Apotheon: ->>hypostatic Union

[MorphRC]

Hey Apo. Ive heard you talking about this over the board, and I think its the key to understand how God can be in heaven and on earth as Jesus, which is always a hard thing to explain to Muslims, can you write a tract out, or link me to some explainations on it?

Be sooooo appreciated!!

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='MorphRC' date=' ']Hey Apo. Ive heard you talking about this over the board, and I think its the key to understand how God can be in heaven and on earth as Jesus, which is always a hard thing to explain to Muslims, can you write a tract out, or link me to some explainations on it?

Be sooooo appreciated!![/quote]
Let me start by saying that the term [i]hypostasis[/i] is simply the Greek technical term for [i]subsistence[/i] or [i]person[/i], and so, the doctrine of the [i]Hypostatic Union[/i] concerns the union of the two natures (divine and human) in the one Divine Person of the eternal Son of God. In the incarnation God the Word assumed a full and complete human nature, but did not become a human person; instead, the [i]Divine Hypostasis[/i] (Person) of the Word took the place of the connatural human [i]hypostasis[/i] that normally actuates and concretizes a particular human nature as this or that particular man. Therefore, after the incarnation, Christ is one Divine Person in two natures, divine and human. Connected to the doctrine of the [i]Hypostatic Union[/i] is the doctrine of the [i]communicatio idiomatum[/i] (i.e., the communication of properties), and this doctrine allows one to predicate things or actions flowing from either nature (divine or human) to the one Divine Person of Christ. As a consequence of the doctrine of the [i]communicatio idiomatum[/i], it is true to say that Mary is the Mother of God, not because she gives birth to the Divine Nature itself, but because she gives birth to the Divine Person of the Word Incarnate.

For a good (but rather complex) explanation of the Catholic doctrine of the incarnation, I suggest reading St. Thomas Aquinas' sections on the incarnation in the Summa Theologica. Click here: [url="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4.htm"]SUMMA THEOLOGICA[/url]

As far as explaining the doctrine of the incarnation to Muslims concerned, it is important to note that they have their own doctrine of the [i]inlibration[/i] of the word of God. Islamic theology teaches that the Qur'an itself has two natures, an earthly nature (i.e., the paper, ink, etc.) and a heavenly nature (i.e., the inspired words themselves). Moreover, the Qur'an is held to be eternal and uncreated, and so it is Allah's word from all eternity, distinct from Allah, but not separate from him. In other words, Muslims believe in two eternal and uncreated things or entities, Allah and the Qur'an.

I hope this helps, and if you have more questions, don't hesitate to ask.

God bless,
Todd

[MorphRC]

[quote]but did not become a human person; instead, the Divine Hypostasis (Person) of the Word took the place of the connatural human hypostasis that normally actuates and concretizes a particular human nature as this or that particular man.[/quote]

So he was human by nature, but not a person? He was Human Nature, Divine person? I dont get that.

[MorphRC]

I found this on NA.Org.

It explains the basic nature thing I was confused about then.

A theological term used with reference to the Incarnation to express the revealed truth that in Christ one person subsists in two natures, the Divine and the human.

&

The distinction in fact was brought about gradually in the course of the controversies to which the Christological heresies gave rise, and was definitively established by the Council of Chalcedon (451), which declared that in Christ the two natures, each retaining its own properties, are united in one subsistence and one person (eis en prosopon kai mian hpostasin) (Denzinger, ed. Bannwart, 148).

&

They are not joined in a moral or accidental union (Nestorius), nor commingled (Eutyches), and nevertheless they are substantially united.

Ok that explains the Nature and Union.

[MorphRC]

[b](3) THE HYPOSTATIC UNION OF THE DIVINE NATURE AND THE HUMAN NATURE OF JESUS IN THE DIVINE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST[/b]

Here we consider this union as a fact; the nature of the union will be later taken up. Now it is our purpose to prove that the Divine nature was really and truly united with the human nature of Jesus, i. e., that one and the same Person, Jesus Christ, was God and man. We speak here of no moral union, no union in a figurative sense of the word; but a union that is physical, a union of two substances or natures so as to make One Person, a union which means that God is Man and Man is God in the Person of Jesus Christ.

[b]C. On the God-Man (Deus-Homo, theanthropos)[/b]

One of the most important effects of the union of the Divine nature and human nature in One Person is a mutual interchange of attributes, Divine and human, between God and man, the Communicatio Idiomatum. The God-Man is one Person, and to Him in the concrete may be applied the predicates that refer to the Divinity as well as those that refer to the Humanity of Christ. We may say God is man, was born, died, was buried. These predicates refer to the Person Whose nature is human, as well as Divine; to the Person Who is man, as well as God. We do not mean to say that God, as God, was born; but God, Who is man, was born. We may not predicate the abstract Divinity of the abstract humanity, nor the abstract Divinity of the concrete man, nor vice versa; nor the concrete God of the abstract humanity, nor vice versa. We predicate the concrete of the concrete: Jesus is God; Jesus is man; the God-Man was sad; the Man-God was killed. Some ways of speaking should not be used, not that they may not be rightly explained, but that they may easily be misunderstood in an heretical sense.

[url="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07706b.htm#I3"]http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07706b.htm#I3[/url]

[MorphRC]

[b]These predicates refer to the Person Whose nature is human, as well as Divine; to the Person Who is man, as well as God. We do not mean to say that God, as God, was born; but God, Who is man, was born.[/b]

BINGO! Thats what Ive been searching for. !!!

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='MorphRC' date='Aug 25 2004, 12:59 AM']So he was human by nature, but not a person? He was Human Nature, Divine person? I dont get that.[/quote]
Christ is a Divine Person who has assumed a human nature, and in doing that He became man. Thus, Christ is one Divine Person and one Divine Being, who in the incarnation assumes a complete human nature (body and soul), and in the process He becomes man. But He is not thereby a human person or a human being, because to say that would be to fall into the Nestorian heresy. There can only be one subject of predication and one subject of action in Christ, and that one subject is the Divine Person of the Word, who acts in and through both natures. Moreover, because the union does not occur within the natures themselves, there is no blending of the two natures, and so they remain distinct, but are united in the one Divine Person of the Word; and in addition, because the union is [i]Hypostatic[/i] it follows that the two natures are now inseparably united in the eternal Person of the Son of God.

Let me, in a rather simplified manner, chart out the orthodox Catholic teaching in opposition to the two major Christological heresies of the 5th century:

[b]The Orthodox Catholic position as formulated at the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon:[/b]
1. [i]Christ is one Divine Person in two natures, divine and human[/i].

[b]The Nestorian heresy:[/b]
2. [i]Christ is a Divine Person and a human person, with a divine nature and a human nature[/i].
(The problem with the Nestorian position is that it is ultimately a denial of the reality of the incarnation, for this reduces the incarnation to an indwelling of man by God, and thus it is not a true incarnation properly speaking. It involves the assumption, or worse, the possession, of one person by another person, which is not really possible.)

[b]The Monophysite heresy:[/b]
3. [i]Christ is one Divine Person with one nature after the incarnation[/i].
(The problem with the Monophysite position is that it is a denial of the incarnation, because the human nature assumed is either destroyed or absorbed by the divine nature and no real incarnation has occurred. One other possible problem is that the "one nature" mentioned, could be thought of as a blending of humanity and divinity, and this leads to other theological problems, because the divine nature is immutable and cannot change.)

God bless,
Todd

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='MorphRC' date='Aug 25 2004, 01:05 AM'] I found this on NA.Org.

It explains the basic nature thing I was confused about then.

A theological term used with reference to the Incarnation to express the revealed truth that in Christ one person subsists in two natures, the Divine and the human.

&

The distinction in fact was brought about gradually in the course of the controversies to which the Christological heresies gave rise, and was definitively established by the Council of Chalcedon (451), which declared that in Christ the two natures, each retaining its own properties, are united in one subsistence and one person (eis en prosopon kai mian hpostasin) (Denzinger, ed. Bannwart, 148).

&

They are not joined in a moral or accidental union (Nestorius), nor commingled (Eutyches), and nevertheless they are substantially united.

Ok that explains the Nature and Union. [/quote]
Yep, yep.

[MorphRC]

Now one more brain buster..lol

When Christ denied on the Cross, His human nature did, what happened to the Divine nature?

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='MorphRC' date='Aug 25 2004, 02:04 AM'] Now one more brain buster..lol

When Christ denied on the Cross, His human nature did, what happened to the Divine nature? [/quote]
The [i]Hypostatic Union[/i] will never cease, and so the death of Christ did not separate the Divine Person of the Word from His body and soul, even though His body and soul were themselves separated in death. As Dr. Ott puts it, Christ's ". . . death did not dissolve the attachment of Godhead and humanity, or of their parts. Even after their separation the body and the soul remained [i]hypostatically[/i] united with the Divine Logos." [Dr. Ludwig Ott, [u]Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma[/u], page 151]

[Guest JeffCR07]

Morph, in many ways it is precisely the idea of the hypostatic union that makes the cross so amazing. When Jesus took his last breath upon the cross, it was not only Christ the man dying, but God Himself dying as well.

One other thing that should be noted with regards to the hypostatic union: human nature is actually twofold, that is, we have one nature which is ordered by our creation towards God, and a second nature that is, by Original Sin and concupiscence, ordered away from God.

The first is human nature as it was originally created, the second a byproduct of Original Sin. Christ, who is incapable of sin, only assumed one [i]human[/i] nature.

Thus, the hypostatic union is a union of one divine nature and one human nature into the one Divine Person of the Word

- Your Brother In Christ, Jeff

[Apotheoun]

Jeff,

Perhaps I am misunderstanding your post, and if I am please correct me.

Original sin is the absence of sanctifying grace and the loss of the preternatural gifts. So, original sin doesn't create a different kind of human nature, and to say that it does borders on a type of Manichaean dualism. In addition, concupiscence is the loss of the preternatural gift of integrity, and so it too is not a positive existing thing, but is a lack of something, i.e., a lack of the preternatural gift of integrity. This is why I am constantly pointing out to ICTHUS that anything that makes sin "natural," makes God the cause of sin, because He is the cause of all created (i.e., natural) and essential things. Evil and sin are not created or essential things; instead, they are a relative absence of the good in the will of the creature, and this means that sin is not "natural," but is instead "unnatural."

[Guest JeffCR07]

You are only slightly misunderstanding my post. The Church has always held, since the time of the Arian heresy, that mankind has two "natures." I do not mean, and the Church does not mean, that God created us as a duality, but rather, that the result of our fall from grace left us with, for lack of a better phrase, two tendencies of being.

If you want the real meat and potatoes of the theology, I would point to the letter written by the pope after Honorius, in defense of Honorius' theology. He elaborates on the "two natures" of man, one being an actual nature created by God, the other, which is not a true "nature" as we define it, which is effected by sin.

I have to leave to take my sisters somewhere, but if you want to shoot me a PM, we can talk about it more. I'm probably not being very eloquent, as well as also not using the correct terminology on the subject. Thanks,

- Your Brother In Christ, Jeff

[Guest JeffCR07]

Apotheoun, I'm back, and I've got the research. I was indeed totally ineloquent, and my terminology was very wrong as well. My post was in regards to the [i]two wills[/i] of man, though I used the term "natures."

I know you like to have sources, so the following is the entire text of a defense of Pope Honorius in light of the monothelite heresy. At the end, I will set aside the part which speaks on the two wills of man.

[quote]THE SUPPOSED FALL OF HONORIUS AND HIS CONDEMNATION

by J. H. R.

American Catholic Quarterly Review, v.7, 1882, pp.162-8

Electronic version Copyright © 1997, Classica Media, Inc.



Occasions for discussing the mooted points of Catholic teaching are never wanting. Objections of opponents a thousand times met and answered, are repeated by tyros and half-fledged controversialists with all the assurance of a first discovery and of infallible certainty. A very particular interest attaches to the case of Pope Honorius, so often cited against the doctrine of papal infallibility, because it is the strongest case presented in the history of the Church, and to an unpracticed controversialist has the appearance of being unanswerable. The simple fact that this pope was, after his death, condemned by a Council of the Church, and that the decree was sanctioned by another Pope, seems to stare us in the face and demand a satisfactory explanation. What, then, are the facts in reference to this interesting case?

The Synod of Ephesus had defined, in opposition to Nestorius, that in our Lord there is but one person; the Council of Chalcedon had defined, against Eutyches, that there are, in Christ, two natures. From these two definitions arose a new heresy, teaching that there is only one will in Christ and one operation. The followers of this opinion were called Monothelites.

Cyrus, Patriarch of Alexandria, in a solemn and public agreement which he made with the Egyptian heretics, in order to reconcile them to the Church, was the first to formulate the error. This he did in the VIIth chapter, in the following terms: "That this same Christ, one and the Son, performs both the actions which belong to him as God, and those which are human, by one, sole, theandric operation." St. Sophronius, at that time a monk, and shortly after Patriarch of Jerusalem, implored Cyrus to abstain from the expression, "one sole theandric operation;" for if there were two natures in Christ, each perfect, it was necessary to acknowledge also two wills and two operations. To all the arguments, counsel and prayers of Sophronius, Cyrus remained inflexible. Sophronius thereupon had recourse to Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople, in order that the latter might dissuade his friend Cyrus from his error. Sergius, who was more astute than Cyrus, though himself also a Monothelite, answered Sophronius that neither the word one will, nor the word two wills should be used; that these terms were new and would be a scandal to the faithful and an impediment to the conversion of heretics. Sophronius, however, repudiated this plan of silence. At this point he was chosen Patriarch. Sergius, fearful lest Sophronius, strengthened by his new dignity, should prove too

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formidable an adversary to the Monothelites, sent letters to the Roman Pontiff, in which he defended the formula of Cyrus, and asked that his plan of silence should be approved by Honorius. To defend Cyrus's formula he used this argument: If there are in Christ two wills, one must be divine, willing the things that are divine the other human, willing the things that are human.

But the human will, willing human things may will sin which is contrary to the divine will. There will, therefore, be in Christ two contrary wills in the one person of Christ; therefore it is absurd to admit two contrary wills in the one person of Christ ; therefore it is absurd to say there are two wills. This epistle of Sergius is full of cunning and written with the greatest apparent submission and deference. Honorius in his answer, drew a very clear distinction between the substance of the doctrine concerning two wills in Christ, and the formulas by which that doctrine is expressed. As to the substance of the doctrine, he says that we must admit, in the one person of Christ, two perfect and entire natures, the divine nature operating divine actions, and the human nature operating human actions, each unconfused, distinct, not only operating, but the principle of its own operations (operantes et operatrices) in regard to those things which are proper to itself.

As to the formula by which this doctrine, entirely contrary to Monothelism, ought to be expressed, Honorius says, "You must confess, with us, one Christ our Lord, operating in either nature, divine or human actions (in utrisque naturis divina vel humana operantem).

Now this formula is directly opposed to that of Cyrus, who had not said, "operating divine OR human actions," distinctively and separately but "operating divine and human actions," conjunctively and in a mixed manner, by one, sole operation, which was neither simply human nor simply divine, but always theandric,—that is, compounded of divine and human.

Honorius adds that the Church has always spoken thus, and so we ought to speak.

As to the question relative to this formula, as to the use, namely, of the words one or two he says, explicitly, that he does not wish to give a definition upon it, leaving it to the grammarians; he therefore approves Sergius's counsel in regard to silence, and confirms it by his own exhortations. But Sergius had defended the article of Cyrus's agreement in regard to the use of the word one (as for the word theandric, Sergius had prudently suppressed it in his appeal to honorius). Honorius, therefore, expressly and solidly confutes both Sergius and Cyrus by this argument.








[b]According to the expression of Scripture, Christ assumed human flesh. Now, in human flesh there are two wills; one upright,

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which is conformed to the divine will; the other vitiated and contrary to the divine will. Hence, in the Scriptures, flesh is taken in two senses; there is good flesh, which is conformed to the will of God, and vitiated flesh, which is contrary to the will of God. Now Christ did not assume these two wills of human nature; he assumed one—the good will; because he did not assume human nature vitiated, but upright.

The preceding is an analysis of the epistle which Honorius wrote to Sergius. It is this epistle which gave rise to the whole question in regard to Honorius; for the heretics not only violated the rule of silence imposed upon them, but, through bad faith, distorting, to suit their own ends, the word one used by Honorius in speaking exclusively of the human nature of Christ, not of his person, they claimed Honorius as a Monothelite, and, resting on his authority, propagated their error.

The Catholics immediately took up the defence of Honorius. The Abbot John, who was scribe and secretary to Honorius, and who had written the letter, testified as follows: "We said that there is one will in the Lord, not of his divinity and humanity, but of his humanity solely." St. Maximus, Doctor, a "hammer" of the Monothelites, and afterwards martyred by them, asserted and proved that the writings of Honorius did not favor the Monothelites, and that his intention had been to maintain one will in the human nature of Christ, not in his person. John IV., who, after Severinus, succeeded Honorins in the Papal chair, wrote a defence of Honorius to the Emperor Constantine, in which he makes the same assertions that Maximus had made.[/b]








The Lateran Synod, convoked by St. Martin against the Monothelites, fifteen years after the date of Honorius's letter, condemned the Monophysites and anathematized them by name, without making any mention of Honorius; nay, it even asserted that all the Roman pontiffs had not, since the rise of the heresy, desisted from solicitude for the faith, writing to the erring, etc. The series of these pontiffs is as follows: Honorius I. (628), Severinus (640), John IV. (642), Theodore I. (649), St. Martin I., Pope St. Agatho, who convened the Sixth General Council, defended Honorius before the Fathers there assembled, and said that Honorius had exhorted the erring that, "at least, by keeping silence, they should desist from the error of their doctrine."

Notwithstanding all this the Sixth Council burned the letters of Honorius, called Honorius himself a heretic, anathematized him after he had been dead for forty-two years, and this sentence of the Sixth Council was approved by Pope St. Leo II. and following Pontiffs, and was, moreover, approved and repeated by the Seventh and Eighth Councils.

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From this series of events and the condemnation by the Council arise the following questions: What is the true sense of this condemnation? What argument can be derived from it against the infallibility of the Pope? And what against the orthodoxy of Honorius himself as a private person? We shall say a few words about each of these in order.

First: In what sense was Honorius condemned by the Council? Not as one who had asserted, taught, or propagated heresy, but as one negligent in his pastoral office, one who had favored heretics (not heresy), and had been overindulgent to Sergius.

Let it be observed, in the first place, that, from the first ages of the Church, the name heretic was applied, first, to those who taught or maintained error in good faith; secondly, to those who taught or maintained heretical doctrine, not only with a knowledge of their error, but also with pertinacity and obstinacy; and, lastly, to those who neither taught nor maintained error themselves, but were accessory to the pertinacity of heretics, whether by protecting them, by favoring them, or by not repressing them, if they were obliged to do so by their office; and it was said, moreover, that bishops were obliged to this repression by apostolic tradition and the discipline of the Holy Fathers. The first class of heretics that we have mentioned were not punished; the second and third were visited with equal penalties. What we have said is clearly evident from ecclesiastical history, from the discipline of the primitive Church, and from the Fathers.

Having premised these remarks we may proceed to our arguments.

I. Many were condemned by the Sixth Council; Sergius, Cyrus, Pyrrhus, Petrus, Paulus, Macarius, etc., and together with these, Honorius. Of all the rest we find it said, in the condemnatory clauses of the Council, that they had maintained one will in Christ; nowhere is this said of Honorius. Therefore it cannot be proved by the authority of the Council that Honorius taught one will in Christ.

II. In none of the Acts of the Council is it said that Honorius is called a heretic because he maintained or taught heresy.

III. It is said expressly, and not once only, that Honorius is condemned because, by his silence, he fostered the Monothelites and followed the counsel of Sergius. For example, Act. Conc. XIII., "We execrate the impious dogmas of these men, and we judge that their own names shall be cast forth from the Holy Church of God, that is to say, Sergius, Cyrus, Pyrrhus, Peter, and Paul, and also Theodore. . . . And with these we order that Honorius be cast out and anathematized, because we find by the writings, made to Sergius, that in all things he followed his coun-

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sel and confirmed his impious doctrines." The Latin has sequi mentem ejus, which is ambiguous, aud may mean either to follow the doctrine, or follow the intention and plan of Sergius; but the original Greek text, of which the Latin is a translation, has, without any ambiguity, "followed the counsel."

Honorius, therefore, is not condemned like the rest for his impious dogmas, but because, by following the counsel of Sergius, he did not repress but strengthened (confirmavit) an impious dogma.

IV. It is expressly said. in the Acts, that God cannot endure that rule of silence, "Et quomodo non indigneretur Deus qui blasphemebatur et non defendebatur." "And how could God but be indignant, who was blasphemed and NOT defended?" (In Sermo Prosphonetics, Act. XVIII.) Hence, also, and for the same reason the Council is indignant, and hurls its anathema against Honorius.

V. The letters of Honorius were burned because they were destructive to the Church and favorable to the heretical contumacy of Sergius, not indeed, in doctrine, but in their approbation of the rule of silence and in too great lenity toward the heresiarch. They are condemned not because they contained the same impiety as the writings of the others, but because "ad unam eademque impietatem tenderent;" they tended (in the Greek concurred) to one and the same impiety."

VI. If, therefore, Honorius is called a heretic, and is anathematized and cast out, it is not for heresy, but for connivance towards heretics. And expressly in this sense was the intention of the Council interpreted by the Emperor Constantine, who was not only present at the Council, but took part in it. In the same sense did St. Leo interpret it, who, having carefully examined the Acts of the Council and conferred with the legates who presided over it, approved them and translated them into Latin. Both Constantine and Leo say that Honorius was condemned, not because he taught error, but because he had favored and strengthened heretics, and had, not stained the Church himself, but suffered it to be distained by others.

Second. What argument can be drawn from the condemnation of Honorius against the infallibility of the Pope?

The Catholic doctrine of infallibility is this: "When the Roman Pontiff speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, in the exercise of his office as Teacher of all Christians, he defines, by his apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals, to be held by the Universal Church, he possesses, through the divine assistance promised to him in Blessed Peter, that infallibility which our Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should possess in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; and therefore, such definitions

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of the Roman Pontiff, of themselves, and not by reason of the consent of the Church, are ulimutable (irreformabiles). Council of the Vatican.

In order, therefore, that the condemnation of Honorius should prove that the Popes did not always possess this infallibility, two things must be established. 1st., That Honorius, exercising his office of Pastor and Teacher, defined some doctrine to be held by the Universal Church. 2d. That this doctrine, thus defined, was heretical. But neither can be shown.

For 1st, in Honorius's letters there is no definition. In the first place, Honorius says that he does not wish to define anything, and he merely approves the plan of imposing silence; and he assigns no reason for this precept of silence except the fear of giving scandal and offence; and the simplicity of men which are not motives for defining but for withholding a definition. In the second place, Honorius, in his letters, did only that which Sergius asked of him, and it was because he followed, in this way, the counsels of Sergius, that he was condemned. But Sergius had asked no definition, but only an approbation of the precept of silence. Therefore Honorius gave no sentence of definition, but only a precept of silence.

In the third place, Honorius said to Sergius, in his letter: "It does not behoove us to affirm one or two operations." "Non nos oportet unam aut duas op operationes predicare." But he could not, possibly, define that there was neither one nor two wills in Christ, because it is absolutely necessary that there should be either one or two. Therefore, Honorius defined nothing, but simply forbade that any should say one or two.

And, 2nd, the Council condemned no heresy as having been maintained by Honorius.

In the first place, there was no heresy in Honorius's letters, as we have proved.

In the second place, the Council condemned him, not for heresy, but for connivance with heretics.

Third. What can be drawn from the condemnation, against the faith and uprightness of Honorius as a private person?

1st. That Honorius was not sound in the faith we have shown to be false. The Council did not condemn heresy as having been maintaind by Honorius. Therefore his orthodoxy is unquestionable.

2d. Honorius was condemned by the Council for a sin of omission in a most weighty matter which was destructive to the peace of the Church. This condemnation was "in foro externo," first, because, in Councils, it is external actions that are condemned, not the intentions of the conscience that are judged; and secondly,

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because, forty-two years after the death of Honorius, no judgment could be passed, or was, in fact, passed, upon his intentions. This being premised, it is more than certain that the precept of silence imposed by Honorius and condemned "in foro externo" was, as to its objective nature, culpable in itself and in the highest degree pernicious to the Church. It merited, therefore, the coudemnation which it received from the Council. But what shall we say of this same precept "in foro conscientiæ;" that is to say, in reference to the culpability of the act, not considered in itself, but in relation to the intentions of Honorius and the guilt which he thereby incurred, or did not incur, before God? Could Honorius, without any fault before God, have judged that, in those particular circumstances, silence was more opportune than the condemnation of error? Honorius was a Pope, not a prophet. His letter should not be judged by the effects which it produced, but by that which human prudence could suggest to him at the time. What then could human prudence suggest to him? We cannot, here, pass any sentence on this point. There are many Catholics who condemn Honorius; there are others who absolve him from all fault. Any one may believe what seems to him more probable. The Popes are not impeccable, but infallible, and this only when they define, with all solemnity, ex cathedra.

But it may be said that St. Leo II. asserts that Honorius, being departed, has been punished with eternal condemnation. Therefore, he asserts him to have sinned. We answer that the only possible sense to be attributed to these words is, that Honorius had committed an act, which, in itself merited eternal condemnation. For, as to the fact of his perdition, a fact of this kind cannot be decided upon by the Church without most certain signs and miracles; because that fact is one which is hidden from human knowledge. It is true that in the canonization of saints, the Pope judges that eternal salvation has certainly been obtained by the saint canonized; but he judges from indubitable prodigies by which God confirms the arguments of human prudence.

We answer, in the second place, that this testimony of St. Leo would prove, not that Honorius was a heretic (for in that very same passage St. Leo says that Honorius was condemned, "because by his negligence he had fanned the flame of heretical dogma"), but that Honorius had sinned grievously, which opinion anyone is free to hold who thinks he sees probable ground for it.

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My previous post was not meant to appear unorthodox, but was more a mistake of terms. I was simply asserting that within the hypostatic Union, Christ has but one human will, that is, the "upright will" spoke of by Honorius, and not the "two" wills that the rest of us have.

- Your Brother In Christ, Jeff

Edited August 25, 2004 by JeffCR07

[Apotheoun]

[quote name='JeffCR07' date='Aug 25 2004, 12:56 PM']Apotheoun, I'm back, and I've got the research. I was indeed totally ineloquent, and my terminology was very wrong as well. My post was in regards to the [i]two wills[/i] of man, though I used the term "natures."

I know you like to have sources, so the following is the entire text of a defense of Pope Honorius in light of the monothelite heresy. At the end, I will set aside the part which speaks on the two wills of man.

[. . .]

My previous post was not meant to appear unorthodox, but was more a mistake of terms. I was simply asserting that within the hypostatic Union, Christ has but one human will, that is, the "upright will" spoke of by Honorius, and not the "two" wills that the rest of us have.

- Your Brother In Christ, Jeff[/quote]
I thought that might be what you were intending, because I even mentioned this "two wills" concept when I was defending Pope Honorius against false accusations that he was a heretic. But when using this terminology one must bear in mind that the word "will" is being used in an equivocal sense, because there are not literally "two" wills in a man. That's why I was glad to see that you put the word "two" in scare quotes.

Let me explain further: the idea of two contrary "wills" in man after the fall is part of the early tradition of the Church, but one must be careful when speaking this way, because there aren't literally "two wills" in man. Honorius, like St. Paul before him, was speaking figuratively, because concupiscence isn't really another will; instead, it is a disordered inclination affecting the will. Now of course, to the man who is trying to do good, concupiscence can appear to be something like a contrary will, because concupiscence tends to draw man away from what he ought to do, in order to satisfy his baser appetites. But in reality, concupiscence is merely the loss of the preternatural gift of [i]integrity[/i], and so it isn't something positively existing in man. The gift of [i]integrity[/i] helped man to perfectly control his passions through the use of right reason. So when Adam fell from grace, he lost this gift, along with the other three preternatural gifts and the supernatural gift of sanctifying grace, but he lost nothing essential to his human nature. Now, when Catholics authors speak of "two wills" in man after the fall, they are referring to the loss of the gift of [i]integrity[/i], and so they are not asserting that there is some kind of positive existing thing in man that draws him toward evil; instead, they are referring to the loss of the preternatural aid given to man through the gift of [i]integrity[/i], which helped him to keep his passions in check through the use of right reason.

By the way, the article in "American Catholic Quarterly" is quite good, and it along with a closer reading of Honorius' own letters, helped me to see that Honorius was fully orthodox in his Christology.

Jeff, I know you weren't asserting anything heretical, and you are correct, Christ assumed a full and complete human nature, and His human will was not vitiated by concupiscence, because Christ's humanity possessed the gift of [i]integrity[/i] from the first moment of His conception in Mary's womb.

God bless,
Todd