Questions about Natural Law and Theology

[Cam42]

[quote name='hot stuff' date='Oct 25 2005, 01:23 AM']Here is the problem that you are going to run into.  (And Cam will correct me if I'm wrong) Your question cannot be answered by philosophy.  Your question is based on science and has to be answered by science. 

You're not going to get any help there either.  For a scientific methodology to be beneficial (and again the scientists can correct me if I'm wrong) there has to be a controlled environment to study the variable in question.  In this case the variable is God.  By the definition of who God is, setting up a controlled environment is impossible. The variable is defined as to being everywhere. Thus you cannot have an enviroment absent of the variable to be studied.  Therefore you cannot prove or disprove the existence of God through reputed scientific means. 

You cannot prove the supernatural by using natural methods.

However let me qualify this.  I did not study philosphy  and I am not a scientist.  Theology and psychology don't substitute for philosophy and hard science.
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hot stuff, you are right on the philosophy point. While I gave a rather windy explaination from a philosophical point of view, I avoided the theological aspect almost entirely, because you didn't really engage that in your question. You were more concerned with Kant and Hume. But defeating their positions are only part of the answer. The real answer to your question is the ontological argument that I proposed first.

In other words, I worked in reverse. I showed you that it would take St. Anslem's view of Ontology to answer your question, but then proceeded to defend that position using philosophy and not theology. Which with Ontology can be done to a point. However, once the point is made, the question still remains of Faith. And that is what hot stuff is getting at; philosophy cannot answer Faith. What it can do is lay the groundwork, but not actually answer it.

That is why I asked the question.....Do you love your father? Assuming that you answer yes, show me.

[scardella]

[quote name='Cam42' date='Oct 24 2005, 09:02 PM']That really isn't hard.....it's just philosophy.
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DISCLAIMER: I've only taken one philosophy class in my life (human person), and it wasn't as mind bending as this is...

Note to self:
philosophy=headache

I was also going to say, son_of_angels, that you're assuming that science can explain everything. Then again, a bunch of other people said that...

If you're going w/ Hume, it seems like the concept of objective reality would go out the window, yet, things like math are purely logical and can be verified w/ pure logic. Use reason, if you like.

However, the real mind-benderness is that your two questions seem to betray opposite worries. One depends on a pure subjective reality (#1) and the other depends on a pure objective reality (biological determinism, #2).

Edited October 25, 2005 by scardella

[morostheos]

[quote name='son_of_angels' date='Oct 24 2005, 11:14 PM']What sort of scientist are you?
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I'm an environmental scientist (although I'm currently on a one-year hiatus as a Catholic campus minister), so I work with a little bit of most science fields - mainly biology, geology, and chemistry but there's a bit of physics in there as well.

So yeah, as other people have said, God is outside of the realm of science. Any scientist who claims they can study God scientifically is not doing science, they are attempting to prove their own (or others) ideologies using pseudo-science. The scientific method does not and can not take the supernatural into account.

[Melchisedec]

[quote name='son_of_angels' date='Oct 24 2005, 09:27 PM']Thank you for the response.  My original question, and, indeed, the doubts that would plague me constantly are these.

1. Even if there is a God, do my beliefs concerning his relationship to me simply come from impressions and thoughts, which are simply, to use Hume, contiguous with other thoughts.  In other words, do I have an experience simply with a God I am creating. What then is the Holy Spirit?
[/quote]

I'm not sure I understand entirely. But are you asking that can your presupposition of God create a false experience with said being? The Holy Spirit has always been ambiguous to me. Can you be possesed by a demon that masquerades as the holy spirit and if so how would you know the difference? Plantinga claims that you "just would'. Holy Spirit and 'inspiration' are a can in its own and I dont want to digress further.


[quote]2. If Science were to explain every passion, every movement of my mind as a biological condition, can I still believe in God as a being with whom I have a relationship?
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I think in this case we would be totally determined in nature. So if you had a nice Christian upbrining than it is completely possible to believe in God and have a seemingly real relationship with God.

[philothea]

[quote name='Cam42' date='Oct 24 2005, 09:02 PM']That really isn't hard.....it's just philosophy.
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I appear to have a hard time settling on a precise definition for any particular word, so I get tangled up discussing anything that relies on specific word meanings.

Differential equations are much easier.

[scardella]

[quote name='philothea' date='Oct 25 2005, 02:44 PM']I appear to have a hard time settling on a precise definition for any particular word, so I get tangled up discussing anything that relies on specific word meanings. 

Differential equations are much easier. 
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Yeah, much less room for finagling in pure math...

Statistics, though... are much more like words...

[son_of_angels]

Thank you all for your responses.

I wrote something which I have included below, tell me what you think about it.




Science and Faith

1. If the laws of natural science, coupled with those of

mathematics, are to be able to explain every physical

phenomena in the world, it would seem that there is no

relationship to God, because all is efficiently caused by

the effects of a natural law.

Yet this may be untrue: 1.) Because, even were every

apparently natural phenomena to occur from a prescribed

natural law, that natural law, by the force of reason, MUST

occur from the original primal cause of the universe and of

matter.

If a god, that is to say, a primal cause, is to be able to

set things in motion, it is still permitted that that Cause

should contain within it all the possible realities which

may result from its effects. Hence a rock, because of its

motion towards a body of water, and not away from it, and

not at rest, is thus able to effect a body of water with

motion. An effect proceeds only from the reality of the

cause.

God then, being infinite in effect, and, if faith may be

believed, having created all things in his goodness then

every possible effect must occur specifically according to

his will, and every possible cause, including those of our

own volition, must work to the accomplishment of that cause.

2. What then of prayer?

Prayer of impetration, that is, petition, when it's object

is obtainted, should not, per se, be seen as a physical

cause of its completion, but nor should prayer be seen as

purposeless. Its purpose is the accomplishment of divine

will, such that God, who is the complete cause of all Good,

created the effect in mind of the prayer itself. Hence,

God's will includes both the prayer and the effect of the

prayer, and the two may not be seen independently.

3. Can we act independent of God's Will?

First, there is to be understood the action of God's Will,

which is, nonetheless, an essential mystery. Because God

acts outside of time, it is not a matter of predeterminism,

because that would imply that, for God, there is a

difference between what has happened and what will happen,

which would describe a cosmic change in God himself.

Secondly, there is likewise to be regarded a distinction

between God's Will and his grace. God's Will is everything

that does occur physically, but his grace is everything

which occurs spiritually. Hence the salvation of our soul

is dependent on his grace and not his Will. His Will is

applied indiscriminate of salvation, such that he does not

will anyone to damnation. This means that the first motive

of the human mind, and the action of God's Church, the

Mystical Body of Christ, all is an action of God's Will

towards salvation. There is nothing which occurs which may

be contrary to that salvation, only that which happens in

the context of grace.

Grace, which is needed for salvation, must be that which

animates the will to the extent that it can be saved. Just

as God's Will is that which actually occurs in the world

physically, human Will is that which actually occurs by the

action of man. Grace is what actually occurs spiritually,

so that while the man physically desires to be saved, he is

desiring that general grace which is being offered to man.

Specific grace is the salvation of a person's soul by means

of the experiences which he has according to the Will of

God.

Yet it must be admitted, in as far as man also is a natural,

sensible being which acts in accordance with the Will of

God, like dogs and all other sorts of creatures and spirits,

man is incapable of acting outside this Will, and therefore

incapable of fully perceiving the efficient cause of this

Will.

4. What about miracles?

One of our primary principles is that every natural

phenomena proceeds from a natural law, which acts

specificallly from the primal Cause of God. That Cause,

being a rational, and not experiential, thing, can be

described but not experienced, can be taught but not felt.

Hence most ideas considered miracles must be seen as a

natural procession of the Will of God, contiguous with

prayers of intercession, etc. but also having a natural

explanation. The passion of wonder which we experience from

them should not be repudiated, but rather seen as a natural

experience which draws us closer to the Grace of God.

However, it must be admitted that certain phenomena are

commonly thought unnatural and without recourse to human

will. An example of this might be considered the stigmata

of St. Padre Pio. In these cases, however, it should be

noticed that the physical effects of these miracles proceed

according to natural principles. The blood from Padre Pio's

was real natural blood, that, apparently, could be perceived

with the natural eyes in the same manner as normal blood, as

did the ocular nerves and brains of those who saw him

bilocated. Likewise, if a healing is considered miraculous,

the healed do not become a different creature, healed

according to a different state other than if they were

healthy. All this is to say that even if something appears

to have not come through natural means, it is not excluded

from the Will of God, nor even an exception to this rule.

However, it shoul be sufficiently proven in both cases

(those cures that can be explained naturally, and those that

can be explained only supernaturally) that these occured

without obvious intervention of man, or that, if man

intervened, that the human intervention was itself incapable

or improbable to yield the ultimate results of the

happening, in order for one to catelogue something as a

miracle.

4. The conclusion

The final point in all this is an admission to science.

In general, no spiritual or faith-based action can be perceived as having a physical effect, just as a gunshot wound cannot determine the activity of the saints in heaven, at best they can be contiguous to one another (though it is perceiveable that one is the spiritual cause for something else) physically.

[morostheos]

I don't see anything wrong with what you state until you get to number 3. I particularly have a problem with this statement:

[quote]Yet it must be admitted, in as far as man also is a natural,

sensible being which acts in accordance with the Will of

God, like dogs and all other sorts of creatures and spirits,

man is incapable of acting outside this Will, and therefore

incapable of fully perceiving the efficient cause of this

Will.[/quote]

So then where is man's free will? We can certainly do things that are outside of the will of God. Every time we sin we are acting outside of God's will. This smacks of the Calvinistic idea of "irresistable grace." As humans, we are not like all other sorts of creatures precisely because God gave us the ability to choose or reject His will in our lives.

[son_of_angels]

I understand your confusion. Here is my point.

God's Will, in the sense that I use it, is everything physical. He is the ultimate Cause of everything physical, and therefore, as far as we think that we are physical, we are incapable of acting outside of his Will.

On the other hand God's Grace is everything spiritual (which is actual), which never, as a natural law, affects something spiritual. We are given grace because of our spiritual being, not our physical being.

In other words, my first motives and the effects of divine Providence all come about by God's Will, and I am incapable of acting without those things. If I choose to act in a particular way, whether by my preferences or not, then I bring about a series of effects, which may well bring about the good or bad of something else. Yet this, like everything else, MUST be God's Will. Ergo, we are incapable of acting outside of God's Will. However, that being said, my actions physically are bound up with a spiritual being (my soul) which exists in light of a reality which cannot be explained physically (nor is it possible). That reality includes Grace, which it freely accepts or rejects (I presume).

In other words, grace cannot be irresistable because, in my theory, no spiritual reality can find its direct effect on a physical reality, in as far as it is expressed physically.

In other words, to use my above example, my prayer to God may be expressing the actions of a free spirit acting in relationship to God, but in as far as it is a physical act it is only contiguous, and not causal with the result.

Likewise if I "sin" that sin is really just a physical action. That physical action is not capable of being outside of God's Will, it is part of it, but my spirit, which receives the blame in terms of the spirit must be rejecting the action of Grace. Hence even my sin is simply contiguous and not the cause of another action, in as far as it is defined as "sin"

So, no, I am not embracing any form of Calvinism, just a stronger, and yet more skeptical, view of free will, grace, and the effects of prayer.

Edited October 26, 2005 by son_of_angels

[son_of_angels]

This whole theology probably has a full set of fallacies and mis-steps, but it is simply my meditations over the course of a night.

[morostheos]

So would you disagree that all suffering and death in the world are the result of original sin? Because that would mean a spiritual reality would be finding its direct effect on physical reality.

[son_of_angels]

Hmmm.... I suppose in that sense I'm toeing the line of orthodoxy.

I would say that original sin is of a different nature than other sin, in that it essentially has its effects on experience and not grace. Hence, after we become baptized and are no longer subject to original sin, we do not commit original sin again and again, such that our children might/might not be subject to it, only mortal sin.

Secondly, I would say that it was not original sin which itself caused anything, but the Judgment of God, which is part of his Will. In that case, original Sin is merely contiguous, like other sin, but not physically causal of suffering.

[son_of_angels]

I think I should also be fair in self-criticism by saying that I did not consider the possibililty of incidental causation in talking about sin and prayer.

For example, if by praying one's mind is relaxed and, as many neuroscientists tell us, that this state permits certain biochemical reactions which allow the healing process to take place, it is given that incidentally a spiritual action caused a physical response. Perhaps original sin is also like that, in that the spiritually physical activity of committing it incidentally caused the results of suffering, etc.

Yet these incidental relationships do not negate my point "as a spiritual/theological act" prayer did not cause something to happen, simply as a physical act, and one was incidentally causal of the other because they were part of the same chain of events. Perhaps this is the same with original sin.

[morostheos]

I must say I can't really get my brain around all of that. I personally just see it as a great mystery, and like the Eastern Rite Catholics, I'm pretty happy to leave it at that. You definitely raise some interesting points though.

[qfnol31]

[quote]Your question is based on science and has to be answered by science.[/quote]

Actually, it is a philosophical question.

I should like to posit an essay I wrote that begins before this question comes about? I'd like to show the link between Kant and Hume (whom I shall read in a few weeks) and the Modernist Heresy, based on science and philosophy as separate.


The Emergence of Materialism Through the Destruction of Physics

“So then we have constituted, as in our own wish and advice, the inquiry touching

human nature entire, as just a portion of knowledge to be handled apart” (Bacon 104).

Though often overlooked or forgotten, Francis Bacon shaped much of the philosophy behind modern science.[1] In the modern world, science (especially physics) is separate from the rest of learning. It concerns itself solely with the what? and how? questions of the physical world, unlike the ancient philosophers who included the immaterial and eternal as essential to their inquiries into truth. Bacon, the father of the modern idea, redefines most of the ancient terms, mixes different and separate sciences together, and turns those sciences into only a matter of practicality by splitting the formal and final causes from material and efficient. According to the ancient understanding of the cosmos, Bacon’s method misses the truth behind the world, and especially the reality of man. His method, while it develops into a new understanding of matter, casts off two causes Aristotle deems indispensable. This new method ultimately leads to the reduction of man and nature to merely matter, a denial of God, and a limited understanding of being that is based solely on material and efficient causes; consequently, it leads to the priority of human and natural philosophies (which focus on matter) and the destruction of Aristotle’s metaphysics; it is the beginning of materialism and Modern Philosophy.

Prior to Francis Bacon and the modern movement, Aristotle’s philosophy held the place of one of the primary sources for the advancement of knowledge.[2] Aristotle begins Book E of the Metaphysics with a distinction between three different types of sciences. The lowest of the hierarchical series are the productive sciences, in which “the principle of a thing produced is that which produces” (1025b 22). The idea of the productive sciences did not center on effects, but rather on the cause. The next category of science he names is practical, of which he says, “the principle of action is in the doer and this is choice; for that which is done and that which is chosen are the same thing” (1025b 23). Once more, the end of this science is not effects, but now choice. The final science Aristotle describes is the theoretical, by which he means the inquiry into being qua being.

Aristotle later in the Metaphysics says, “Hence, there should be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and theology” (1026a 18). Mathematics he defines as the study of “some immovable things although not separable but as in matter” (15).[3] Physics, in contrast, he identifies as “concerned with separable but not immovable things” (14). Aristotle makes certain to retain a distinction between mathematics and physics. While physics deals with the being of individuals, such as man, mathematics questions being that is not truly separate as such. To mix the two philosophies is to misunderstand altogether the different types of being. The third philosophy, theology (also metaphysics), Aristotle says is a necessity “if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separate” (1026a 10). This science handles something other than an abstract reality; indeed, Metaphysics investigates into the necessary and ultimate final and efficient cause(s) of all things.[4] Furthermore, because of its subject (which is eternal and unchangeable), metaphysics is the highest of the theoretical (and all) philosophies. In addition for Aristotle, these two causes (along with the material and efficient causes) are also fundamental to understanding being, especially in man and nature. While it is from the unmoved movers that these two causes come, and any study into the existence of man or nature must include these unmoved movers through metaphysics, this does not mean that physics itself does not also include the formal and final causes of the beings it investigates (L). To remove them from the science would eliminate the purpose behind physics.

Bacon begins to discuss the division of knowledge almost immediately. He redefines philosophia prima as the beginning of the inquiry into knowledge. It is “the main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which science whether I should report as deficient or no, I stand doubtful” (83). Unlike Aristotle, who understood all knowledge as convergent, Bacon conceives the various sciences as a river flowing backwards through its streams and tributaries. Eventually the absence of a universal philosophy brings about the separation of all the sciences. Instead of working towards a single end, they continually diverge until they lack any commonality. This new approach permits the eventual elimination of two of the causes – formal and especially final. By dividing knowledge, Bacon allows the end of metaphysics and eventually even materialism.[5] Consequently, this single claim sets up the whole of the rest of the modern situation.

In Book II of The Advancement of Learning, Bacon begins by separating what he calls divinity and philosophy. Divinity is the knowledge directly inspired by God. Bacon does not give a clear definition for this term, but it is contrary to what Aquinas says regarding theology and philosophy.[6] Bacon then moves to divide philosophy into three parts, the first of which he names divine philosophy (natural theology).[7] Though this term appears similar to Aristotle’s metaphysics upon first glance, Bacon considers the worth of natural theology to extend only so far that it “sufficieth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion” (86). He later clarifies this by saying, “I have digressed because of the extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy hath received by being commixed together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy” (86). Saint Thomas had healed this rift (at least in the Christian understanding) between faith and reason centuries before, but in the Advancement of Learning Bacon sets the two as incompatible and almost contrary. Unlike Aristotle, Bacon moves this to the lowest place on his list of scientific inquiry. Together, Bacon’s new definitions and emphases eventually lead to a separation of God from all physics inquiries and show the first signs of the loss of final cause to all things physical.

The second division of philosophy for Bacon is natural philosophy, of which he says, “it were good to divide natural philosophy into the mind and the furnace: and to make professions or occupations of natural philosophers, some to be pioneers and some smiths; some to dig and some to refine and hammer” (87). This illustrates his conception of natural philosophy as primarily a “productive” science.[8] Instead of the cause of the effect, the effect (product) now takes preference. Bacon then proceeds to separate natural philosophy into the speculative and operative. The speculative part is linked to the “inquisition of causes” whilst the operative relates to the “production of effects” (87).[9] Unlike the ancient tradition which kept all knowledge together, Bacon reiterates his earlier theme of the disjointing of knowledge, saying, “I judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and handled” (88).

Bacon takes these sciences further and gives them the old titles of physic and metaphysic.[10] He explains the two by saying,

Physic should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and Metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed. And again, that Physic should handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and moving; and Metaphysic should handle that which supposeth forth in nature a reason, understanding, and platform…For as we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes, and productions of effects: so that part which concerneth the inquiry of causes we do subdivide…the one part, which is Physic, inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and the other, which is Metaphysic, handleth the formal and final causes.



Unlike Aristotle, who insisted that physics and metaphysics differed only because of the type of being investigated in each case, Bacon splits the causes between these. By doing so, materialism is eventually able to overcome the belief in four causes; instead of two different types of being, there becomes a split approach to the same type of being.

After briefly expounding upon physics as simply a study of the material and efficient causes, Bacon moves into a discussion of the Platonic idea of Forms. [11] He says that an investigation into the Forms is pointless because “the Forms of substances…they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied, are so perplexed, as they are not to be inquired” (91). He then goes on to say that the forms of qualities and natures ore “that part of metaphysic which [he] now define[s] of” (91). He takes the term form to mean the type rather than (as in the case of a person or an animal) the soul: that which gives self-motion (life) and shape. Hence, Bacon’s forms are not actually physical, but rather they appear in physical substances. He then moves to say that the second cause, the final, is “misplaced” in the ancient understanding, which he says caused a deficiency in the discovery of that science (93). Both of these shifts towards a disintegration of the formal and final causes in physics eventually give way to pure materialism.

After redefining the sciences of physics and metaphysics, Bacon proceeds to do something Aristotle condemned; he mixes mathematics and metaphysics: “but I think it more agreeable to the nature of things and to the light of order to place it [mathematics] as a branch of Metaphysics: for the subject of it being quantity” (94). Aristotle did not consider these two sciences as an inquiry into either quantity or quality, which were relatively unimportant to the question of being. By changing the focus of metaphysic and mathematics to these, Bacon has effectively put the emphasis on physics, which for him is material. While for Aristotle the three sciences were concentrated on types of being, with eternal being as the most important, Bacon makes being a question of simply matter.

In Chapter IX of Book II, Bacon shifts into the third division of his philosophy: human philosophy (humanity). He says this philosophy “deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature” (101). In this small section, Bacon links the natural and human philosophies; therefore, a proper understanding of man only comes from grasping the natural philosophy, which ends on a note of materialism. Nevertheless, Bacon does not boldly declare the absence of the soul (which Aristotle claimed was the form and life-principle), though he does limit its purpose. He even ends by quoting a philosopher who argued in favor of an immortal soul as form of the body: “For the opinion of Plato, who placed the understanding in the brain, animosity…in the heart, and concupiscence or sensuality in the liver, deserveth not to be despised; but much less to be allowed” (104). His purpose in this last section is to limit the functions of the soul, which eventually leads to the same materialism that he hinted at in his previous section on natural philosophy.

Francis Bacon’s radical changes to Aristotle’s theoretical philosophies have changed the world. Instead of cooperation between the sciences, there is much digression.[12] His idea of knowledge as diverging and beginning with a single inquiry is a radical movement from the ancient philosophers. His fusion of the types of being separation of the four causes quickly led to the end of most philosophy based on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (and also Saint Thomas’s philosophy as well). Bacon, by emphasizing the material world without consideration of formal or final causes, has helped lead to the modern, materialist movement, in which God practically does not exist and man is no more than a random mixture of atoms and molecules.

[1] Having asked around, I have found that very few people actually recognize any of Bacon’s work, even amongst those studying science or philosophy.

[2] This is due much in part to the work of Thomas Aquinas who assisted in the “combination” of the truths of theology and philosophy, fides et ratio.

[3] Although at this point Aristotle gives no clear definition to mathematics.

[4] In reality, Aristotle says there are more than one of these beings/unmoved movers (L8).

[5] This occurs because he later divides formal and final causes into the study of Metaphysics and the material and efficient causes into the science of Physics.

[6] Saint Thomas argued for a connection between the two, which was the backbone of at least Catholic Christianity during Bacon’s life.

[7] The name, Bacon comments, comes from both the subject and how the subject is approached – namely through nature.

[8] This is not the same as the Aristotelian concept of productive science, but rather an idea of “product science.” Indeed, it appears that in the modern world most science (especially physics!) is focused on practicality (usage) and utility.

[9] Bacon eventually discusses the operative part of his natural philosophy which he divides into three parts corresponding to the three named here for speculative. This, it appears, he sets up as a means for the inquiry into the speculative, such as through alchemy, astronomy, et cetera (97).

[10] He claims that this is to keep from breaking too much with the ancient tradition, but ends up only making a mess.

[11] To further his physics argument, Bacon uses the example of fire, through which he mixes the term “physics” and “physical,” making the case that the fire only causes physical change to the matter and so is only the efficient cause of change, which is a complete rejection of the Aristotelian idea of ‘cause.’

[12] This actually can often hurt the sciences because they one discovers something another is seeking to find and information can take years or even decades to pass between them.