The Constitution

[Socrates]

[quote name='qfnol31' date='Nov 5 2004, 10:06 PM'] The next question I have is if the Constitution isn't against the Natural Law, should we allow people to interpret it to be outside the Natural Law, which has been done today (and I think part of what CatholicforChrist may have a problem with).

Also, did you know that Pope Leo XIII said that the government should have little to do with economics? This is how our government was set up. It's not how it is today.

And did you also know that the founding fathers pushed for religion to be used by government officials? It may have not been Catholic necessarily, but then again, much of it used was by Catholic politicians. Why isn't this the case today? [/quote]
The problem is that much of our legal system, as well as the media, etc. has been taken over by radical secularists with an active hatred for religion.

Separation of Church and State was to prevent the government from persecuting the free practice of religion. (as the Church of England had done). It was not intended to outlaw any public display of religion, as twentieth-century secularists have twisted it to mean.


And CatholicforChrist, since you profess such an antagonism toward the Constitution and the whole American system of government, what do you propose Catholics do? Work to overthrow the constitution, in the hopes that a Catholic monarchy will be established?

[voiciblanche]

[quote]The Constitution doesn't allow for those, and I bet the founding fathers would be appalled today.[/quote]

They'd be appalled on the basis of their morals. They didn't mean for the country to be one without morals, they meant for it not to persecute people of religions other than its own. We, along the way, distorted that to mean that we freedom [i]from[/i] morals, rather than freedom [i]of[/i] religion or even freedom [i]from[/i] religion.

I, for one, think gov't officials get a little too hung up on what's Constitutional and what's not, but that could be stupid of me.

[quote]What's wrong with the Constitution is the same thing that's wrong with Vatican II.  People try to interpret it based on what they want and not the original intent.[/quote]

Unfortunately, we have no way to guarantee what the original intent [i]was.[/i]

[voiciblanche]

Edit:

Nevermind; figured it out.

[CatholicCrusader]

qfnol31,

The idea that there is a God and He deserves worship IS A PART OF NATURAL LAW. I don't know who is teaching you your Natural Law, but he obviosuly doesn't know what he is doing. Here is a brief explanation of Natural Law:

"Catholic Morality" (for high school students)

Fr. John Laux, M.A.

[quote]The subject-matter of the natural law is: (a) the primary precepts of morality, (b) the immediate conclusions, and, © the remote conclusions drawn from the primary precepts.
a) There are [i]three primary precepts of morality[/i] corresponding to man's relation to God, to himself, and to his neighbor: We should worship God, we should control our sensual appetites, we should not do to others what we would not have them do to us. A fourth might be added: Thou shalt honor thy father and thy mothers. [u][b]No normal person can be ignorant of these fundamental principles[/b][/u]. (bold and underline added by me, italics are from Fr. Laux)[/quote]

Those are the PRIMARY PRECEPTS OF MORALITY, which are FROM NATURAL LAW. Right there you see: "We should worship God". We know by Natural Law that God exists, and we see right here that we also owe Him worship. NO NORMAL PERSON (that is, those who are not retarded) CAN BE IGNORANT OF THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. Continuing from the same:

[quote]b) The [i]immediate conclusions[/i] from these primary precepts are the [i]Ten Commandments[/i], with the exception of the Third. These conclusions are reached by a process of reasoning [u][b]so simple as to be within the powers of the most illiterate[/b][/u]. (same emphasis as before)[/quote]

The reason that the Third Commandment is not from Natural Law is that there is no way that a person would think that the Sabbath day is a special day without Revelation. Of course, this Revelation comes from the fact that God created the World in six days, and He rested on the Sabbath day. (Then again, modernists, even those claiming the name Catholic, deny this very fact themselves: that God created the World in six days and rested on the seventh.) We see, though, from this that the reasoning entailed here is possibly for anyone who has the use of reason. A person who neglects ANY of the Ten Commandments, save the Third, breaks with Natural Law.

[qfnol31]

Actually, I'm learning Natural Law via Thomas Aquinas. He said Natural Law is this:

1) Do good, avoid evil.
2) Treat everyone with dignity.
3) Absolute [b][i]moral[/i][/b] norms.
4) Application of conscience in specific instances.

Umm, where does God fit into this? He comes in through Divine Revelation, Divine Law.

Also, Human Law cannot encompass all of Natural Law. That's Thomas again. Thomas said that Human Law cannot contradict Natural Law, and the Constitution, Human Law, does not contradict the Natural Law, nor does it encompass it all.

You need to find a new teacher on this subject.

Edited November 10, 2004 by qfnol31

[qfnol31]

[quote name='CatholicCrusader' date='Nov 10 2004, 11:39 AM'] Those are the PRIMARY PRECEPTS OF MORALITY, which are FROM NATURAL LAW. Right there you see: "We should worship God". We know by Natural Law that God exists, and we see right here that we also owe Him worship. NO NORMAL PERSON (that is, those who are not retarded) CAN BE IGNORANT OF THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. Continuing from the same: [/quote]
Natural Law is morals. God's not morals, God's faith.

[CatholicCrusader]

[quote name='qfnol31' date='Nov 10 2004, 03:07 PM'] Actually, I'm learning Natural Law via Thomas Aquinas. He said Natural Law is this:

1) Do good, avoid evil.
2) Treat everyone with dignity.
3) Absolute [b][i]moral[/i][/b] norms.
4) Application of conscience in specific instances.

Umm, where does God fit into this? He comes in through Divine Revelation, Divine Law.

Also, Human Law cannot encompass all of Natural Law. That's Thomas again. Thomas said that Human Law cannot contradict Natural Law, and the Constitution, Human Law, does not contradict the Natural Law, nor does it encompass it all.

You need to find a new teacher on this subject. [/quote]
No, your problem is this: ABSOLUTE MORAL NORMS. One of which is BELIEF AND WORSHIP OF GOD. That is MORAL issue. The definition of moral:
[quote]mor·al    adj.
Of or concerned with the judgment of the goodness or badness of human action and character: moral scrutiny; a moral quandary.
Teaching or exhibiting goodness or correctness of character and behavior: a moral lesson.
Conforming to standards of what is right or just in behavior; virtuous: a moral life.
Arising from conscience or the sense of right and wrong: a moral obligation.
Having psychological rather than physical or tangible effects: a moral victory; moral support.
Based on strong likelihood or firm conviction, rather than on the actual evidence: a moral certainty. [/quote]

The act of belief in God and the act of worshiping God are understood by Natural Law alone.

I have a Priest who knows what he is teaching vs. your private reading of St. Thomas Aquinas... I am sure Fr. Laux read much more of St. Thomas than you have. It seems very prideful to me for you to say: my ideas about reading St. Thomas (who is difficult enough for theologians) supercede accredited and accountable morality books, such as written by Fr. Laux and others who have read: 1) more St. Thomas than you 2) understand it much better 3) have been taught in seminaries and proper schools for the education of those who are to teach these beliefs. It just seems very prideful to elevate yourself above St. Thomas by misrepresenting his teaching (in what appears to be an effort to include everyone in the group of "invincibly ignorant", even those who contradict the Natural Law).

[qfnol31]

Mine isn't private reading. It's from a Moral Theology class, under the document Veritatis Splendor and our reading of Thomas. This is at a faithful Catholic university under the Bishop, with a Mandatum, and a Theology department that is faithful to Rome, under the eyes of the Cistercian order, in complete allignment with the Pope.

[quote]QUOTE 
mor·al    adj.
Of or concerned with the judgment of the goodness or badness of human action and character: moral scrutiny; a moral quandary.
Teaching or exhibiting goodness or correctness of character and behavior: a moral lesson.
Conforming to standards of what is right or just in behavior; [b]virtuous[/b]: a moral life.
Arising from [b]conscience[/b] or the sense of right and wrong: a moral obligation.
Having psychological rather than physical or tangible effects: a moral victory; moral support.
Based on [b]strong likelihood or firm conviction, rather than on the actual evidence[/b]: a [b]moral certainty[/b].  [/quote]

Natural Law is known through reason (Thomas). Not very many people can reason the existence of God. That's why we have Divine Law (Thomas).

Plus, where does the Constitution go against belief in God? All it does is not regulate it. The job of Human Law is not to encompass all of Natural Law.

What I've learned is not private reading, it's what I've been taught.

[qfnol31]

To furthur my argument, I want you to read this, from New Advent.org:

According to St. Thomas, the natural law is "nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law" (I-II, Q. xciv). The eternal law is God's wisdom, inasmuch as it is the directive norm of all movement and action. When God willed to give existence to creatures, He willed to ordain and direct them to an end. In the case of inanimate things, this Divine direction is provided for in the nature which God has given to each; in them determinism reigns. Like all the rest of creation, man is destined by God to an end, and receives from Him a direction towards this end. This ordination is of a character in harmony with his free intelligent nature. In virtue of his intelligence and free will, man is master of his conduct. Unlike the things of the mere material world he can vary his action, act, or abstain from action, as he pleases. Yet he is not a lawless being in an ordered universe. In the very constitution of his nature, he too has a law laid down for him, reflecting that ordination and direction of all things, which is the eternal law. The rule, then, which God has prescribed for our conduct, is found in our nature itself. Those actions which conform with its tendencies, lead to our destined end, and are thereby constituted right and morally good; those at variance with our nature are wrong and immoral.

The norm, however, of conduct is not some particular element or aspect of our nature. The standard is our whole human nature with its manifold relationships, considered as a creature destined to a special end. Actions are wrong if, though subserving the satisfaction of some particular need or tendency, they are at the same time incompatible with that rational harmonious subordination of the lower to the higher which reason should maintain among our conflicting tendencies and desires (see GOOD). For example, to nourish our bodies is right; but to indulge our appetite for food to the detriment of our corporal or spiritual life is wrong. Self-preservation is right, but to refuse to expose our life when the well-being of society requires it, is wrong. It is wrong to drink to intoxication, for, besides being injurious to health, such indulgence deprives one of the use of reason, which is intended by God to be the guide and dictator of conduct. Theft is wrong, because it subverts the basis of social life; and man's nature requires for its proper development that he live in a state of society. There is, then, a double reason for calling this law of conduct natural: first, because it is set up concretely in our very nature itself, and second, because it is manifested to us by the purely natural medium of reason. [b]In both respects it is distinguished from the Divine positive law, which contains precepts not arising from the nature of things as God has constituted them by the creative act, but from the arbitrary will of God. This law we learn not through the unaided operation of reason, but through the light of supernatural revelation.[/b]

We may now analyse the natural law into three constituents: the discriminating norm, the binding norm (norma obligans), and the manifesting norm. The discriminating norm is, as we have just seen, human nature itself, objectively considered. It is, so to speak, the book in which is written the text of the law, and the classification of human actions into good and bad. Strictly speaking, our nature is the proximate discriminating norm or standard. The remote and ultimate norm, of which it is the partial reflection and application, is the Divine nature itself, the ultimate groundwork of the created order. The binding or obligatory norm is the Divine authority, imposing upon the rational creature the obligation of living in conformity with his nature, and thus with the universal order established by the Creator. Contrary to the Kantian theory that we must not acknowledge any other lawgiver than conscience, the truth is that reason as conscience is only immediate moral authority which we are called upon to obey, and conscience itself owes its authority to the fact that it is the mouthpiece of the Divine will and imperium. The manifesting norm (norma denuntians), which determines the moral quality of actions tried by the discriminating norm, is reason. Through this faculty we perceive what is the moral constitution of our nature, what kind of action it calls for, and whether a particular action possesses this requisite character...

Founded in our nature and revealed to us by our reason, the moral law is known to us in the measure that reason brings a knowledge of it home to our understanding. The question arises: How far can man be ignorant of the natural law, which, as St. Paul says, is written in the human heart (Rom., ii, 14)? The general teaching of theologians is that the supreme and primary principles are necessarily known to every one having the actual use of reason. These principles are really reducible to the primary principle which is expressed by St. Thomas in the form: "Do good and avoid evil". Wherever we find man we find him with a moral code, which is founded on the first principle that good is to be done and evil avoided. When we pass from the universal to more particular conclusions, the case is different. Some follow immediately from the primary, and are so self-evident that they are reached without any complex course of reasoning. Such are, for example: "Do not commit adultery"; "Honour your parents". No person whose reason and moral nature is ever so little developed can remain in ignorance of such precepts except through his own fault. Another class of conclusions comprises those which are reached only by a more or less complex course of reasoning. These may remain unknown to, or be misinterpreted even by persons whose intellectual development is considerable. To reach these more remote precepts, many facts and minor conclusions must be correctly appreciated, and, in estimating their value, a person may easily err, and consequently, without moral fault, come to a false conclusion.




[quote]Objection 1. It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my members," etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason.

Objection 2. Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above (57). Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.

Objection 3. Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said above (9, 1). Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law."

On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as stated above (17, 1). Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.

I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above (1, 1, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.

Reply to Objection 1. Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the members."

Reply to Objection 2. Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above (13, 3; 76, 1) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.

Reply to Objection 3. Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above (17, 1): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law.[/quote]


[color=red]Are you saying that we can know about God through reason?[/color]

[quote]I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For it has been stated above (90, 1, ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially.

Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles the habit of which we possess.[/quote]

[quote]I answer that, As stated above (91, 3), the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another." But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.

Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.

Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" [Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.[/quote]


[quote]Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty, as stated above (5, 5), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.

Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.

Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.

Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.

And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, where it is said: "The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; "converting souls," because it directs not only exterior, but also interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the certainty of what is true and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.

Reply to Objection 1. By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law. [/quote]


God is our supernatural end. We can't, by our limited human nature, know positively about a supernatural end. That is why Natural Law doesn't tell us about God, for it is about our [i]nature[/i] and then Divine Law comes in and reveals to us the supernatural.

[CatholicCrusader]

[quote name='qfnol31' date='Nov 10 2004, 07:03 PM'] Mine isn't private reading. It's from a Moral Theology class, under the document Veritatis Splendor and our reading of Thomas. This is at a faithful Catholic university under the Bishop, with a Mandatum, and a Theology department that is faithful to Rome, under the eyes of the Cistercian order, in complete allignment with the Pope.



Natural Law is known through reason (Thomas). Not very many people can reason the existence of God. That's why we have Divine Law (Thomas).

Plus, where does the Constitution go against belief in God? All it does is not regulate it. The job of Human Law is not to encompass all of Natural Law.

What I've learned is not private reading, it's what I've been taught. [/quote]
"Natural Law is known through reason (Thomas). Not very many people can reason the existence of God. That's why we have Divine Law (Thomas)."

You can't reason to the existence of God?? So much for the PROOFS of St. Thomas...

"Plus, where does the Constitution go against belief in God?"

If you consider the Bill of Rights a part of the Constitution (it really isn't strictly speaking...) "Amendment I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion".

If every person has the duty to worship God, so also does the State have the strict obligation to belong to the Church, as well.

[Theoketos]

[quote]Are you saying that we can know about God through reason?[/quote]

St. Thomas, St. Anslem, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Justin the Martyr, Boetheius, Dun Scotis, and John Pual II do.

Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart a desire to know the truth—in a word, to know himself—so that, by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves (cf. Ex 33:18; Ps 27:8-9; 63:2-3; Jn 14:8; 1 Jn 3:2).

[CatholicCrusader]

[quote name='Theoketos' date='Nov 10 2004, 08:11 PM']
St. Thomas, St. Anslem, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Justin the Martyr, Boetheius, Dun Scotis, and John Pual II do.

Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart a desire to know the truth—in a word, to know himself—so that, by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves (cf. Ex 33:18; Ps 27:8-9; 63:2-3; Jn 14:8; 1 Jn 3:2). [/quote]
Thank you

[qfnol31]

[quote name='Theoketos' date='Nov 10 2004, 06:11 PM']
St. Thomas, St. Anslem, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Justin the Martyr, Boetheius, Dun Scotis, and John Pual II do.

Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart a desire to know the truth—in a word, to know himself—so that, by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves (cf. Ex 33:18; Ps 27:8-9; 63:2-3; Jn 14:8; 1 Jn 3:2). [/quote]
LoL, and these were extraordinary men. You're right, I should clarify. Is it normal for men to reason about God? Most people aren't quite as smart or wise as those you mentioned.

Edited November 11, 2004 by qfnol31

[Guest Aluigi]

he was saying that those people [b]SAY[/b] you can know God through reason.

[qfnol31]

Okay...but the problem I have with that argument is all of those philosophers knew about God beforehand I believe.


Ed. Can we know about God through reason alone? As in, can we know He exists and that we are to worship him, etc, by reason alone?

Edited November 11, 2004 by qfnol31