The Constitution

[Guest Aluigi]

CCC 36:
"Our holy mother, the Church, holds and teaches that God, the first principle and last end of all things, can be known with certainty from the created world by the natural light of human reason"

(Citing Vatican Council I, Dei Filius 2: DS 3004; cf. 3026; Vatican Council II, Dei Verbum 6.)

Without this capacity, man would not be able to welcom God's revelation. Man has this capacitty because he is created "in the image of God." Genesis 1:27

[Guest Aluigi]

CCC 37 37 In the historical conditions in which he finds himself, however, man experiences many difficulties in coming to know God by the light of reason alone:

"Though human reason is, strictly speaking, truly capable by its own natural power and light of attaining to a true and certain knowledge of the one personal God, who watches over and controls the world by his providence, and of the natural law written in our hearts by the Creator; yet there are many obstacles which prevent reason from the effective and fruitful use of this inborn faculty. For the truths that concern the relations between God and man wholly transcend the visible order of things, and, if they are translated into human action and influence it, they call for self-surrender and abnegation. The human mind, in its turn, is hampered in the attaining of such truths, not only by the impact of the senses and the imagination, but also by disordered appetites which are the consequences of original sin. So it happens that men in such matters easily persuade themselves that what they would not like to be true is false or at least doubtful." Pius XII, Humani Generis, 561: DS 3875

[qfnol31]

LoL, I posted the same thing as you. That's why I don't think man in his fallen state can, for certain, know about God through reason alone, and even in the redeemed state (or elevated state), it would seem concupiscence would be a large problem.

Edited November 11, 2004 by qfnol31

[qfnol31]

[quote]38 This is why man stands in need of being enlightened by God's revelation, not only about those things that exceed his understanding, but also "about those religious and moral truths which of themselves are not beyond the grasp of human reason, so that even in the present condition of the human race, they can be known by all men with ease, with firm certainty and with no admixture of error"[/quote]

Pius XII, Humani generis 561: DS 3876; cf. Dei Filius 2: DS 3005;
DV 6; St. Thomas Aquinas, S Th I, I, I.

Edited November 11, 2004 by qfnol31

[Guest Aluigi]

[b]human reason is, strictly speaking, truly capable by its own natural power and light of attaining to a true and certain knowledge of the one personal God, who watches over and controls the world by his providence, and of the natural law written in our hearts by the Creator;[/b]

it just says there are difficulties. but human reason is capable

[qfnol31]

[quote]35 Man's faculties make him capable of coming to a knowledge of the existence of a personal God. But for man to be able to enter into real intimacy with him, God willed both to reveal himself to man, and to give him the grace of being able to welcome this revelation in faith.(so) the proofs of God's existence, however, can predispose one to faith and help one to see that faith is not opposed to reason.[/quote]

[Guest Aluigi]

... yeah.... again man's faculties capable of coming to knowledge of the One True God....

[qfnol31]

The real question I asked, and has never been truly answered, is [i]how[/i], specifically, does the Constitution counter Natural Law?

[Guest Aluigi]

oh I'm not arguing that, I'm just telling you to drop that point of argument cause your side was kinda in opposition to the CCC. i'll butt out now and let you continue, so long as you admit knowledge of God would be part of the natural law.

[qfnol31]

LoL, it's okay, it's important to get that out, but where in the Natural Law would it fit? Is it a moral that we must acknowledge God's existence? I mean I guess I could see that, but I was wondering how that's not faith.

[qfnol31]

[quote]Some people, however, disregarding the dependence of human reason on Divine Wisdom and the need, given the present state of fallen nature, for Divine Revelation as an effective means for knowing moral truths, even those of the natural order,62 have actually posited a complete sovereignty of reason in the domain of moral norms regarding the right ordering of life in this world. Such norms would constitute the boundaries for a merely "human" morality; they would be the expression of a law which man in an autonomous manner lays down for himself and which has its source exclusively in human reason. In no way could God be considered the Author of this law, except in the sense that human reason exercises its autonomy in setting down laws by virtue of a primordial and total mandate given to man by God. These trends of thought have led to a denial, in opposition to Sacred Scripture (cf. Mt 15:3-6) and the Church's constant teaching, of the fact that the natural moral law has God as its author, and that man, by the use of reason, participates in the eternal law, which it is not for him to establish.[/quote]

[qfnol31]

Does this apply at all?


An Analysis of Leithart’s “Natural Law: a Reformed Critique”

“Natural Law: a Reformed Critique” is an analysis and rebuttal by Peter Leithart on the ideas of natural law theory, especially “as it has developed mainly in Roman Catholic theology” (Leithart 3). Leithart argues why the theories of natural law as presented by men such as Thomas Aquinas, John Murray, and George Weigel cannot hold true in the modern world. He mentions that people, when discussing morality with society today, should “argue from explicitly Christian premises” (1)—the language of Scripture—rather than the language of natural law, saying, “I believe the theological foundations of natural law language are extremely shaky” (13). However, much of Leithart’s claims about the theories of natural law are inaccurate; his comments often result, less from an actual disagreement with the authors, but rather a misinterpretation of their writings and the natural law theory in general.

Leithart begins by explaining that he does not think that Christians “are obligated explicitly to appeal to Scripture in every single encounter with unbelievers” (3). However, he also believes that “the only thing gained by restricting ourselves to the grammar of natural law is a measure of incoherence and confusion” (3). Leithart goes on to claim that “the rules of natural law are derived from rational reflection on human experience and inclinations, from reflection on the nature of man as man, nothing else taken into consideration” (10). He argues that for the purposes of morals, one must always speak of the Bible, and not transform the language into what he calls modern terms . This is contrary to natural law theorists such as George Weigel and Kenneth Myers, whom he says “converge on the practical point that Christians should avoid entering public debate armed with appeals to Scripture, but instead of appeal in a universally recognized language, to universally accessible norms drawn from general revelation or natural law” (2). As Leithart describes:
Natural law, Weigel believes, can provide the necessary grammar for ordering the moral argument that derives from the various normative stories which are in play in American public life, a language into which our many stories can be translated…[it] is capable of providing a language of truly public moral argument, one that is open to all Americans irrespective of confessional allegiance (1).

Leithart says that the “chief cultural-political claim of Christians is Jesus is Lord” and that cannot be translated into Natural Law language (14). Rather, he ignores the fact that no one wants to translate the Divine Law into the Natural Law.
The problem with this part of Leithart’s argument is that he confuses the natural law with the divine law. William May says, “…human persons, inasmuch as they are intelligent, rational creatures, participate actively in the eternal law, and their active, intelligent participation is precisely what the natural law is” (May 73). In addition, May goes on to say that natural reason “pertains to reason insofar as it is something that practical reason constitutes or brings into being” (77). This follows along with Thomas who says, “the precepts of the natural law are related to practical reason as the first principles of scientific demonstrations are related to theoretical reason” (Aquinas 42). Aquinas is saying that a person can come to know the precepts of the natural law by a true reasoning.

In Catholic Tradition, there are four different types of law: eternal law, divine law, natural law, and human law, all of which Thomas addresses in his treatise on law. When describing the necessity of the divine law in the life of man, Aquinas says, “in addition to the natural law and human laws, divine law was necessary to give direction to human life” (21). The first reason why divine law was necessary is that man has a supernatural end. If he were not destined for everlasting life with God, then man would have no need for divine law. Aquinas says that this law “direct[s] human beings to their end” (21). Here he gives a very good description of why the divine law, given through revelation, was necessary in addition to both the natural and human laws.

This distinction between the natural and divine law is key to understanding the one of the major flaws in Leithart’s argument. He seems to think that modern natural law theorists wish to depart from the language of Scripture. However, what he does not realize is that the natural law theorists are not separating Scripture from a virtuous life, but rather better defining the differences in natural and divine law. By doing this, the theorists are able to appeal to the individual’s reason. Divine law specifically deals with revelation, a topic that many people wish to ignore. Natural law aims at truths accessible to reason (which can include the virtues), and is more readily available to the public, for all men have the power to reason. Scripture directs its attentions towards divine law—made known through revelation—and is supplementary to act of reason, showing man why he should act a certain way versus how he should act. It is because of this distinction that man cannot promulgate the claims of Christianity, namely that “Jesus is Lord” with natural law as Leithart would think we are doing; for as soon as a person speaks of salvation and man’s end, he begins to speak through the ideas from divine law (3).

In his essay, Leithart delves into the account of natural law as given by John Murray. As Leithart describes, “Murray argued that natural law teaches men only how to be reasonable not how to be saints” (12). Leithart says, “The distinction between sainthood and reasonableness is itself suspect” (12). He does not think that anyone should work towards being reasonable, but all must work towards sainthood. Here Leithart makes the distinction that to become a saint one must know about God. However, this is similar to his problem before, where Leithart fails to make a distinction between natural law and divine law, claiming that they should be the same. The theories on natural law say that the divine law complements the natural law, but that one can reason with out it. To be a reasonable person, or someone with external virtues, one must only know the natural law; to be a saint, that is, to work towards one’s end in regards to virtue, one must know the divine law.

Another of Leithart’s claims against Thomas deals with free will and evil acts. Aquinas has a treatise on synderesis where he says it “is a characteristic disposition” of human nature (2). Aquinas also establishes that “synderesis incites to do good and complains about evil,” which is the first precept (2). As part of his argument that men can choose to do an evil act, Leithart gives the example of a person who commits adultery:
On the other hand, the first principle might be understood as a statement of fact: What men seek is, by definition, good. This seems to be what Thomas meant…Thomas, of course, knew the reality of sin. He acknowledged, therefore, that men will seek things that are objectively evil. Still, Thomas says, what they seek will seem good to them. An adulterer does not intend evil; he intends to receive the pleasure of his adultery, which appears to him good. Still, his adultery is objectively evil…This simply won’t do. First, it is contradicted by Scripture. Paul states in Romans 1 that sinners, knowing that what they do is evil, continue to practice it…Sinners do directly intend evil” (11).

Leithart claims that anyone can directly intend to do evil, while Thomas says that it is impossible for a person to directly intend evil.

One of the problems with Leithart’s argument is his misunderstanding of Thomas. He does not seem to believe that Aquinas would support the case that a man can do an act knowing it is evil. The first way he misinterprets Thomas is in the idea of the first principle in practical reason, which “is based on the nature of good, namely, that good is what all things seek” (43). For Thomas, this idea means that man seeks everything ‘under the aspect of the good,’ meaning that man pursues good—which he may not realize—even though he “intends evil.” However, man is capable of replacing (in his mind) the true Good with other goods, at which point the good he seeks becomes disordered. According to Thomas, all goods become disordered if taken out of context, or even replacing, the Summum Bonum. For example, a man cannot morally make sex his god, where the highest goal of his life is seeking sex with women. Sex is a good, given to human beings for the purposes of procreation and the unity of the marriage. However, when a person takes sex out of the context that God intended, where the man either doesn’t use sex to the ends that God meant for it to have, or he makes sex as his god, sex becomes a disordered good for that man. Another instance is with the person who chooses to commit adultery with another woman. This causes disorder of the attraction, or even the love, that is natural between man and woman. In both cases the act may be a grave, evil act, but each man truly is choosing a good (there is a good within the act and it is that good he is seeking e.g., pleasure, companionship, etc), just one that is not properly ordered under the Summum Bonum.

Another problem with Leithart’s disagreement is a misunderstanding of the act of free will. Aquinas will admit that a will can be evil, saying, “the will that wills contrary to erroneous reason wills contrary to conscience” (5). What this is saying is that a person can have an evil will, and can know that it is evil, yet he still seeks at a good. St. Augustine wrote in his biography, Confessions, about an act of evil he committed by stealing some pears. Augustine stole the pears for no other purpose than the act. He did not want the pears and he did not do it for the enjoyment of having stolen. This creates a problem for Augustine: how he could steal pears for a seemingly evil end? However, Thomas would claim that even in the act there was a good sought after by Augustine. The good was contained in the act of choosing to do something, or the act of free will. For Thomas, just the act of using free will is a good in itself. Therefore, as in the case of Augustine, the person who “directly intends evil” is a person who chooses a good, albeit disordered, just by choosing to enact his free will.

Leithart proposes some interesting ideas about natural law theory and the ideas of evil. However, his ideas also produce many problems. Natural law theorists claim that through reason a man can understand the eternal law. Leithart wants to deny the use of reason in knowing the law of God, but his stance on Scripture would imply that a person must use reason to interpret it. It brings about the problem of how one could understand the divine law of Scripture if he could not use reason or have natural law as a foundation for his interpretation. He also thinks that natural theorists claim the natural law derives from social norms, but rather they say the opposite, namely, that moral norms derive directly from the natural law. Leithart again errs in his analysis of natural law and divine law, where he makes no distinction between the two, trying to put them in the same category. In summary, Leithart’s views and disagreements about the natural law really stem directly from misinterpretations of the natural law theorist rather than disagreements with the actual natural law theory.

[CatholicCrusader]

[quote name='qfnol31' date='Nov 10 2004, 10:12 PM'] The real question I asked, and has never been truly answered, is [i]how[/i], specifically, does the Constitution counter Natural Law? [/quote]
If you admit Natural Law entails a belief in an omnipotent God, then the Constitution contradicts Natural Law in that it says the government gets its authority from the people (not from God, Who has all authority--which Christ makes clear: you would have no authority over me except it be given you from above, when speaking to Pilate), AND it does not recognize God as being True. To neglect the recognition of God, it clearly contradicts Natural Law, by which alone it is possible to know God. That is very simple, so long as you admit that to know God is a part of Natural Law.

[qfnol31]

Most political laws don't acknowledge God as True. They also don't say anything against Him, which this does not. Again, Human Law [i]cannot[/i] encompass all of Natural Law.

"...human reason needs to advance from the precepts of the natural law, as general and indemonstrable first principles, to matters that are to be more particularly regulated."

You cannot regulate someone's interior attitude by Human Law. That's taken from Aquinas, that's why we have the Divine Law, to regulate interior movements. Knowing and acknowledging God is an interior thing. Read question 95, Articles 1 and 2. Then read question 96, Article 2.

Question 100: "And there are some things that human reason needs divine instruction to judge, and we thereby learn about divine things (e.g., "Thou shalt no make for thyself a graven image or any likeness," "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in Vain").


I guess I should clarify something. Man naturally seeks everything under the aspect of the Good, and therefore, he naturally seeks at God and knowing Him. However, because of concupiscence, it can be difficult for man to acknowledge God as the greatest good. He can know of God, but man cannot really know God without the aid of the Divine Law. Divine Law takes what we can know of God and suppliments it. God is a Trinity, this isn't something you'd really come to by reason alone. However, man can only know God by using reason, but not reason alone. He can come to know about God, and can know Him through his natural inclinations, but at the same time to know God as it seems the Constitution you say should acknowledge, you would have to have Divine Law.

Does that make sense?

[qfnol31]

[quote name='qfnol31' date='Nov 10 2004, 07:59 PM'] Ed.  Can we know about God through reason alone?  As in, can we know He exists and that we are to worship him, etc, by reason alone? [/quote]
Okay, I want to restate this one last time, hopefully it will be correct. We can know God exists, we can know some about Him, through reason alone. Can we [i]know [/i]God through reason alone? For us to give our whole lives to God I believe Aquinas would say must come from Divine Law, because through reason alone (he argues, as I posted above) he thinks we can't come to the fact that we can't worship other idols. If that takes Divine intervention, then it seems that we shouldn't know that through reason alone. If that is the case, it is not fair to hold the state to this and say that the state, through reason alone, can acknowledge God as the person to whom everyone must be perfectly oriented, as seems to be the case in your argument.

That should be a better clarification of what I'm trying to argue.

Edited November 11, 2004 by qfnol31