The Sufficiency Of Grace.

[ICTHUS]

Actually, on a second reading of that canon, I see that the moving and exciting mentioned in the second instance is one and the same as the moving and exciting mentioned in the first.

CANON IV.-If any one saith, that man's free will moved and excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and calling, nowise co-operates towards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of Justification; that it cannot refuse its consent, if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive; let him be anathema.

Let me represent diagrammatically what this is saying.

Moving and exciting -> Grace of justification <-Cooperation <-Free will of Man

of Grace

In essence, mans will co-operates with Gods Grace in obtaining the grace of justification. Clearly, this is semi-pelagianism, since it is not grace alone which saves us, but mans will in addition to grace.

I never thought I would think like a Calvinist, but here I am, thinkin' like one...

Edited October 24, 2003 by ICTHUS

[Anna]

Perhaps try looking at Scripture...

Look first at the Blessed Mother. She was filled with grace, yet God didn't impose himself upon her. He sent a messenger to ask if she willed to cooperate with His Divine Plan of Salvation for the world.

Look at Adam and Eve. They lived in paradise and did not even have the stain of original sin. Yet they freely chose to reject God's instructions.

Grace doesn't mean that we lose our automony. It helps and guides us to make right choices if we use it to our benefit, but we can just as easily reject it.

Am I wayyyyy off the mark?

I haven't read up on pelagianism nor semi pelagianism, but it pains me to see you struggling with this. I'll certainly try.

When in doubt, remember, "Upon this rock, I will build My Church, and the gates of hell will not prevail against it." We may err, and may not be able to find the answers to all our questions as quickly as we'd like. That is when God is asking us to Trust.

[Aloysius]

its like the perfect unity between the divine element and the human element

just like Christ Jesus, true God and true man. by Him our salvation is reached, then our salvation must come with true human free will and true God-given grace

[Katholikos]

Actually, on a second reading of that canon, I see that the moving and exciting mentioned in the second instance is one and the same as the moving and exciting mentioned in the first.

Let me represent diagrammatically what this is saying.

Moving and exciting -> Grace of justification <-Cooperation <-Free will of Man

of Grace

In essence, mans will co-operates with Gods Grace in obtaining the grace of justification. Clearly, this is semi-pelagianism, since it is not grace alone which saves us, but mans will in addition to grace.

I never thought I would think like a Calvinist, but here I am, thinkin' like one...

Does the Catholic Church understand herself to be Semi-Pelagian? If not, you need to look deeper into the interpretation you have given to the decrees of the Council of Trent. You need to know how the Church understands her own decrees before you declare them to be Semi-Pelagianist.

Does the Church think like a Calvinist?

I don't think so. If you do, you -- not the Church -- are mistaken. Please consider that your interpretation may be incorrect. This I know: the Church is never wrong in matters of faith and morals. She is infallible, protected from teaching error. This is a matter of faith, is it not?

Your concluding that the Church is Semi-Pelagian is equivalent to declaring that the Church is semi-heretical.

Peace be to you and to all.

Katholikos

[Cure of Ars]

One problem is that you are using Trent to answer questions that it is not trying to answer. This leads to a lot of interpretive leeway when applying the cannons to different answers. And the problem is you are interpreting it wrong. Although you almost had it right. It is addressing this heresy of Protestantism (Calvinism and Lutheranism). It is not addressing the heresy of Semi-Pelagian. The council that addresses Semi-Pelagian is the council of Orange. It is not an ecumenical council but I do not find anything that is in opposition to the Catholic doctrine of Grace and free will. But it does not conform to Calvin’s understanding. Here are some of the Canon's that I think are relevant.

CANON 8. If anyone maintains that some are able to come to the grace of baptism by mercy but others through free will, which has manifestly been corrupted in all those who have been born after the transgression of the first man, it is proof that he has no place in the true faith. For he denies that the free will of all men has been weakened through the sin of the first man, or at least holds that it has been affected in such a way that they have still the ability to seek the mystery of eternal salvation by themselves without the revelation of God. The Lord himself shows how contradictory this is by declaring that no one is able to come to him "unless the Father who sent me draws him" (John 6:44), as he also says to Peter, "Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona! For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven" (Matt. 16:17), and as the Apostle says, "No one can say 'Jesus is Lord' except by the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor. 12:3).

CANON 13. Concerning the restoration of free will. The freedom of will that was destroyed in the first man can be restored only by the grace of baptism, for what is lost can be returned only by the one who was able to give it. Hence the Truth itself declares: "So if the Son makes you free, you will be free inDouche" (John 8:36).

CANON 18. That grace is not preceded by merit. Recompense is due to good works if they are performed; but grace, to which we have no claim, precedes them, to enable them to be done.

CANON 23. Concerning the will of God and of man. Men do their own will and not the will of God when they do what displeases him; but when they follow their own will and comply with the will of God, however willingly they do so, yet it is his will by which what they will is both prepared and instructed.

CANON 25. Concerning the love with which we love God. It is wholly a gift of God to love God. He who loves, even though he is not loved, allowed himself to be loved. We are loved, even when we displease him, so that we might have means to please him. For the Spirit, whom we love with the Father and the Son, has poured into our hearts the love of the Father and the Son (Rom. 5:5).

Notice that after grace is given Free will is possible along with merit. Calvin would reject this. The Catholic Church would say amen to man's Total Depravity apart from God through original sin. But because we are given the Holy Spirit man does not remain in this state.

Edited October 24, 2003 by Cure of Ars

[kdewolf2]

In essence, mans will co-operates with Gods Grace in obtaining the grace of justification. Clearly, this is semi-pelagianism, since it is not grace alone which saves us, but mans will in addition to grace.

I don't think you're right about Semipelagianism. The Semipelagians said that the initial act of faith or goodwill, the "beginning of salvation," was due to man's unaided will, and grace comes afterward. The Church teaches that grace is prevenient. It comes first. This is why the Church said that the will was "moved and excited" by grace. Hence the Church is not Semipelagian.

It is grace alone which saves us, but you have to understand that in an orthodox sense. You have to freely assent to God's grace to be saved, but since your free assent is elicited by grace, you can't really take credit for it. If you hadn't been given grace already, you would not have been able to freely accept it. Hence you owe nothing to yourself, but everything to grace.

You think salvation can't be by grace alone, if it also depends on a free act of man's will. I'd suggest that the free act of man's will was produced by God's grace, and therefore does not contradict salvation by grace alone. Its not really easy to understand how grace can produce a "free" act. According to human logic, freedom excludes any notion of dependence. But human logic has its limitations.

I'd also suggest that Calvinism makes sense only superficially. It may be hard to understand how grace can be reconciled with freedom but it is really insane to deny the existence of freedom. I think you just have to realize how obscure all these things are. The Apostle Paul said we see through a glass darkly. You have to accept that you are totally dependent on God's grace but you also have to realize that you have a choice to make. You can't really understand it if you try to work it out so that it's all nice, neat, and logical. It's more of an existential thing.

[Anna]

I'm so impressed with your answers. (Especially Cure')

I'm also impressed with ICHYTHUS' questions.

[p0lar_bear]

Just to add my 2 cents...

As I understand it, semi-pelagianism says that God's grace is not sufficient for salvation, that God cannot save man without man's help.

In the Council of Trent, the Church isn't talking about what God can do, but what He does do, how He has chosen to save us.

God loves all of creation, but He loves man in a special way. In all creation man is unique in that he was created in and for relationship with God. He loves us not as things, but as persons. This means that He wants us to love Him in return. Love cannot be forced; it necessarily involves freedom. God doesn't save people against their will (which is the result of removing the free response), because He wants to enter into a personal relationship (i.e. a relationship between persons) with us.

Saying that salvation involves the free response of the person is not to say that God's grace is too weak, but rather that His love is too strong.

[kdewolf2]

I don't really want to burden anyone with long extracts, but here is a passage from The Catholic Encyclopedia's article on St. Augustine's teachings, which I think answers a lot of questions we might have about how grace and free will can be reconciled. It is worth reading if you have time.

---

It is unquestionably in the great Doctor's solution of the eternal problem of freedom and grace -- of the part taken by God and by man, in the affair of salvation -- that his thought stands forth as most personal, most powerful, and most disputed. Most personal, for he was the first of all to synthesize the great theories of the Fall, grace, and free will; and moreover it is he who, to reconcile them all, has furnished us with a profound explanation which is in very truth his, and of which we can find no trace in his predecessors. Hence, the term Augustinism is often exclusively used to designate his system of grace. Most powerful, for, as all admit, it was he above all others who won the triumph of liberty against the Manichæans, and of grace against the Pelagians. His doctrine has, in the main, been solemnly accepted by the Church, and we know that the canons of the Council of Orange are borrowed from his works. Most disputed, also. like St. Paul, whose teachings he develops, he has often been quoted, often not understood. Friends and enemies have exploited his teaching in the most diverse senses. It has not been grasped, not only by the opponents of liberty, and hence by the Reformers of the sixteenth century, but even today, by Protestant critics the most opposed to the cruel predestinationism of Calvin and Luther who father that doctrine on St. Augustine. A technical study would be out of place here; it will be sufficient to enunciate the most salient thoughts, to enable the reader to find his bearings.

(1) It is regarded as incontestable today that the system of Augustine was complete in his mind from the year 397 -- that is, from the beginning of his episcopate, when he wrote his answers to the "quæstiones Diversæ" of Simplician. It is to this book that Augustine, in his last years, refers the Semipelagians for the explanation of his real thought. This important fact, to which for a long time no attention was paid, has been recognized by Neander and established by Gangaut, and also by recent critics, such as Loofs, Reuter, Turmel, Jules Martin (see also Cunningham, St. Austin, 1886, pp. 80 and 175). It will not, therefore, be possible to deny the authority of these texts on the pretext that Augustine in his old age adopted a system more antagonistic to liberty.

(2) The system of Pelagius can today be better understood than heretofore. Pelagius doubtless denied original sin, and the immortality and integrity of Adam; in a word, the whole supernatural order. But the parent idea of his system, which was of stoic origin, was nothing else than the complete "emancipation" of human liberty with regard to God, and its limitless power for good and for evil. It depended on man to attain by himself, without the grace of God, a stoic impeccability and even insensibility, or the absolute control of his passions. It was scarcely suspected, even up to our time, what frightful rigorism resulted from this exaggeration of the powers of liberty. Since perfection was possible, it was of obligation. There was no longer any distinction between precepts and counsels. Whatever was good was a duty. There was no longer any distinction between mortal and venial sin. Every useless word merited hell, and even excluded from the Church the children of God. All this has been established by hitherto unedited documents which Caspari has published (Briefe, Abhandlungen, und Predigten, Christiania, 1890).

(3) The system of St. Augustine in opposition to this rests on three fundamental principles:

God is absolute Master, by His grace, of all the determinations of the will;

man remains free, even under the action of grace;

the reconciliation of these two truths rests on the manner of the Divine government.

Absolute sovereignty of God over the will

This principle, in opposition to the emancipation of Pelagius, has not always been understood in its entire significance. We think that numberless texts of the holy Doctor signify that not only does every meritorious act require supernatural grace, but also that every act of virtue, even of infidels, should be ascribed to a Gift of God, not inDouche to a supernatural grace (as Baius and the Jansenists pretend), but to a specially efficacious providence which has prepared this good movement of the will (Retractations, I, ix, n. 6). It is not, as theologians very wisely remark, that the will cannot accomplish that act of natural virtue, but it is a fact that without this providential benefit it would not. Many misunderstandings have arisen because this principle has not been comprehended, and in particular the great medieval theology, which adopted it and made it the basis of its system of liberty, has not been justly appreciated. But many have been afraid of these affirmations which are so sweeping, because they have not grasped the nature of God's gift, which leaves freedom intact. The fact has been too much lost sight of that Augustine distinguishes very explicitly two orders of grace: the grace of natural virtues (the simple gift of Providence, which prepares efficacious motives for the will); and grace for salutary and supernatural acts, given with the first preludes of faith. The latter is the grace of the sons, gratia fliorum; the former is the grace of all men, a grace which even strangers and infidels (filii concubinarum, as St. Augustine says) can receive (De Patientiâ, xxvii, n. 28).

Man remains free, even under the action of grace

The second principle, the affirmation of liberty even under the action of efficacious grace, has always been safeguarded, and there is not one of his anti-Pelagian works even of the latest, which does not positively proclaim a complete power of choice in man; "not but what it does not depend on the free choice of the will to embrace the faith or reject it, but in the elect this will is prepared by God" (De Prædest. SS., n. 10). The great Doctor did not reproach the Pelagians with requiring a power to choose between good and evil; in fact he proclaims with them that without that power there is no responsibility, no merit, no demerit; but he reproaches them with exaggerating this power. Julian of Eclanum, denying the sway of concupiscence, conceives free will as a balance in perfect equilibrium. Augustine protests: this absolute equilibrium existed in Adam; it was destroyed after original sin; the will has to struggle and react against an inclination to evil, but it remains mistress of its choice (Opus imperfectum contra Julianum, III, cxvii). Thus, when he says that we have lost freedom in consequence of the sin of Adam, he is careful to explain that this lost freedom is not the liberty of choosing between good and evil, because without it we could not help sinning, but the perfect liberty which was calm and without struggle, and which was enjoyed by Adam in virtue of his original integrity.

The reconciliation of these two truths

But is there not between these two principles an irremediable antinomy? On the one hand, there is affirmed an absolute and unreserved power in God of directing the choice of our will, of converting every hardened sinner, or of letting every created will harden itself; and on the other hand, it is affirmed that the rejection or acceptance of grace or of temptation depends on our free will. Is not this a contradiction? Very many modern critics, among whom are Loofs and Harnack, have considered these two affirmations as irreconcilable. But it is because, according to them, Augustinian grace is an irresistible impulse given by God, just as in the absence of it every temptation inevitably overcomes the will. But in reality all antinomy disappears if we have the key of the system; and this key is found in the third principle: the Augustinian explanation of the Divine government of wills, a theory so original, so profound, and yet absolutely unknown to the most perspicacious critics, Harnack, Loofs, and the rest.

Here are the main lines of this theory: The will never decides without a motive, without the attraction of some good which it perceives in the object. Now, although the will may be free in presence of every motive, still, as a matter of fact it takes different resolutions according to the different motives presented to it. In that is the whole secret of the influence exercised, for instance, by eloquence (the orator can do no more than present motives), by meditation, or by good reading. What a power over the will would not a man possess who could, at his own pleasure, at any moment, and in the most striking manner, present this or the other motive of action? -- But such is God's privilege. St. Augustine has remarked that man is not the master of his first thoughts; he can exert an influence on the course of his reflections, but he himself cannot determine the objects, the images, and, consequently, the motives which present themselves to his mind. Now, as chance is only a word, it is God who determines at His pleasure these first perceptions of men, either by the prepared providential action of exterior causes, or interiorly by a Divine illumination given to the soul. -- let us take one last step with Augustine: Not only does God send at His pleasure those attractive motives which inspire the will with its determinations, but, before choosing between these illuminations of the natural and the supernatural order, God knows the response which the soul, with all freedom, will make to each of them. Thus, in the Divine knowledge, there is for each created will an indefinite series of motives which de facto (but very freely) win the consent to what is good. God, therefore, can, at His pleasure, obtain the salvation of Judas, if He wishes, or let Peter go down to perdition. No freedom, as a matter of fact, will resist what He has planned, although it always keeps the power of going to perdition. Consequently, it is God alone, in His perfect independence, who determines, by the choice of such a motive or such an inspiration (of which he knows the future influence), whether the will is going to decide for good or for evil. Hence, the man who has acted well must thank God for having sent him an inspiration which was foreseen to be efficacious, while that favour has been denied to another. A fortiori, every one of the elect owes it to the Divine goodness alone that he has received a series of graces which God saw to be infallibly, though freely, bound up with final perseverance.

Assuredly we may reject this theory, for the Church, which always maintains the two principles of the absolute dependence of the will and of freedom, has not yet adopted as its own this reconciliation of the two extremes. We may ask where and how God knows the effect of these graces. Augustine has always affirmed the fact; he has never inquired about the mode; and it is here that Molinism has added to and developed his thoughts, in attempting to answer this question. But can the thinker, who created and until his dying day maintained this system which is so logically concatenated, be accused of fatalism and Manichæism?

It remains to be shown that our interpretation exactly reproduces the thought of the great Doctor. The texts are too numerous and too long to be reproduced here. But there is one work of Augustine, dating from the year 397, in which he clearly explains his thought -- a work which he not only did not disavow later on, but to which in particular he referred, at the end of his career, those of his readers who were troubled by his constant affirmation of grace. For example, to the monks of Adrumetum who thought that liberty was irreconcilable with this affirmation, he addressed a copy of this book "De Diversis quæstionibus ad Simplicianum," feeling sure that their doubts would be dissipated. There, in fact, he formulates his thoughts with great clearness. Simplician had asked how he should understand the Epistle to the Romans 9, on the predestination of Jacob and Esau. Augustine first lays down the fundamental principle of St. Paul, that every good will comes from grace, so that no man can take glory to himself for his merits, and this grace is so sure of its results that human liberty will never in reality resist it, although it has the power to do so. Then he affirms that this efficacious grace is not necessary for us to be able to act well, but because, in fact, without it we would not wish to act well. From that arises the great difficulty: How does the power of resisting grace fit in with the certainty of the result? And it is here that Augustine replies: There are many ways of inviting faith. Souls being differently disposed, God knows what invitation will be accepted, what other will not be accepted. Only those are the elect for whom God chooses the invitation which is foreseen to be efficacious, but God could convert them all: "Cujus autem miseretur, sic cum vocat, quomodo scit ei congruere ut vocantem non respuat" (op. cit., I, q. ii, n. 2, 12, 13).

Is there in this a vestige of an irresistible grace or of that impulse against which it is impossible to fight, forcing some to good, and others to sin and hell? It cannot be too often repeated that this is not an idea flung off in passing, but a fundamental explanation which if not understood leaves us in the impossibility of grasping anything of his doctrine; but if it is seized Augustine entertains no feelings of uneasiness on the score of freedom. In fact he supposes freedom everywhere, and reverts incessantly to that knowledge on God's part which precedes predestination, directs it, and assures its infallible result. In the "De Done perseverantiæ" (xvii, n. 42), written at the end of his life, he explains the whole of predestination by the choice of the vocation which is foreseen as efficacious. Thus is explained the chief part attributed to that external providence which prepares, by ill health, by warnings, etc., the good thoughts which it knows will bring about good resolutions. Finally, this explanation alone harmonizes with the moral action which he attributes to victorious grace. Nowhere does Augustine represent it as an irresistible impulse impressed by the stronger on the weaker. It is always an appeal, an invitation which attracts and seeks to persuade. He describes this attraction, which is without violence, under the graceful image of dainties offered to a child, green leaves offered to a sheep (In Joannem, tract. xxvi, n. 5). And always the infallibility of the result is assured by the Divine knowledge which directs the choice of the invitation.

(4) The Augustinian predestination presents no new difficulty if one has understood the function of this Divine knowledge in the choice of graces. The problem is reduced to this: Does God in his creative decree and, before any act of human liberty, determine by an immutable choice the elect and the reprobate? -- Must the elect during eternity thank God only for having rewarded their merits, or must they also thank Him for having, prior to any merit on their part, chosen them to the meriting of this reward? One system, that of the Semipelagians, decides in favour of man: God predestines to salvation all alike, and gives to all an equal measure of grace; human liberty alone decides whether one is lost or saved; from which we must logically conclude (and they really insinuated it) that the number of the elect is not fixed or certain. The opposite system, that of the Predestinationists (the Semipelagians falsely ascribed this view to the Doctor of Hippo), affirms not only a privileged choice of the elect by God, but at the same time (a) the predestination of the reprobate to hell and (B) the absolute powerlessness of one or the other to escape from the irresistible impulse which drags them either to good or to evil. This is the system of Calvin.

Between these two extreme opinions Augustine formulated (not invented) the Catholic dogma, which affirms these two truths at the same time:

the eternal choice of the elect by God is very real, very gratuitous, and constitutes the grace of graces;

but this decree does not destroy the Divine will to save all men, which, moreover, is not realized except by the human liberty that leaves to the elect full power to fall and to the non-elect full power to rise.

Here is how the theory of St. Augustine, already explained, forces us to conceive of the Divine decree: Before all decision to create the world, the infinite knowledge of God presents to Him all the graces, and different series of graces, which He can prepare for each soul, along with the consent or refusal which would follow in each circumstance, and that in millions and millions of possible combinations. Thus He sees that if Peter had received such another grace, he would not have been converted; and if on the contrary such another Divine appeal had been heard in the heart of Judas, he would have done penance and been saved. Thus, for each man in particular there are in the thought of God, limitless possible histories, some histories of virtue and salvation, others of crime and damnation; and God will be free in choosing such a world, such a series of graces, and in determining the future history and final destiny of each soul. And this is precisely what He does when, among all possible worlds, by an absolutely free act, He decides to realize the actual world with all the circumstances of its historic evolutions, with all the graces which in fact have been and will be distributed until the end of the world, and consequently with all the elect and all the reprobate who God foresaw would be in it if de facto He created it.

Now in the Divine decree, according to Augustine, and according to the Catholic Faith on this point, which has been formulated by him, the two elements pointed out above appear:

The certain and gratuitous choice of the elect -- God decreeing, inDouche, to create the world and to give it such a series of graces with such a concatenation of circumstances as should bring about freely, but infallibly, such and such results (for example, the despair of Judas and the repentance of Peter), decides, at the same time, the name, the place, the number of the citizens of the future heavenly Jerusalem. The choice is immutable; the list closed. It is evident, inDouche, that only those of whom God knows beforehand that they will wish to co-operate with the grace decreed by Him will be saved. It is a gratuitous choice, the gift of gifts, in virtue of which even our merits are a gratuitous benefit, a gift which precedes all our merits. No one, in fact, is able to merit this election. God could, among other possible worlds, have chosen one in which other series of graces would have brought about other results. He saw combinations in which Peter would have been impenitent and Judas converted. It is therefore prior to any merit of Peter, or any fault of Judas, that God decided to give them the graces which saved Peter and not Judas. God does not wish to give paradise gratuitously to any one; but He gives very gratuitously to Peter the graces with which He knows Peter will be saved. -- Mysterious choice! Not that it interferes with liberty, but because to this question: Why did not God, seeing that another grace would have saved Judas, give it to him? Faith can only answer, with Augustine: O Mystery! O Altitudo! (De Spiritu et litterâ, xxxiv, n. 60).

But this decree includes also the second element of the Catholic dogma: the very sincere will of God to give to all men the power of saving themselves and the power of damning themselves. According to Augustine, God, in his creative decree, has expressly excluded every order of things in which grace would deprive man of his liberty, every situation in which man would not have the power to resist sin, and thus Augustine brushes aside that predestinationism which has been attributed to him. Listen to him speaking to the Manichæans: "All can be saved if they wish"; and in his "Retractations" (I, x), far from correcting this assertion, he confirms it emphatically: "It is true, entirely true, that all men can, if they wish." But he always goes back to the providential preparation. In his sermons he says to all: "It depends on you to be elect" (In Ps. cxx, n. 11, etc.); "Who are the elect? You, if you wish it" (In Ps. Lxxiii, n. 5). But, you will say, according to Augustine, the lists of the elect and reprobate are closed. Now if the non-elect can gain heaven, if all the elect can be lost, why should not some pass from one list to the other? You forget the celebrated explanation of Augustine: When God made His plan, He knew infallibly, before His choice, what would be the response of the wills of men to His graces. If, then, the lists are definitive, if no one will pass from one series to the other, it is not because anyone cannot (on the contrary, all can), it is because God knew with infallible knowledge that no one would wish to. Thus I cannot effect that God should destine me to another series of graces than that which He has fixed, but, with this grace, if I do not save myself it will not be because I am not able, but because I do not wish to.

Such are the two essential elements of Augustinian and Catholic predestination. This is the dogma common to all the schools, and formulated by all theologians: predestination in its entirety is absolutely gratuitous (ante merita). We have to insist on this, because many have seen in this immutable and gratuitous choice only a hard thesis peculiar to St. Augustine, whereas it is pure dogma (barring the mode of conciliation, which the Church still leaves free). With that established, the long debates of theologians on special predestination to glory ante or post merita are far from having the importance that some attach to them. (For a fuller treatment of this subtile problem see the "Dict. de théol. cath., I, coll. 2402 sqq.) I do not think St. Augustine entered that debate; in his time, only dogma was in question. But it does not seem historically permissible to maintain, as many writers have, that Augustine first taught the milder system (post merita), up to the year 416 (In Joan. evang., tract. xii, n. 12) and that afterwards, towards 418, he shifted his ground and went to the extreme of harsh assertion, amounting even to predestinationism. We repeat, the facts absolutely refute this view. The ancient texts, even of 397, are as affirmative and as categorical as those of his last years, as critics like Loofs and Reuter have shown. If, therefore, it is shown that at that time he inclined to the milder opinion, there is no reason to think that he did not persevere in that sentiment.

(5) The part which Augustine had in the doctrine of Original Sin has been brought to light and determined only recently.

In the first place, It is no longer possible to maintain seriously, as was formerly the fashion (even among certain Catholics, like Richard Simon), that Augustine invented in the Church the hitherto unknown doctrine of original sin, or at least was the first to introduce the idea of punishment and sin. Dorner himself (Augustinus, p. 146) disposed of this assertion, which lacks verisimilitude. In this doctrine of the primal fall Augustine distinguished, with greater insistency and clearness than his predecessors, the punishment and the sin -- the chastisement which strips the children of Adam of all the original privileges -- and the fault, which consists in this, that the crime of Adam, the cause of the fall is, without having been committed personally by his children, nevertheless in a certain measure imputed to them, in virtue of the moral union established by God between the head of the human family and his descendants.

To pretend that in this matter Augustine was an innovator, and that before him the Fathers affirmed the punishment of the sin of Adam in his sons, but did not speak of the fault, is a historical error now proved to demonstration. We may discuss the thought of this or that pre Augustinian Father, but, taking them as a whole, there is no room for doubt. The Protestant R. Seeberg (Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, I, p. 256), after the example of many others, proclaims it by referring to Tertullian, Commodian, St. Cyprian, and St. Ambrose. The expressions, fault, sin, stain (culpa, peccatum, macula) are repeated in a way to dispel all doubt. The truth is that original sin, while being sin, is of a nature essentially different from other faults, and does not exact a personal act of the will of the children of Adam in order to be responsible for the fault of their father, which is morally imputed to them. Consequently, the Fathers -- the Greeks especially -- have insisted on its penal and afflictive character, which is most in evidence, while Augustine was led by the polemics of the Pelagians (and only by them) to lay emphasis on the moral aspect of the fault of the human race in its first father.

With regard to Adam's state before the fall Augustine not only affirmed, against Pelagius, the gifts of immortality, impassibility, integrity, freedom from error, and, above all, the sanctifying grace of Divine adoption, but he emphasized its absolutely gratuitous and supernatural character. Doubtless, considering the matter historically and de facto, it was only the sin of Adam that inflicted death on us -- Augustine repeats it again and again -- because God had safeguarded us against the law of our nature. But de jure neither immortality nor the other graces were our due, and Augustine recognized this in affirming that God could have made the condition in which we were actually born the primitive condition of our first parents. That assertion alone is the very reverse of Jansenism. It is, moreover, formally confirmed in the "Retractations" (I, ix, n. 6).

(6) Does this mean that we must praise everything in St. Augustine's explanation of grace? Certainly not. And we shall note the improvements made by the Church, through her doctors, in the original Augustinism. Some exaggerations have been abandoned, as, for instance, the condemnation to hell of children dying without baptism. Obscure and ambiguous formulæ have been eliminated. We must say frankly that Augustine's literary method of emphasizing his thought by exaggerated expressions, issuing in troublesome paradoxes, has often obscured his doctrine, aroused opposition in many minds, or led them into error. Also, it is above all important, in order to comprehend his doctrine, to compile an Augustinian dictionary, not a priori, but after an objective study of his texts. The work would be long and laborious, but how many prejudices it would dispel!

The Protestant historian Ph. Schaff (St. Augustine, p. 102) writes: "The great genius of the African Church, from whom the Middle Ages and the Reformation have received an impulse alike powerful, though in different directions, has not yet fulfilled the work marked out for him in the counsels of Divine Wisdom. He serves as a bond of union between the two antagonistic sections of Western Christendom, and encourages the hope that a time may come when the injustice and bitterness of strife will be forgiven and forgotten, and the discords of the past be drowned forever in the sweet harmonies of perfect knowledge and perfect love." May this dream be realized!

[Donna]

Icthus, remember man's last end.

God created us.

For our last end.

Which is salvation.

Of course He would first give the grace.

To respond to Him.

Does the maker of the lawn mower

Just sit there and wait for the mower to turn itself on?

The maker must do something first.

[ICTHUS]

Okay, my theory of predestination then:

Mans free will and ability to choose good is damaged by sin. Hence, it is not that he cannot choose good, but that he would not choose it, given the choice.

Enter the Grace of God!

Grace infuses the conscience and the soul of unregenerate man, infusing him with the virtues of faith, hope, and love, so that he would choose good.

Gods grace of justification offered through Christ Jesus is chosen by "graced" man, which brings him to saving relationship with Christ.

Which leads us to another dilemma:

Since not all men, but only the Elect, come to God, would that mean that the grace which infuses mans soul before he is justified would be wasted on some?

Or is this where the Thomist "I" for "intrinsically efficacious grace" comes in. But if this were so, then God would be guilty of giving intrinsically efficacious, sufficient grace to some, but not to others, thus condemning man to Hell.

Or is it that God gives sufficient grace to all, so that all may choose, but to the Elect He gives intrinsically efficacious grace, that is, grace that by its very nature will always produce the end of justification?

[Donna]

Icthus, good to see you.

"The Last Gospel" (John 1: 1-14), or parts thereof.

(Which is read at the end of every old Latin Mass).

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God...

"In him was life, and the life was the light of men.

"And the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it...

"That was the true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world...

"But as many as received him, he gave to them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believeth in his name...

"Who are born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.

"And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us..."

[Donna]

A couple more:

(DRV)

2 Thes. 2:10-11:

St. Paul is speaking of the antichrist and of his luring the masses; how they will be deceived in powers and lying wonders, etc;

"And in all seduction of iniquity to them that perish: because they receive not the love of the truth that they might be saved. Therefore, God shall send them the operation of error, to beleive a lie. That all may be judged, who have not believed the truth, but have consented to iniquity."

Apocalypse 3:20:

"Behold, I stand at the door, and knock: if any man shall hear my voice, and open to me the gate, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me."

[ICTHUS]

What do people think of my last post (my soteriological theory)? Is it orthodox?

[p0lar_bear]

Icthus,

The flaws in your theory begin with your first statement.

Mans free will and ability to choose good is damaged by sin. Hence, it is not that he cannot choose good, but that he would not choose it, given the choice.

How does this not amount to man being wholy evil? Also, it contradicts lived experience. People who utterly reject the notion of God are still capable of choosing the good. Many atheists have a great love of truth (granted, they do not recognize the greatest Truth, but they do value truth). A pagan can recognize beauty in nature, art, etc.. The fact that they do not recognize the source of that beauty doesn't mean they are blind to beauty itself. Non-believers often choose physical goods (such as good food) and spiritual goods (such as meditation, though significantly flawed). Love, forgiveness, generousity, compassion, work, honesty, loyalty, and sacrifice are all goods that are embraced by those who do not recognize God. Yes, they embrace them in flawed and incomplete ways, but they embrace them all the same.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church no. 405 affirms that man's ability and willingness to do good is not destroyed by the Fall:

[Original sin] is a deprivation of original holiness and justice, but human nature has not been totally corrupted: it is wounded in the natural powers proper to it, subject to ignorance, suffering and the dominion of death, and inclined to sin - an inclination to evil that is called concupiscence.

Gods grace of justification offered through Christ Jesus is chosen by "graced" man, which brings him to saving relationship with Christ.

In a way, yes. Through what we call actual grace, God draws man to Himself. After all, one can only come to the Father if the Father calls him (I can't remember the reference off-hand), so man does not come to God without His help (i.e. grace).

However, since God desires that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of truth" (1 Tim 2:4), this grace is offered to all men. It is not the case that God only offers grace to certain people, who inevitably choose Him.

Since not all men, but only the Elect, come to God, would that mean that the grace which infuses mans soul before he is justified would be wasted on some?

God dispenses His grace according to His infinite wisdom. Because He is God, nothing He does is in vain or a waste.

Or is this where the Thomist "I" for "intrinsically efficacious grace" comes in. But if this were so, then God would be guilty of giving intrinsically efficacious, sufficient grace to some, but not to others, thus condemning man to Hell.

Not being a Thomistic scholar, I'm not sure what Thomas was referring to in this. If you want, I can research it and get back to you. What I can tell you is that God condemns no one to Hell. His grace is sufficient, but He still allows us the choice. Those who do not choose God do so not because of a lack of grace.

Or is it that God gives sufficient grace to all, so that all may choose, but to the Elect He gives intrinsically efficacious grace, that is, grace that by its very nature will always produce the end of justification?

What you're saying is that God gives enough grace to everyone, but He makes some of them choose Him while others are left to make the choice alone, and thereby choose against Him. Isn't that the same thing as saying He doesn't give the others enough grace? Isn't the "intrinsically efficacious grace," as you define it, still removing the free will?

God give suffient grace to everyone. Some choose Him, some choose against Him. His grace is suffient, but out of love He respects man's free will.

Edited October 29, 2003 by p0lar_bear