just reading off a script than you and calvin have no problem with God knowing the future as exhausted-settled. Yet, the existence of free will, and the clear talk of "if" "maybe" and other emotions of God (*I will not buy the anthropromorphism argument without alil fire power. i supplied a biblical and philosophical argument and I cant find anything in patristics that would hint anthropromorphism)

now, lets talk an offensive tone. What is wrong, theologically with having the future events completely known by God, but known as possibility? Whats wrong with having an experiencial God? Not effected by time of course, but maybe if you could systematically explain why this is such a heresy using simple logic and scripture.

[quote]word bon homme.[/quote]


what?

Edited January 26, 2006 by Revprodeji

[Quietfire]

He said,
word good man.

[N/A Gone]

whats that mean

[toledo_jesus]

[quote name='Revprodeji' date='Jan 26 2006, 12:50 PM']whats that mean
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Word as in the affirmation of what you said. "Word, dawg" being common usage.

Bon Homme being French for good man, as in my "homie"

So in effect, I said "word, homie."

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]I remember your argument on subsequent and preceeding necessity and I think it is a very faulty argument. All it would end up saying is that we are dominos in a line started by a God millions of dominos ago.[/quote]

You clearly do not understand the distinction between subsequent and preceeding necessity if you think it results in God starting a line of dominoes. In fact, this is exactly what it [i]denies[/i]. God's knowledge of all facts, whether past, present, or future, is necessary according to [i]subsequent[/i] necessity, and that is [b]non[/b]-causal.

God knows everything that I [i]freely[/i] do simply because He is outside of time. He observes that I do X, and so He knows that I do X. That does not mean that He makes me do X. The [i]cause[/i] of my doing it is nothing other than my own free will.

[quote]now, lets talk an offensive tone. What is wrong, theologically with having the future events completely known by God, but known as possibility? Whats wrong with having an experiencial God? Not effected by time of course, but maybe if you could systematically explain why this is such a heresy using simple logic and scripture.[/quote]

Quite simply:

Wherever something exists, there is God, for there is no existence without God. If the future exists as possibility, then there also must be God. But all possibility is potentiality, and there is no potentiality in God, for He is pure actuality. If some actuality were present in some potentiality, then that potentiality would no longer be potential, but actual, insofar as that one actuality was present. Therefore, the future cannot exist as a potentiality, but must in fact be actualized for God.

Another Argument:

Wherever something exists, there is God, for there is no existence without God. If the future exists as possibility, then there also must be God. But when a possible future becomes a determined present, then all things in it must change from possible to actual/determined. Anything that changes is mutable, but God is immutable. Therefore, God does not change from possible to actual, and so God is not in any possible future. But wherever God is not, there is no existence. Therefore, possible futures do not exist.

A much better treatment of the subject than I can give, by St. Anselm:

[quote]CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
[The Supreme Being] exists
without beginning and without end.

From what time, then, did this so simple Nature—Creator and Sustainer
of all things—first exist? And when will it cease to exist?
Or does [this Nature] exist neither from a beginning point nor to
an end point but rather as beginningless and endless? For were it
to have a beginning it would have a beginning either (1) from or
through itself, (2) from or through something other [than itself],
or (3) from or through nothing. But from the truth already seen,
clearly [this Nature] does not in any way exist either from something
other [than itself] or from nothing, either through something
other [than itself] or through nothing. Therefore, it did not
at all have a beginning from or through something other [than itself],
from or through nothing. Moreover, it could not have had a
beginning from or through itself, even though it exists from itself
and through itself. For [this Nature] exists from and through itself
in such way that there is not at all one being which exists from
and through itself and another being through which and from
which the first being exists. Now, whatever begins to exist from
something or through something is not at all the same thing as
that from which or through which it begins to exist. Therefore, the
Supreme Nature did not begin [to exist] through itself or from itself.
Thus, since it has no beginning either from or through itself,
either from or through something other [than itself], either from
or through nothing, it has no beginning at all.
On the other hand, [the Supreme Nature] will also have no end.
For if it were going to have an end, it would not be supremely immortal
and supremely incorruptible. But it is evident that it is both
supremely immortal and supremely incorruptible. Hence, it will
not have an end. Furthermore, if it were going to have an end, it
would come to an end either willingly or unwillingly. But surely
that [Being] by means of whose will the Supreme Good perished
would not be a simple good. But the Supreme Nature is a true and
simple good. Hence, this Nature, which is assuredly the Supreme
Good, would not come to an end willingly. Yet, if it were going to
come to an end unwillingly, it would not be supremely powerful
or all-powerful. But rational necessity has already declared that it
is supremely powerful and all-powerful. Hence, it would not come
to an end unwillingly. Consequently, if the Supreme Nature shall
not have an end either willingly or unwillingly, it shall not at all
have an end.
Moreover, if the Supreme Nature were to have a beginning or
an end it would not be true eternity—something which it has already
uncontestably been found to be. Or again, let anyone who
can, try to conceive of when it began to be true, or was ever not
true, that something was going to exist. Or [let him try to conceive
of] when it will cease being true and will not be true that something
has existed in the past. Now, if neither of these things can
be conceived, and if both [statements] can be true only if there is
truth, then it is impossible even to think that truth has a beginning
or an end. Indeed, suppose that truth had had a beginning,
or suppose that it would at some time come to an end: then even
before truth had begun to be, it would have been true that there
was no truth; and even after truth had come to an end, it would
still be true that there would no longer be truth. But it could not
be true without truth. Hence, there would have been truth before
truth came to be, and there would still be truth after truth had
ceased to be. But these [conclusions] are self-contradictory. Therefore,
whether truth is said to have a beginning or an end, or
whether it is understood not to have a beginning or an end, truth
cannot be confined by any beginning or end. Consequently, the
same [conclusion] holds with regard to the Supreme Nature, because
the Supreme Nature is the Supreme Truth.

CHAPTER NINETEEN
How nothing existed before or will exist after the Supreme
Being.

But, behold, nothing once again rises up; and it alleges to be nothing
all that reason has thus far discussed and all that truth and
necessity have given consistent witness to. For if those things which
have been explained
above have been made secure by the fortification of necessary
truth, then there was not anything earlier than the Supreme Being
nor will there be anything later than the Supreme Being. Hence,
nothing was before it, and nothing will be after it. For, necessarily,
either something or nothing preceded it and is going to succeed
it. But anyone who says that nothing was before it and that nothing
will be after it seems to be saying that (1) before the Supreme
Being there was a time when nothing existed and that (2) after
the Supreme Being there will be a time when nothing will exist.
Consequently, when nothing existed, the Supreme Being did not
exist; and when nothing will exist, the Supreme Being will not
exist. So if when nothing already existed the Supreme Being did
not yet exist, and if the Supreme Being will no longer exist when
nothing will still exist, how is it that [the Supreme Being] did not
begin [to exist] from nothing, or how is it that it will not come to
nothing? What, then, did such an array of arguments accomplish
if nothing so easily destroys their efficacy? For if it be established
that the Supreme Being is subsequent to nothing, which precedes
it, and ceases prior to nothing, which succeeds it, then all that necessary
truth determined above is destroyed through a mere nothing.
Or must this nothing be opposed, lest so many necessary structures
of reason be overthrown by nothing and lest the Supreme
Good, which by the light of truth has been sought-after and found,
be lost for nothing?
Therefore, if possible, let us deny the proposition “Nothing existed
before and will exist after the Supreme Being” rather than,
while giving place to nothing before and after the Supreme Being,
to reduce to nothing through nothing this Being, which through
itself brought into existence what had been nothing. For the one
expression—viz., “Nothing existed before the Supreme Being”—
has a twofold meaning. For one meaning of it is that before the
Supreme Being existed there was a time when nothing existed; but
the other meaning of it is: it is not the case that there was anything
before the Supreme Being. Similarly, if I were to say “Nothing
taught me to fly” I might construe this [statement] to mean
that nothing itself (in the sense of not-something) taught me to
fly—[an assertion] which would be false. Or [I might construe it
to mean] that it is not the case that anything taught me to fly—
[an assertion] which is true. And so, the first construal is that from
which there follows the inconsistency discussed above; and [this
construal] is rejected as in every respect false. But the second [construal]
is perfectly consistent with the earlier [conclusions] and is
of necessity true in conjunction with them. Therefore, when it is
said that nothing existed before the Supreme Being, the statement
must be taken in accordance with the second meaning. It must
not be construed to mean that there was a time when nothing existed
and the Supreme Being did not exist; rather, [it must be construed]
to mean that it is not the case that there was anything before
the Supreme Being. The same kind of twofold meaning occurs
if we say that nothing will exist after the Supreme Being. Accordingly,
if we examine carefully the construal which has been
given concerning [the word] “nothing,” then we conclude very
truly that neither something nor nothing preceded or will succeed
the Supreme Being and that nothing existed before it or will exist
after it. And nevertheless, the stability of our previously established
conclusions is not at all shaken by a mere nothing.

[b]CHAPTER TWENTY
The Supreme Being exists in every place and at all times.

It was concluded above that this Creative Nature exists everywhere,
in all things and through all things; and the fact that it neither
began to exist nor will cease to exist entails that it always was,
is, and will be. Nonetheless, I detect a murmur of contradiction
which requires me to investigate more closely where and when the
Supreme Being exists. Accordingly, the Supreme Being exists either
(1) everywhere and always or (2) only in some place and at
some time or (3) nowhere and never—in other words, either (1)
in every place and at every time or (2) [only] in a delimited way
in some place and at some time or (3) in no place and at no time.
But what is more obviously objectionable than [supposing] that
what exists supremely and most truly, exists nowhere and never?
Therefore, it is false that the Supreme Being exists nowhere and
never. Moreover, without this Being there would exist neither any
good nor anything at all. Hence, if it existed nowhere or never,
there would nowhere or never be anything good and nowhere or
never be anything at all. (It is not necessary to discuss how false
this [consequence] is.) (NOT 3) So it is false that the Supreme Being
nowhere and never exists. Hence, either it exists [only] in a delimited
way in some place and at some time or else it exists everywhere
and always. Assume that it exists only in a delimited way
in some place and at some time. Then, only where and when it
existed could anything exist; where and when it did not exist, no
being would exist—because without the Supreme Being there
would be nothing. Thus, it would follow that there is a place and
a time at which there would not exist anything at all. But this [consequence]
is false; for that place and that time would be something.
(NOT 2) Therefore, the Supreme Nature cannot exist [only]
in a delimited way in some place and at some time. Now, if it be
said that through itself this Nature exists in a delimited way in
some place and at some time but that through its power it exists
wherever and whenever something is—[this statement] would not
be true. For since, clearly, this Nature's power is nothing other
than itself, its power exists in no way apart from itself. (1) Therefore,
since [this Nature] does not exist in a delimited way in any
place or at any time, it is necessary that it exist everywhere and
always, i.e., in every place and at every time.[/b][/quote]

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thanks bro, but I am in prayerful struggle over whether or not to continue this debate. I met with my priest and bishop again this weekend and once again I was told that there is no issue here. That open theism as I explained it to them (i used pictures, maybe thats the issue here) has no problem within catholicism. If anything it is a possiblility that needs to be looked at. The way you have been showing me is the common view, but by no means is the only view. Both views work within the guidlines. I know you are going to argue against this, but coming from a bishop and a well taught priest I have issues arguing this more.