A response to Peter Leithart

[qfnol31]

I don't know if this will end up a debate or not...


Original article: [url="http://capo.org/premise/96/feb/p960204.html"]http://capo.org/premise/96/feb/p960204.html[/url] (page under construction)
[b]An Analysis of Leithart’s “Natural Law: a Reformed Critique”[/b]

“Natural Law: a Reformed Critique” is an analysis and rebuttal by Peter Leithart on the ideas of natural law theory, especially “as it has developed mainly in Roman Catholic theology” (Leithart 3). Leithart argues why the theories of natural law as presented by men such as Thomas Aquinas, John Murray, and George Weigel cannot hold true in the modern world. He mentions that people, when discussing morality with society today, should “argue from explicitly Christian premises” (1)—the language of Scripture—rather than the language of natural law, saying, “I believe the theological foundations of natural law language are extremely shaky” (13). However, much of Leithart’s claims about the theories of natural law are inaccurate; his comments often result, less from an actual disagreement with the authors, but rather a misinterpretation of their writings and the natural law theory in general.

Leithart begins by explaining that he does not think that Christians “are obligated explicitly to appeal to Scripture in every single encounter with unbelievers” (3). However, he also believes that “the only thing gained by restricting ourselves to the grammar of natural law is a measure of incoherence and confusion” (3). Leithart goes on to claim that “the rules of natural law are derived from rational reflection on human experience and inclinations, from reflection on the nature of man as man, nothing else taken into consideration” (10). He argues that for the purposes of morals, one must always speak of the Bible, and not transform the language into what he calls modern terms . This is contrary to natural law theorists such as George Weigel and Kenneth Myers, whom he says “converge on the practical point that Christians should avoid entering public debate armed with appeals to Scripture, but instead of appeal in a universally recognized language, to universally accessible norms drawn from general revelation or natural law” (2). As Leithart describes:
[i]Natural law, Weigel believes, can provide the necessary grammar for ordering the moral argument that derives from the various normative stories which are in play in American public life, a language into which our many stories can be translated…[it] is capable of providing a language of truly public moral argument, one that is open to all Americans irrespective of confessional allegiance (1).[/i]

Leithart says that the “chief cultural-political claim of Christians is Jesus is Lord” and that cannot be translated into Natural Law language (14). Rather, he ignores the fact that no one wants to translate the Divine Law into the Natural Law.
The problem with this part of Leithart’s argument is that he confuses the natural law with the divine law. William May says, “…human persons, inasmuch as they are intelligent, rational creatures, participate actively in the eternal law, and their active, intelligent participation is precisely what the natural law is” (May 73). In addition, May goes on to say that natural reason “pertains to reason insofar as it is something that practical reason constitutes or brings into being” (77). This follows along with Thomas who says, “the precepts of the natural law are related to practical reason as the first principles of scientific demonstrations are related to theoretical reason” (Aquinas 42). Aquinas is saying that a person can come to know the precepts of the natural law by a true reasoning.

In Catholic Tradition, there are four different types of law: eternal law, divine law, natural law, and human law, all of which Thomas addresses in his treatise on law. When describing the necessity of the divine law in the life of man, Aquinas says, “in addition to the natural law and human laws, divine law was necessary to give direction to human life” (21). The first reason why divine law was necessary is that man has a supernatural end. If he were not destined for everlasting life with God, then man would have no need for divine law. Aquinas says that this law “direct[s] human beings to their end” (21). Here he gives a very good description of why the divine law, given through revelation, was necessary in addition to both the natural and human laws.

This distinction between the natural and divine law is key to understanding the one of the major flaws in Leithart’s argument. He seems to think that modern natural law theorists wish to depart from the language of Scripture. However, what he does not realize is that the natural law theorists are not separating Scripture from a virtuous life, but rather better defining the differences in natural and divine law. By doing this, the theorists are able to appeal to the individual’s reason. Divine law specifically deals with revelation, a topic that many people wish to ignore. Natural law aims at truths accessible to reason (which can include the virtues), and is more readily available to the public, for all men have the power to reason. Scripture directs its attentions towards divine law—made known through revelation—and is supplementary to act of reason, showing man why he should act a certain way versus how he should act. It is because of this distinction that man cannot promulgate the claims of Christianity, namely that “Jesus is Lord” with natural law as Leithart would think we are doing; for as soon as a person speaks of salvation and man’s end, he begins to speak through the ideas from divine law (3).

In his essay, Leithart delves into the account of natural law as given by John Murray. As Leithart describes, “Murray argued that natural law teaches men only how to be reasonable not how to be saints” (12). Leithart says, “The distinction between sainthood and reasonableness is itself suspect” (12). He does not think that anyone should work towards being reasonable, but all must work towards sainthood. Here Leithart makes the distinction that to become a saint one must know about God. However, this is similar to his problem before, where Leithart fails to make a distinction between natural law and divine law, claiming that they should be the same. The theories on natural law say that the divine law complements the natural law, but that one can reason with out it. To be a reasonable person, or someone with external virtues, one must only know the natural law; to be a saint, that is, to work towards one’s end in regards to virtue, one must know the divine law.

Another of Leithart’s claims against Thomas deals with free will and evil acts. Aquinas has a treatise on synderesis where he says it “is a characteristic disposition” of human nature (2). Aquinas also establishes that “synderesis incites to do good and complains about evil,” which is the first precept (2). As part of his argument that men can choose to do an evil act, Leithart gives the example of a person who commits adultery:
[i]On the other hand, the first principle might be understood as a statement of fact: What men seek is, by definition, good. This seems to be what Thomas meant…Thomas, of course, knew the reality of sin. He acknowledged, therefore, that men will seek things that are objectively evil. Still, Thomas says, what they seek will seem good to them. An adulterer does not intend evil; he intends to receive the pleasure of his adultery, which appears to him good. Still, his adultery is objectively evil…This simply won’t do. First, it is contradicted by Scripture. Paul states in Romans 1 that sinners, knowing that what they do is evil, continue to practice it…Sinners do directly intend evil” (11). [/i]

Leithart claims that anyone can directly intend to do evil, while Thomas says that it is impossible for a person to directly intend evil.

One of the problems with Leithart’s argument is his misunderstanding of Thomas. He does not seem to believe that Aquinas would support the case that a man can do an act knowing it is evil. The first way he misinterprets Thomas is in the idea of the first principle in practical reason, which “is based on the nature of good, namely, that good is what all things seek” (43). For Thomas, this idea means that man seeks everything ‘under the aspect of the good,’ meaning that man pursues good—which he may not realize—even though he “intends evil.” However, man is capable of replacing (in his mind) the true Good with other goods, at which point the good he seeks becomes disordered. According to Thomas, all goods become disordered if taken out of context, or even replacing, the Summum Bonum. For example, a man cannot morally make sex his god, where the highest goal of his life is seeking sex with women. Sex is a good, given to human beings for the purposes of procreation and the unity of the marriage. However, when a person takes sex out of the context that God intended, where the man either doesn’t use sex to the ends that God meant for it to have, or he makes sex as his god, sex becomes a disordered good for that man. Another instance is with the person who chooses to commit adultery with another woman. This causes disorder of the attraction, or even the love, that is natural between man and woman. In both cases the act may be a grave, evil act, but each man truly is choosing a good (there is a good within the act and it is that good he is seeking e.g., pleasure, companionship, etc), just one that is not properly ordered under the Summum Bonum.

Another problem with Leithart’s disagreement is a misunderstanding of the act of free will. Aquinas will admit that a will can be evil, saying, “the will that wills contrary to erroneous reason wills contrary to conscience” (5). What this is saying is that a person can have an evil will, and can know that it is evil, yet he still seeks at a good. St. Augustine wrote in his biography, Confessions, about an act of evil he committed by stealing some pears. Augustine stole the pears for no other purpose than the act. He did not want the pears and he did not do it for the enjoyment of having stolen. This creates a problem for Augustine: how he could steal pears for a seemingly evil end? However, Thomas would claim that even in the act there was a good sought after by Augustine. The good was contained in the act of choosing to do something, or the act of free will. For Thomas, just the act of using free will is a good in itself. Therefore, as in the case of Augustine, the person who “directly intends evil” is a person who chooses a good, albeit disordered, just by choosing to enact his free will.

Leithart proposes some interesting ideas about natural law theory and the ideas of evil. However, his ideas also produce many problems. Natural law theorists claim that through reason a man can understand the eternal law. Leithart wants to deny the use of reason in knowing the law of God, but his stance on Scripture would imply that a person must use reason to interpret it. It brings about the problem of how one could understand the divine law of Scripture if he could not use reason or have natural law as a foundation for his interpretation. He also thinks that natural theorists claim the natural law derives from social norms, but rather they say the opposite, namely, that moral norms derive directly from the natural law. Leithart again errs in his analysis of natural law and divine law, where he makes no distinction between the two, trying to put them in the same category. In summary, Leithart’s views and disagreements about the natural law really stem directly from misinterpretations of the natural law theorist rather than disagreements with the actual natural law theory.

Edited November 2, 2004 by qfnol31

[Guest JeffCR07]

good article!

[Ricky2]

The second law of thermodynamics states: Energy, unless constrained, will always increase in disorder (chaos), entropy always increases.

Observations of Natural Law reveal the existence of a counterpart in the domain of human behavior. The principles of the Secular New Age provide civilization with the road map to its destination, while the principles of Christianity show us the way to constrain it. The choice is ours to make!
Ricky2