Soul Gender?

[scardella]

[quote name='Apotheoun' date='Jul 1 2005, 11:51 PM']I have never seen or heard of any Church document that ascribes sexuality to the soul; in other words, I've never seen anything that supports the idea that there are "male souls" and "female souls." In fact this idea seems to be contrary to the doctrine of the simplicity of the soul and the distinction that exists between the soul, as a substantial form, and the operations of the composite being that it informs.
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What doctrine of the simplicity of the soul? Can you provide some documentation on that?

[scardella]

Oh, btw, Apotheoun, why do you seem to think those of Latin rite would see the more Eastern lines of thought irrelevant? I've heard you speak a number of times to the effect of, "well, I'm not a Latin rite, so....." The little bit of Eastern theology that I've seen has been intriguing.

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='scardella' date='Jul 5 2005, 07:13 AM']What doctrine of the simplicity of the soul?  Can you provide some documentation on that?
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The soul is the immaterial and substantial form of the human person.

The fact that the soul is immaterial also means that it is indivisible, i.e., it means that it cannot be broken into parts or pieces, and so, it is not composite. Furthermore, if it were composite instead of simple, there would not be one substantial form, but many, and a man would be as many beings as he had substantial forms, and this is clearly not the case.

You can read more about the spirituality, simplicity, and immorality of the soul in the Summa Theologica (Prima Pars, Q. 75, Q. 76, Q. 79) and the Summa Contra Gentiles (Part II, chapters, 57, 58, 76, 78, and 79).

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='scardella' date='Jul 5 2005, 07:19 AM']Oh, btw, Apotheoun, why do you seem to think those of Latin rite would see the more Eastern lines of thought irrelevant?  I've heard you speak a number of times to the effect of, "well, I'm not a Latin rite, so....."  The little bit of Eastern theology that I've seen has been intriguing.
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The Eastern and Western traditions have similar views about the nature of the soul as the immaterial and substantial form of the human person, but the two traditions have a different way of looking at God. Thus, when it comes to the doctrine of God's simplicity, Byzantines and Latins have different perspectives on how this is to be understood.

[Guest JeffCR07]

In a huge over-generalization, we Latins tend towards definition while Easterns tend towards mystery

[scardella]

[quote name='Apotheoun' date='Jul 5 2005, 10:21 AM']The soul is the immaterial and substantial form of the human person. 

The fact that the soul is immaterial also means that it is indivisible, i.e., it means that it cannot be broken into parts or pieces, and so, it is not composite.  Furthermore, if it were composite instead of simple, there would not be one substantial form, but many, and a man would be as many beings as he had substantial forms, and this is clearly not the case.

You can read more about the spirituality, simplicity, and immorality of the soul in the Summa Theologica (Prima Pars, Q. 75, Q. 76, Q. 79) and the Summa Contra Gentiles (Part II, chapters, 57, 58, 76, 78, and 79).
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That's not doctrinal, even though he is a giant in western theological and philosophical thought. (As far as I know, he is not considered a "Church Father" either.) I was looking for something from the Magisterium that would make it doctrinal. Or, at the very least, something from the Magisterium that hinges upon it or implies that it is universally accepted.

Edited July 5, 2005 by scardella

[scardella]

Oh, and when I get a chance, I'll look over and try to understand the Summa Theologica and Summa Contra Gentiles stuff.

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='scardella' date='Jul 5 2005, 08:40 AM']That's not doctrinal, even though he is a giant in western theological and philosophical thought.  (As far as I know, he is not considered a "Church Father" either.)  I was looking for something from the Magisterium that would make it doctrinal.  Or, at the very least, something from the Magisterium that hinges upon it or implies that it is universally accepted.
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It is a doctrine, because to assert its opposite is to posit multiple beings in man, and that is heresy. The vast majority of definitive doctrines have been taught through non-defining acts of the Ordinary Magisterium. Very few have been taught through solemn defining acts of the Extraordinary Magisterium.

[scardella]

[quote name='Apotheoun' date='Jul 5 2005, 11:10 AM']It is a doctrine, because to assert its opposite is to posit multiple beings in man, and that is heresy.  The vast majority of definitive doctrines have been taught through non-defining acts of the Ordinary Magisterium.  Very few have been taught through solemn defining acts of the Extraordinary Magisterium.
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How is a non-simple soul positing multiple beings in man?

Is the simplicity of the soul in the CCC? Is it referred to by ecumenical council documents? the CDF? encyclicals? apostolic letters? If it's doctrine, it has to be referenced or documented somewhere in the Magisterium. So far, nobody has done that. I just want one specific example of the Magisterium that assumes it, references it or flat out says it.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote name='scardella' date='Jul 5 2005, 12:13 PM']How is a non-simple soul positing multiple beings in man?

Is the simplicity of the soul in the CCC? Is it referred to by ecumenical council documents?  the CDF?  encyclicals? apostolic letters?  If it's doctrine, it has to be referenced or documented somewhere in the Magisterium.  So far, nobody has done that.  I just want one specific example of the Magisterium that assumes it, references it or flat out says it.
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First, a non-simple soul is a contradiction in terms. By definition, the soul is the substantial form of the body. By definition, substantial forms are simple. Thus, if you are talking about a "non-simple" soul, then you are not really talking about a soul at all, but a combination of substantial forms. If there are multiple substantial forms making up one "soul" (now a misnomer) then you must have two beings, one for each substantial form.

Second, what you are asking for is a citation of a doctrinal definition or declaration by the Magisterium. But there are things which are doctrine yet are not defined or declared by the Magisterium. Whenever the saints and bishops of the Church speak with one voice on an issue, that carries the weight of doctrine, precisely because it [i]is[/i] doctrine, simply not a doctrine which has been declared/defined.

Every Catholic philosopher that I have ever read who has discussed the soul has done so with the understanding that the soul is simple. To argue otherwise, even if it has not been defined/declared, is to depart from the doctrine taught by the Church.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]365 The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the "form" of the body:234 i.e., it is because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature.[/quote]

[quote]We, therefore, directing our apostolic attention, to which alone it belongs to define these things, to such splendid testimony and to the common opinion of the holy fathers and doctors, declare with the approval of the sacred council that the said apostle and evangelist, John, observed the right order of events in saying that when Christ was already dead one of the soldiers opened his side with a spear. Moreover, with the approval of the said council, we reject as erroneous and contrary to the truth of the catholic faith every doctrine or proposition rashly asserting that the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is not of itself and essentially the form of the human body, or casting doubt on this matter. In order that all may know the truth of the faith in its purity and all error may be excluded, we define that anyone who presumes henceforth to assert defend or hold stubbornly that the rational or intellectual soul is not [b]the form of the human body of itself and essentially[/b], is to be considered a heretic.

- Council of Vienne (1312) [emphasis mine][/quote]

The soul is the form of the human body of itself and essentially. If the soul were composite, there would be something more essential to the form of the human body, namely, the composite parts of which the soul was made.

More importantly, however, I would like to point out that the Council, itself authoritative, still thought it of great importance to reiterate the fact that its teachings are consistent with the testimony and common teaching of the holy fathers and doctors.

Now all of the Fathers and Doctors that I know of, when discussing the soul, do so with the teaching that the soul is simple. It would be unwise to think that this is not enough, and that only a declaration or a definition of a Council can make a doctrine "real."

- Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[scardella]

I'm still in the process of reading the Aquinas stuff, but in Question 75, Article 5 "Whether the Soul Is Composed of Matter and Form?" it states

[quote]I answer that ... But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, [i]is [b]in[/b] the intellectual soul.[/i][/quote]

Here we see that Aquinas is implying knowledge is contained in the soul.

In Question 76, Article 1, it says
[quote]I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. [/quote]

Is he identifying the intellect with the soul here? Where did the knowledge go? I see distinction between knowledge and intellect.

He continues later on
[quote]But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man.[/quote]

One [b]can[/b] think in a uniquely masculine way without regard to the body.

and later

[quote]First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect.[/quote]

man's appetites are different from women's appetites.

and this is worth mentioning:
[quote]Reply to Objection 4: The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body.[/quote]

In Question 76, Article 3
[quote] I answer that ...  If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. ... We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul.[/quote]

Here's where the beef comes in Q76, A4:
[quote] In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual being---for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort---maintained that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption, all of which is clearly false.[/quote]

My problem here is that man cannot exist without being either male or female. As such, for man "to be", he has to be male or female. One cannot separate the maleness/femaleness or intellect or will or knowledge without changing who the person is. If you remove I guess what I'm arguing is that a male soul is substantially different from the female soul, not accidentally.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]My problem here is that man cannot exist without being either male or female. As such, for man "to be", he has to be male or female. One cannot separate the maleness/femaleness or intellect or will or knowledge without changing who the person is. If you remove I guess what I'm arguing is that a male soul is substantially different from the female soul, not accidentally.[/quote]

I think if you take a little time with it, you will realize that you're putting the cart before the horse in the above. You are right that for I]man[/I] to be, he must be male or female. But that is because one cannot talk about "man" without refering to a [i]person[/i]. A man's soul cannot be substantially different from a woman's soul on account of sex, because sex belongs to the [i]person[/i], and only the person. Man can't be reduced to his animating principle.

[Guest JeffCR07]

[quote]But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man.[/quote]

[quote]One [b]can[/b] think in a uniquely masculine way without regard to the body.[/quote]

[quote]First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect.[/quote]

[quote]man's appetites are different from women's appetites.[/quote]

No one is arguing that male and female appetites are the same, nor that man and woman think exactly alike. Perhaps an analogy will help:

Lets imagine two rivers, one is very wide and runs in a fairly straight direction, while the other is very narrow and meanders across the countryside.

Now let us imagine that a precise amount of force is applied to the water in each in order to make the river run, and the river will only run for as long as that force is applied. Moreover, lets imagine that the same amount of force is applied to both rivers. It is clear that the water in the broad straight river will flow slowly (the force is spread out), while the narrow river will rage and crash as it turns.

No one argues that the rivers are very different in their operations. Sure both are rivers, but one runs straight and slow while the other runs fast with twists and turns. In the same way man and woman, while both equally human, differ in their operations (like their appetites, their manner of thinking, etc).

However, this does not mean that the animating force which moves the water is somehow different from one river to the next, or, analogously, that the soul of a man must be different from that of a woman. Indeed, the force which moves the water is the same, and it would be wrong to gather from the operations of the rivers that one is a "broad, slow" force and the other a "narrow, fast" force. In the same way, it would be wrong to gather from the differing appetites and ways of thinking between men and women that somehow their [i]souls[/i] are male or female.

I hope that helps, rather than just making things more confusing.

- Your Brother In Christ,

Jeff

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='scardella' date='Jul 5 2005, 03:04 PM']man's appetites are different from women's appetites.
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You are saying things that Aquinas is not saying. I see nowhere in any of his writings a distinction between "male appetites" and "female appetites," where in the Summa is this distinction made?