Sheed and God experiencing

[N/A Gone]

Those of whom I enjoyed the dialogue on open theism. I am truly sorry for opening this small question up again but I must ask.

I was reading thru F.J. Sheed "theology for beginners" and he says

( chapter 3...page 17)

"God is a spirit...it is partless, spaceless, immortal; it knows, loves, decides and acts. All these things are true of God."

Now, I can..if needed, accept a concept that God is "out of time" if out of time is to be not changed in essence or attribute. But this does not come near answering how he could "see" a determined future and still give us determing ability in that future.

But the problem still is that I see God as relational, thus there is a degree of experience there. I see God as asking and regreting and dialoging with the possiblity of outcomes. Some say this is anthropromorphic but I have not read any reason to believe it to be so and would enjoy dialog on this.

Why is experience bad? According to Sheed God has perfect attributes. How would that change if he experiences? Also, what about relations after death? What about events like the fall or the cross? These seem to me as relational.

I agree that God knows all, there is no limit to his knowledge, but I do not yet come to the point of seeing logic or a need in saying that this means the "future" does not exist in some point in possibility.

ban me if Im annoying. But this is still bothersome to me. I pray we are using different language to hold the same thing.(*sheed's def of "outside of time" is what I agree with and much different than what I thought you were saying)

[OLAM Dad]

Reading Sheed is good.

I'm having a hard time understanding how your concerns have anything to do with the quote you gave.

[quote]"God is a spirit...it is partless, spaceless, immortal; it knows, loves, decides and acts. All these things are true of God."[/quote]

Can you elaborate?

[Quietfire]

[quote]Now, I can..if needed, accept a concept that God is "out of time" if out of time is to be not changed in essence or attribute. But this does not come near answering how he could "see" a determined future and still give us determing ability in that future.[/quote]

If this is the elaboration of your concern in respect to the Sheed quote then the answer comes later in the book.
Have you read through the whole book yet?

[Quietfire]

Sometimes Sheed makes a statement and shows the only possibility later on. You have to read through the book to get to that point though, otherwise you can get lost.

Sheed is an excellent read. Very easy to understand, just stick with him and let us know.
Patience young jedi.

Edited January 22, 2006 by Quietfire

[Quietfire]

Actually, it reads....

God is a spirit. As a first step towards forming our idea of him, we imagine our body away and see our soul existing and functioning bodiless: it is partless, spaceless, immortal, it knows, loves, decides, acts. And all these things are true of God. But our soul is not God's equal, it is only his image. For God is infinite, we are not.

Time is something that belongs to this world. Time is a measure of change.
God does not change.
Once we leave this world, time as we now know, will not exist.
Theologians call it [i]aevum.[/i]
It is not a clock measured cycle of minutes and hours. There is no "waiting". No sense of monotony, no looking ahead to tomorrow.
God is in the now.

Just read on and you'll understand. Especially at page 20.

Edited January 22, 2006 by Quietfire

[Laudate_Dominum]

hey!!!!! good to see you're back my friend.

I've missed our old discussions, but I'm not going to be posted much 4 a while cause I start a job thing on monday.

how've you been?

God bless you sir.

[dspen2005]

I'm not quite clear as to what the question is....

[Guest JeffCR07]

Hey Rev! Good to see you back!

I apologize ahead of time if I'm not on phatmass much in the coming week - I just got back to college and things will probably be a little crazy with the semester just starting. Hopefully I can address some of your questions quickly and concisely in the time that I have:

First, it is very important to point out that I, and all Catholics, [i]do[/i] see God as being relational, but that doesn't mean that God feels regret or pain or suffering, nor does it mean that he changes his mind or pleads with us. Let me explain: When I sin mortally, I am no longer in communion with God. This does not mean that God changes, but rather, my relation to Him changes. Moreover, because God is unchanging Love and unchanging Mercy, when I move myself out of communion with Him, He pours his grace forth that I might return to him. This outpouring of Grace according to his unchanging nature we might call "regret" or "sorrow" for my sins, but we say this in a sense improperly, because when we talk about being "sorry" ourselves, we mean to say that [i]we[/i] are fundamentally changed. But this is not what we say of God, because the outpouring of Grace that occurs is not us affecting God, but it is the natural action of God's Perfect Nature. So, does God change in his manner or disposition? No, because he is [i]always[/i] ever Merciful, ever Just, ever Loving, ever Wise. Rather, it is [i]we[/i] who change in relation to him, and, as we change so too does our relation to him. In this way, God is [i]very[/i] relational to us. He is the North Star in our navigation through life - He is constant while we are not, and depending on where we are in relation to Him, the rest of the stars in the sky (his many graces and gifts to us) will change.


Returning now to the issue of God not knowing the future as set, but only knowing the future as possibility, I think that perhaps what is giving you confusion is that you are not aquainted with discussions of the manner in which God knows what He knows. Here are some very applicable quotations from St. Thomas Aquinas:

[quote]I answer that, God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (2, 3), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause--viz. God--is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.

Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.

[b]So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself. [/b][/quote]

[quote]I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God.

First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive. [/quote]

Now at first glance, these quotations may not seem applicable to your problem, but I implore you to give them some thought.

If God only knows the future as possibility, then you are saying that God's knowledge runs discursively according to cause and effect, because the effect (what a person wills to do) is known only by the cause (the person's free will) and that cause is not yet determined. But as Aquinas shows, God's knowledge is [i]not[/i] discursive.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[Guest JeffCR07]

I also think that it is extremely important for you to look over the Prima Pars, Question 14, Article 13, as it relates exactly to the issue you have with God's knowledge of future contingencies. St. Thomas' discussion is extremely similar to the distinction that St. Anselm makes:

[quote]Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?

Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above (8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.

Objection 2. Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.

Objection 3. Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God.

On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 32:15), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.

I answer that, Since as was shown above (9), God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.

In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (10, 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.

Reply to Objection 1. Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.

Reply to Objection 2. Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass will grow."

Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.

Reply to Objection 3. Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."

Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.[/quote]

[toledo_jesus]

Feh, apologists. You want a 3 word answer?


"It's a mystery."

[N/A Gone]

thanks for the quotes Jeff...I think I read the Thomas one before, but I will work thru it tommorow

toledo...

The nature of a mystery is a great answer when discussing the essence of something relating to a greater than us thing doing what is doing. Basically because God is so much greater than us we should easily accept that things about Him are beyond what we can understand. The light that is darkness. now, the problem here is that this question directly is based on the implication of our "future" actions not yet happened, or determined by us. So the question is not about God, but rather about the nature of our free will and its determinability.

Now, considering that we have a better chance to understand our own decision making than we would have a chance at understanding the nature of God in relation to us I find it suprising that we insist on an affirmative about the essense of a mystery when a very possible answer is regarded as false. For the event to happen before we caused it does not imply we are determining it. Now, in my reading I see God as eternal and not in the realm of change. But instead of taking God out of the lake and saying he sees all of ripples at once why not say he stands in the water and the ripples flow around him? Why say that seeing change weakens God? Even if you do someone justify that our future can be determined within this time you still have an event like the fall or even creation itself which shows God in a sequence. Why is this a bad thing?

Jeff, if you do not mind I share where my mind is right now. Having all the free time on j-term allowed me to indulge in this.

How can we be free and morally responsable for what we do if our future has been settled in God's mind from all eternity? No one holds that we are morally responsable for events that occured before we were born, for we have no power to influence. If God has known from all eternity everything I shall do in the "future", however, then the fact that I shall choose something in the future is actually part of the settled past! Indeed, my decisions have been settled in the mind of God at every moment in the past. Hence, it seems I can exercise no more power over a present decision than I can over any past fact. And from this it follows that I can be no more free or morally responsable regarding my future decisions than I am about events that took place before I was born. Conversely, if people believe they are free to determine their futures, and if they believe they are morallu responsable for how they determine their futures, they should reject the doctrine that every detail of their futures has been settled in God's mind before they were born.
Why would God create beings such as satan and adolf hitler if he was certain they would turn out as evil as they did? And why does God create people he knows will go to hell if he is truly all-loving and does not want anyone to perish (ezek 18.23,32;33:11;John 3:16;1 Tim 2:4;4:10;2 Peter 3:9)(please dont insult them all by saying they are all anthropromorphic)? We can easily understand why God must allow free agents to do evil and eventuallu go to hell once he gives them a free will, for to recoke a gift once given is disingenuous. But why give the gift in the first place if God were certain ahead of time that agents would do what they did and end up suffering eternally?
Because the future is not exhaustively settled, prayer and godly living are extremly important. We are not just waiting for the future to be revealed. We are helping determine what the future will be. Indeed, this view allows us to affirm what happens in the world (Exod 32:14;Num 11:1-2;2 King 20:1-6; Jer 18:7-10;26:2-3,19). Prayer is part of our moral responsability, for the welfare of individuals and even nations hang in the balance as tio whether we choose to pray(ezek 22:29-31)
The view of an open future is the most plausable view because it squares with everyday life. Whatever philosophy we might embrace we all live as though the open view were true. With every decision we make we assume that much of our immediate future is settled (we take for granted the ongoing reality of our world and the laws of physics) but that some of it is up to us to decide. How could we deliberate between choices in a way that would illustrate the conviction that the choice is already settled? It is impossibloe. Rather, every act of deliberation reveals a fundamental conviction that our future is at least partly up to us to determine. This view simply says that this commonsense perspective is accurate.

Edited January 23, 2006 by Revprodeji

[N/A Gone]

hehe..I tried to put this down, but had problems. Ironically Sheed lists this (and the existence of hell) as two things people have alot of problem working thru(knowing my luck my hell view is probably wrong also. Hmm, another dialogue)

Anyway I wanted to address 2 issues in my defense before I finally sleep.

It has been argued that my view denies the omniscience of God. This is a misunderstanding. In the same way that your view does, my view affirms that God knows the truth or falsity of all true and false propositions. But against much of this tradition, I hold that the truth value of propositions about unsettled realities is unsettled. For example, if it is not yet a reality that hillary clinton will be elected president in 2008, then there is no definite truth value that can be assigned to the proposition "hillary clinton will be elected president in 2008." Hence, denying that God knows for certain whether hilary will be elected president in 2008 in no way undermines God's omniscience. God "knows" it as a "maybe" for it is a "maybe" (unless of course God has decided to predestine the matter one way or another.)

Also, I have heard that the verses I have used to show God in relation are "anthropomorphic" this has been very bothersome to me. This is the most important objection against my view, for it deals with a major source of the view. In a similar way your classical view largely hangs on the ability to believe they are anthropromorphic. There are four reasons I remain unconvinced.
First, nothing in any of these passages suggest that they are anthropomorphic. None of the texts suggest that it is as though God changes his mind, regrets previous decisions, is suprised or disapointed and so on. Rather, they teach in a straightforward manner that God "may change his mind"(Jer 26:3) regret decisions and so on. If these passages were not meant to be taken in a straightforward manner, what would passages that did teach this in a straight forward manner say? If God cannot convince us by explicity saying he can and dodes change his mind, experience regret, and so on, how could he convince us if he wanted to?
Second, nothing in scripture requires or even warrants that we interpret all passages that depict a partly open future as anthropomorphic. Scripture describes God's character as unchanging (mal 3:6), but it never teaches that God is unable to change in any respect.(his intentions, exeperiences) If teaches that the future is settled to the extent God wills it, but it never teaches that the future is exhaustively settled. And it teaches that God sometimes chooses not to change his mind( num 23:19; 1 Sam 15:29; Ezek 24:14; Zech 8:14) but never that he cannot change his mind.
third, the passages cited in support of my view do not readily lend themselves to an anthropomorphic interpretation. As with all figures of speech, anthropomorphisms must connect with reality as some point if they are to communicate anything truthful. Expressions such as "the right hand of God" or "the eyes of the lord," for example, communikcatge something true about God's strength and knowledge. But what does the concept of God changing his mind communicate if indeed it is merely an anthropomorphism? If God in fact never changes his mind, saying he does so does not communicate anything truthful. It is simply inaccurate. This observation is especially important when we recall several passages that expressly encourage us to think of God as being capable of changing his mind ( jer 18:1-10; 26:2-3,13) and depict God's willingness to change as one of his praiseworthy attributes (joel 2:13-14;Jonah 4:2)
Finally, we cannot interpret these passages as anthropomorphism without undermining the integrity of scripture. For example, scripture says that because of Moses' intercession, "the lord changed his mind about the disaster that he planned to bring on his people"(exod 32:14; Deut 9:13-14,18-20,25; Ps 106:23). If the lord did not really change his mind then neither did he really plan to bring disaster on his people. Scripture thus misleads us when it explicitly tells us what the lord was planning before he changed his mind. SImilary, 1 chronicles 21:15 tells us that the lord in righteous anger dispatched "an angel to jerusalem to destroy it" but "when he was about to destroy it, the lord...relented." If God never really changes his mind, the explanation scriipture explicity offers as to why the lord sent the angel cannot be correct, for God never really inteneded to destroy jerusalem.
to wrap this up and get some sleep, while expressions such as ":the right hand of God" are rightly considered anthropomorphiusms to preserve the integrity of scriptures, interpreting the portrayals of God facing an open future in this fashion has the opposite effect. Out of fidelity to scripture, I argue, we must affirm that God faces a future that is partly open.

ok, bed..thanks Guys

[Laudate_Dominum]

I'm off to work in a little while here so I'd best not respond. Let me just say that I'm quite familiar with the open theist perspective (I've read Boyd and others) and I've had a good bit of time to stew over this stuff. The thrust of my take on the matter, as expressed in the TWT thread remains the same and in fact I am even more confirmed in my original assessment.

I will be out of town all week, but I hope that some day soon I can offer you an adequate response to the issues at hand.

God bless you my friend.

[Paphnutius]

Just my personal observation, but I believe that part of the problem is in the language that is being used. Rev, when you use the word "settled" I think that the connotations are causing a natural rejecetion of something. Because it can mean that situation was settled by someone mediation party, we find that it may imply that God has settled something which removes our free will. Instead let us say, "God precisely knows all future events." Using the word "knows" I feel would present a more neutral word than "settles."

Also, we touched on this in the other thread, but there is a real ontological difference between God and us. LD did an excellent job describing it and grounded it in the Father's writings so I will spare us all my attempt. I did, however, run across an example that might help us better swallow this. I was reading [u]God is Near Us[/u] by the then Cardinal Ratzinger ( ) and he was speaking about the Eucharist and the connection with the Resurrection (making the Body present to all ages at all times, etc...) Anyway, he used an analogy the helped to bring out the difference between God and man. Imagine that there was a 2D being or creature. This 2D being was attempting to understand what it is like to be a 3D creature, but could not fathom the concept of depth. It had the character of height and length, but due to its natural limitations it could only get so far in its understanding of depth. We are similiar to the 2D being, and God would be the 3D being. While we may indeed know some truth about the extra dimension that we do not have by our nature (here it would be infinite, or standing outside of time), we may not truly come to know what it is like. I took some liberty with that to try to tailor it to this discussion, but that is the gist.

Furthermore, you seem to think that if God is outside of time and immutable or unchaning He cannot be a personal or relating being. This is not the case. God is very personal and always relating, but He is always doing it perfectly. God is love. God loves perfectly. Now, what about me coming into existence? Would that not represent a change in God relating to me since I did not exist before? I would answer (aside from the ontological difference related to time) that God loved me perfectly before my existence, and during. God does not change in loving or relating because He always does this perfectly.

Anyway, those are just my observations. As you were. (By the by, did Jeff just quote Aquinas? )

[Guest JeffCR07]

Rev, I again apologize for not having a ton of time at my disposal. I know this is something that you are struggling with, and it merits a much deeper assesment than I have time to give right now. This being said, I hope you will take a little time to look at the short responses that I [i]can[/i] give.

You ask two major questions. First, how can we be morally responsible for our actions if God has known, before we were born, everything that we will do, and God is never wrong? Second, why would an omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving God create beings that he [i]knows[/i] are going to do evil, let alone beings that he knows are going to be damned to hell?

1.) There are two points to be made regarding moral culpability. First, the argument that we cannot be morally culpable because God knew what we would do before we did it and therefore we had no freedom hinges on the false presumption of placing God [i]inside[/i] time. But God is outside of time, and so God is not, properly speaking, "before" or "after." Rather, all of time is in Him. Thus, all of time is seen by God as one thing, and saying that God knows what we do before we do it is a mistake. God simply knows what we do, and this knowledge is not temporal. Second, we can be morally responsible for our actions because God's knowledge of what we do does not [i]cause[/i] us to do it. For example, I am now writing on my computer. Does God know this in a non-temporal way? Sure. Is that knowledge what is forcing me to type? No. What is forcing me to type is my own free will, which God sees and knows. If a physicist is given a problem in which an 8-ball is hit by a cue ball, he can [i]know[/i] where the 8-ball will go, but his knowledge isn't what causes the 8-ball to go where it does, my hitting the cue ball into it does.

2.) In order to understand why God would create creatures that he knows are going to be damned, it must fist be understood that existence itself is a good. Even damned creatures are, in thier [i]being[/i], good. Moreover, creation is an absolute act of love from God. The evil that a given creature might do does not outweigh the supreme goodness of God's act of creating that creature. No evil that we do could ever be so great as to invalidate our existence, because all evil is a privation of a Good, and so even the worst conceivable creature (lacking all good except existence) is still fundamentally good. Thus, a created being lacking all good save existence makes a better world than a world without that being, because the latter would lack the good of that being's existence.

Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff