Pope suggests contraceptives could be used

[Nihil Obstat]

Basic moral philosophy totally prohibits it. If contraception is inherently evil, then no reason justifies its use. That would be consequentialism.

There are three relevant considerations in evaluating the moral quality of an act. These are the moral object, the intent, and the circumstances. The moral object, the active blocking of fertility, is inherently evil, and a defective moral object renders the entire act evil. The intent and circumstances are considerations which are subordinate to the moral object, though I would argue that the intent is at least suspect if not totally irredeemable. But even if the intent were irreproachably pure, the defective moral object makes the intent not strictly relevant in terms of the act's permissibility.

Veritatis Splendor lays this out nicely. Please read that rather than taking my word for it, convincing though I may be.

[Spem in alium]

The pope said that avoiding pregnancy is not an absolute evil and suggested it could be practiced by people in areas at risk of Zika. He said nothing about contraception being okay, and there are other, natural ways of avoiding pregnancy which are licit: natural family planning and abstinence being two of them. Of course, though, his words are more likely to be read as supporting the use of contraception, partly because that is what many people want to hear. I do think though that if he did not intend to come across in this way, there should be some sort of clarifying statement. It seems rather ambiguous and difficult to arrive at an exact understanding. 

[MarysLittleFlower]

19 hours ago, Peace said:

The question of whether/when condom use is "acceptable" for sex outside of marriage is kind of an open one I think. You are already sinning to start with. I think that there could be some situations (for example, a husband cheating on his wife with a prostitute and using a condom so that he does not risk giving his wife HIV or some other disease) where the use of a condom could be the "right" thing to do. Another example might be the case of rape. Using a contraceptive drug to prevent pregnancy in that situation might be acceptable.

My understanding is that if the pill can cause contraception (simply if couple is not celibate), its not allowed even if the intent is something else. I checked with a priest known for orthodoxy and he confirmed. (I wouldn't advise the pill even to celibate people though cause its very unhealthy to take it and a person may get used to it and have a hard time quitting if they marry). I assume its the same with condoms. If someone has a serious reason to avoid pregnancy or has HIV their only option is periodic continence or complete abstinence (depending on what it is). It may sound harsh ..I fully believe a person can live a full meaningful life being celibate. 

3 hours ago, Spem in alium said:

The pope said that avoiding pregnancy is not an absolute evil and suggested it could be practiced by people in areas at risk of Zika. He said nothing about contraception being okay, and there are other, natural ways of avoiding pregnancy which are licit: natural family planning and abstinence being two of them. Of course, though, his words are more likely to be read as supporting the use of contraception, partly because that is what many people want to hear. I do think though that if he did not intend to come across in this way, there should be some sort of clarifying statement. It seems rather ambiguous and difficult to arrive at an exact understanding. 

Hmm maybe he meant abstinence? I hope it would be clarified. As we know the Church allows that for sufficient reasons..

6 hours ago, Nihil Obstat said:

Basic moral philosophy totally prohibits it. If contraception is inherently evil, then no reason justifies its use. That would be consequentialism.

There are three relevant considerations in evaluating the moral quality of an act. These are the moral object, the intent, and the circumstances. The moral object, the active blocking of fertility, is inherently evil, and a defective moral object renders the entire act evil. The intent and circumstances are considerations which are subordinate to the moral object, though I would argue that the intent is at least suspect if not totally irredeemable. But even if the intent were irreproachably pure, the defective moral object makes the intent not strictly relevant in terms of the act's permissibility.

Veritatis Splendor lays this out nicely. Please read that rather than taking my word for it, convincing though I may be.

That seems to be what I was taught too. What about the comment on Pope Paul VI and rape? 

Edited February 20, 2016 by MarysLittleFlower

[Peace]

7 hours ago, Nihil Obstat said:

Basic moral philosophy totally prohibits it. If contraception is inherently evil, then no reason justifies its use. That would be consequentialism.

There are three relevant considerations in evaluating the moral quality of an act. These are the moral object, the intent, and the circumstances. The moral object, the active blocking of fertility, is inherently evil, and a defective moral object renders the entire act evil. The intent and circumstances are considerations which are subordinate to the moral object, though I would argue that the intent is at least suspect if not totally irredeemable. But even if the intent were irreproachably pure, the defective moral object makes the intent not strictly relevant in terms of the act's permissibility.

Veritatis Splendor lays this out nicely. Please read that rather than taking my word for it, convincing though I may be.

I am not so convinced that the use of a condom or other contraceptive means is intrinsically evil. Let's take the case of rape as an example. The Church says that even in the case of rape, once there has been conception, abortion cannot occur. That is because abortion is an intrinsic evil. Can't be done under any circumstances.

But can a rape victim use a contraceptive drug to prevent conception? Can a woman who is being raped ask the rapist to wear a condom? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes" which some people seem to suggest, then I think it is pretty clear that the use of a condom by itself is not intrinsically evil. What makes the use of a condom evil is the specific purpose for which the condom is used - specifcially, the use of a condom by a married couple for the specific purpose of preventing pregnancy.

So can you then make an argument that if the condom is used not to prevent pregnacy, but to prevent the spread of some disease like HIV from one person to another, that the double effect test is satisfied? I think you can make a reasonable argument. For example:

http://marccortez.com/2010/11/23/the-pope-condoms-and-the-principle-of-double-effect/

To determine whether PDE applies to this scenario, we must see if the scenario meets the following conditions:

1. The Nature of the Act: The act in question must be at least a morally neutral act (i.e. it cannot be an intrinsically bad act).
2. Means-End: The bad effect  cannot be the means by which the good effect is accomplished.
3. Right-Intention: The bad effect cannot be that which is intended by the actor.
4. Proportionality: The good effect must be equivalent to or greater than the corresponding bad effect.

And, as I see it, the condom-use scenario meets all four conditions.

1. The Nature of the Act: It seems to me that even for Catholic theologians, condom use is a morally neutral act. In and of itself, using a condom has no moral consequences (e.g. using it as a water balloon). It is one  particular result of using a condom (preventing conception and, consequently, separating the sexual act from its procreative function) that is instrinsically wrong.
2. Means-End: As in most PDE scenarios the good effect and bad effect are inseparable. Wearing a condom during the sexual act (assuming that the condom does not malfunction) necessarily results in both consequences. But, it seems clear that the bad effect in this situation is not the means for accomplishing the good effect – i.e., a person does not seek to separate the sexual act from its intended purposes as a means to preventing the spread of a deadly disease. The two consequences are inseparable, but the one is not the means for accomplishing the other.
3. Right-Intention: This is critical. For this situation to come under PDE, the actor must intend the good effect and not the bad one. So, in this scenario, the person using the condom must intend to stop the spread of a deadly disease and not to prevent procreation.
4. Proportionality: The benefit of preventing the spread of a deadly disease must outweigh the drawback of separating the sexual act from its procreative function. As with most PDE scenarios, there is a strong element of subjectivity in this final step. But, it is certainly not obvious that this scenario violates this condition.

Now, I am not saying that the above analysis is correct. I think you can put forth a good argument that the test is not satisfied as well. But I think the matter is still an open question within the Church. I don't think that there are any dogmatic statements that compel the conclusion that condoms cannot be used as a means to stop the spread of a disease (although many in the Church have suggested this). I don't think there are any papal encyclials that really address the issue head on, either. Humanae vitae was written well before the AIDS outbreak and I don't think it was really written with that modern problem in mind.

Another hypothetical for you - let's say that one spouse has contracted HIV through a blood transfusion and that the other spouse has not yet contracted it. By some miracle of technology, a new condom is created that is a fiddler of sorts. This new condom prevents the HIV virus from being transmitted, while at the same time not preventing contraception. It fiddlers out HIV but does not fiddler semen. Can the couple use the condom? Sure they can. They are using the condom not to prevent contraception, but to prevent the spread of disease. Let's say that they use this new condom during intercourse, but for whatver reason one time it does not work properly and has the unintended consequence of preventing conception. Have they sinned because the condom did not work and had the unintended consequence of preventing pregnancy? I don't think they have sinned in this scenario.

If technology has not yet developed and they are left with a regular condom, I do not know if they have sinned if they choose to use it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV from one spouse to anohter, if their intent is not to stop contraception and they would have otherwise used the new condom were it available.

Sure, you can make some distinctions between the two scenarios, but I think there is at least a decent argument that they are morally equivalent, as long as there is no specific intent to stop procreation, and as long as the use of a condom itself is not wrong in every circumstance. . .

I do think it is kind of an open question for the Church, and perhaps there will be a new encyclical in the future that addresses the question head on . . .

*fiddler not fiddler*

LOL. Why does Phatmass automatically change Fi-L-ter to "Fiddler"?

[Guest]

I started listening to Catholic AM radio a few weeks ago after seeing a bumper sticker. I've enjoyed it although it's challenging sometimes not to turn it off out of frustration. It gets intense and challenges the way I think about things. They were going on and on about this this morning. I thought Patrick Madrid and this other guy were going overboard. Talking about a possible schism and misrepresenting what this female caller was trying to say. They were extremely dogmatic and legalistic and saying things like the gates of hell won't prevail and 2000 years of Church teaching. I understand this response and respect it. It was tough to listen to though. They would not budge on understanding how it could be in parents loving nature not to want to intentionally set out to have children that would be affected by this virus. I'm not saying they aren't right for arguing it the way they did but there was no discussing this with them.

Edited February 20, 2016 by Guest

[Nihil Obstat]

8 hours ago, Spem in alium said:

The pope said that avoiding pregnancy is not an absolute evil and suggested it could be practiced by people in areas at risk of Zika. He said nothing about contraception being okay, and there are other, natural ways of avoiding pregnancy which are licit: natural family planning and abstinence being two of them. Of course, though, his words are more likely to be read as supporting the use of contraception, partly because that is what many people want to hear. I do think though that if he did not intend to come across in this way, there should be some sort of clarifying statement. It seems rather ambiguous and difficult to arrive at an exact understanding. 

But avoiding pregnancy within marriage with the use of artificial contraceptive is evil. And according to Lombardi's follow-up, at least as reported by LSN, this is what the Holy Father actually referred to.

4 hours ago, MarysLittleFlower said:

 

 

2 hours ago, Peace said:

I am not so convinced that the use of a condom or other contraceptive means is intrinsically evil. Let's take the case of rape as an example. The Church says that even in the case of rape, once there has been conception, abortion cannot occur. That is because abortion is an intrinsic evil. Can't be done under any circumstances.

But can a rape victim use a contraceptive drug to prevent conception? Can a woman who is being raped ask the rapist to wear a condom? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes" which some people seem to suggest, then I think it is pretty clear that the use of a condom by itself is not intrinsically evil. What makes the use of a condom evil is the specific purpose for which the condom is used - specifcially, the use of a condom by a married couple for the specific purpose of preventing pregnancy.

So can you then make an argument that if the condom is used not to prevent pregnacy, but to prevent the spread of some disease like HIV from one person to another, that the double effect test is satisfied? I think you can make a reasonable argument. For example:

http://marccortez.com/2010/11/23/the-pope-condoms-and-the-principle-of-double-effect/

To determine whether PDE applies to this scenario, we must see if the scenario meets the following conditions:

1. The Nature of the Act: The act in question must be at least a morally neutral act (i.e. it cannot be an intrinsically bad act).
2. Means-End: The bad effect  cannot be the means by which the good effect is accomplished.
3. Right-Intention: The bad effect cannot be that which is intended by the actor.
4. Proportionality: The good effect must be equivalent to or greater than the corresponding bad effect.

And, as I see it, the condom-use scenario meets all four conditions.

1. The Nature of the Act: It seems to me that even for Catholic theologians, condom use is a morally neutral act. In and of itself, using a condom has no moral consequences (e.g. using it as a water balloon). It is one  particular result of using a condom (preventing conception and, consequently, separating the sexual act from its procreative function) that is instrinsically wrong.
2. Means-End: As in most PDE scenarios the good effect and bad effect are inseparable. Wearing a condom during the sexual act (assuming that the condom does not malfunction) necessarily results in both consequences. But, it seems clear that the bad effect in this situation is not the means for accomplishing the good effect – i.e., a person does not seek to separate the sexual act from its intended purposes as a means to preventing the spread of a deadly disease. The two consequences are inseparable, but the one is not the means for accomplishing the other.
3. Right-Intention: This is critical. For this situation to come under PDE, the actor must intend the good effect and not the bad one. So, in this scenario, the person using the condom must intend to stop the spread of a deadly disease and not to prevent procreation.
4. Proportionality: The benefit of preventing the spread of a deadly disease must outweigh the drawback of separating the sexual act from its procreative function. As with most PDE scenarios, there is a strong element of subjectivity in this final step. But, it is certainly not obvious that this scenario violates this condition.

Now, I am not saying that the above analysis is correct. I think you can put forth a good argument that the test is not satisfied as well. But I think the matter is still an open question within the Church. I don't think that there are any dogmatic statements that compel the conclusion that condoms cannot be used as a means to stop the spread of a disease (although many in the Church have suggested this). I don't think there are any papal encyclials that really address the issue head on, either. Humanae vitae was written well before the AIDS outbreak and I don't think it was really written with that modern problem in mind.

Another hypothetical for you - let's say that one spouse has contracted HIV through a blood transfusion and that the other spouse has not yet contracted it. By some miracle of technology, a new condom is created that is a fiddler of sorts. This new condom prevents the HIV virus from being transmitted, while at the same time not preventing contraception. It fiddlers out HIV but does not fiddler semen. Can the couple use the condom? Sure they can. They are using the condom not to prevent contraception, but to prevent the spread of disease. Let's say that they use this new condom during intercourse, but for whatver reason one time it does not work properly and has the unintended consequence of preventing conception. Have they sinned because the condom did not work and had the unintended consequence of preventing pregnancy? I don't think they have sinned in this scenario.

If technology has not yet developed and they are left with a regular condom, I do not know if they have sinned if they choose to use it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV from one spouse to anohter, if their intent is not to stop contraception and they would have otherwise used the new condom were it available.

Sure, you can make some distinctions between the two scenarios, but I think there is at least a decent argument that they are morally equivalent, as long as there is no specific intent to stop procreation, and as long as the use of a condom itself is not wrong in every circumstance. . .

I do think it is kind of an open question for the Church, and perhaps there will be a new encyclical in the future that addresses the question head on . . .

*fiddler not fiddler*

LOL. Why does Phatmass automatically change Fi-L-ter to "Fiddler"?

This is a good reply and I am going to try to spend an appropriate amount of time on it.

[Nihil Obstat]

3 hours ago, Peace said:

I am not so convinced that the use of a condom or other contraceptive means is intrinsically evil. Let's take the case of rape as an example. The Church says that even in the case of rape, once there has been conception, abortion cannot occur. That is because abortion is an intrinsic evil. Can't be done under any circumstances.

But can a rape victim use a contraceptive drug to prevent conception? Can a woman who is being raped ask the rapist to wear a condom? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes" which some people seem to suggest, then I think it is pretty clear that the use of a condom by itself is not intrinsically evil. What makes the use of a condom evil is the specific purpose for which the condom is used - specifcially, the use of a condom by a married couple for the specific purpose of preventing pregnancy.

So can you then make an argument that if the condom is used not to prevent pregnacy, but to prevent the spread of some disease like HIV from one person to another, that the double effect test is satisfied? I think you can make a reasonable argument. For example:

http://marccortez.com/2010/11/23/the-pope-condoms-and-the-principle-of-double-effect/

To determine whether PDE applies to this scenario, we must see if the scenario meets the following conditions:

1. The Nature of the Act: The act in question must be at least a morally neutral act (i.e. it cannot be an intrinsically bad act).
2. Means-End: The bad effect  cannot be the means by which the good effect is accomplished.
3. Right-Intention: The bad effect cannot be that which is intended by the actor.
4. Proportionality: The good effect must be equivalent to or greater than the corresponding bad effect.

And, as I see it, the condom-use scenario meets all four conditions.

1. The Nature of the Act: It seems to me that even for Catholic theologians, condom use is a morally neutral act. In and of itself, using a condom has no moral consequences (e.g. using it as a water balloon). It is one  particular result of using a condom (preventing conception and, consequently, separating the sexual act from its procreative function) that is instrinsically wrong.
2. Means-End: As in most PDE scenarios the good effect and bad effect are inseparable. Wearing a condom during the sexual act (assuming that the condom does not malfunction) necessarily results in both consequences. But, it seems clear that the bad effect in this situation is not the means for accomplishing the good effect – i.e., a person does not seek to separate the sexual act from its intended purposes as a means to preventing the spread of a deadly disease. The two consequences are inseparable, but the one is not the means for accomplishing the other.
3. Right-Intention: This is critical. For this situation to come under PDE, the actor must intend the good effect and not the bad one. So, in this scenario, the person using the condom must intend to stop the spread of a deadly disease and not to prevent procreation.
4. Proportionality: The benefit of preventing the spread of a deadly disease must outweigh the drawback of separating the sexual act from its procreative function. As with most PDE scenarios, there is a strong element of subjectivity in this final step. But, it is certainly not obvious that this scenario violates this condition.

Now, I am not saying that the above analysis is correct. I think you can put forth a good argument that the test is not satisfied as well. But I think the matter is still an open question within the Church. I don't think that there are any dogmatic statements that compel the conclusion that condoms cannot be used as a means to stop the spread of a disease (although many in the Church have suggested this). I don't think there are any papal encyclials that really address the issue head on, either. Humanae vitae was written well before the AIDS outbreak and I don't think it was really written with that modern problem in mind.

Another hypothetical for you - let's say that one spouse has contracted HIV through a blood transfusion and that the other spouse has not yet contracted it. By some miracle of technology, a new condom is created that is a fiddler of sorts. This new condom prevents the HIV virus from being transmitted, while at the same time not preventing contraception. It fiddlers out HIV but does not fiddler semen. Can the couple use the condom? Sure they can. They are using the condom not to prevent contraception, but to prevent the spread of disease. Let's say that they use this new condom during intercourse, but for whatver reason one time it does not work properly and has the unintended consequence of preventing conception. Have they sinned because the condom did not work and had the unintended consequence of preventing pregnancy? I don't think they have sinned in this scenario.

If technology has not yet developed and they are left with a regular condom, I do not know if they have sinned if they choose to use it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV from one spouse to anohter, if their intent is not to stop contraception and they would have otherwise used the new condom were it available.

Sure, you can make some distinctions between the two scenarios, but I think there is at least a decent argument that they are morally equivalent, as long as there is no specific intent to stop procreation, and as long as the use of a condom itself is not wrong in every circumstance. . .

I do think it is kind of an open question for the Church, and perhaps there will be a new encyclical in the future that addresses the question head on . . .

*fiddler not fiddler*

LOL. Why does Phatmass automatically change Fi-L-ter to "Fiddler"?

"But can a rape victim use a contraceptive drug to prevent conception? Can a woman who is being raped ask the rapist to wear a condom? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes" which some people seem to suggest, then I think it is pretty clear that the use of a condom by itself is not intrinsically evil. What makes the use of a condom evil is the specific purpose for which the condom is used - specifcially, the use of a condom by a married couple for the specific purpose of preventing pregnancy."

Ok. That is fair. We should instead distinguish between artificial contraception during marital relations, and use of contraception for other purposes. The use of a condom during intercourse in marriage would always and everywhere be evil. And I think it is morally relevant that this is the officially intended purpose of a condom, but that is neither here nor there.

"So can you then make an argument that if the condom is used not to prevent pregnacy, but to prevent the spread of some disease like HIV from one person to another, that the double effect test is satisfied? I think you can make a reasonable argument."

In this case I do not think so. It would be a contraceptive use within marriage which, even theoretically allowing some other non-contraceptive use, is still inherently evil.

"The Nature of the Act: It seems to me that even for Catholic theologians, condom use is a morally neutral act. In and of itself, using a condom has no moral consequences (e.g. using it as a water balloon). It is one particular result of using a condom (preventing conception and, consequently, separating the sexual act from its procreative function) that is instrinsically wrong."

No, this is where it goes wrong. That is like saying that abortion is not inherently evil because forceps have legitimate uses. There are permissible uses for a condom, like using it as a water balloon, but this is a totally different act. "Using a condom" is not really an act, at least not in a way that makes any sense to talk about. We have to be intellectually honest here and actually refer to what we are talking about, which would be the use of a condom during intercourse within a marriage. That act is inherently evil.

"Means-End: As in most PDE scenarios the good effect and bad effect are inseparable. Wearing a condom during the sexual act (assuming that the condom does not malfunction) necessarily results in both consequences. But, it seems clear that the bad effect in this situation is not the means for accomplishing the good effect – i.e., a person does not seek to separate the sexual act from its intended purposes as a means to preventing the spread of a deadly disease. The two consequences are inseparable, but the one is not the means for accomplishing the other."

I may want to argue with this later, but I am quite sick this morning so I will leave it unchallenged. However if my characterization of the act is correct, this is irrelevant.

"Right-Intention: This is critical. For this situation to come under PDE, the actor must intend the good effect and not the bad one. So, in this scenario, the person using the condom must intend to stop the spread of a deadly disease and not to prevent procreation."

If we dig deeper, the bad effect and the good effect are essentially the same, which would be "the disease spreading through procreation." I think we can make a reasonable argument that prevention of procreation is absolutely intended in our scenario, even if it is intended for less selfish reasons.

"But I think the matter is still an open question within the Church."

I do not think so. We can have discussion about very unusual cases (specifically Paul VI's and Benedict XVI's) where we are speaking, respectively, of forced intercourse and sodomy which is already inherently closed to life. Those cases bring different wrinkles to the story which are morally relevant. Here we are talking about couples specifically choosing to use contraceptives, specifically because they do not want to become pregnant. Yes there are serious reasons that cause them to think this, but the act itself is the same and is not permitted.

"Another hypothetical for you - let's say that one spouse has contracted HIV through a blood transfusion and that the other spouse has not yet contracted it. By some miracle of technology, a new condom is created that is a fiddler of sorts. This new condom prevents the HIV virus from being transmitted, while at the same time not preventing contraception. It fiddlers out HIV but does not fiddler semen. Can the couple use the condom?"

Well, this is not really a condom anymore. Or rather it is not a contraceptive device. Yes, such a device should be permissible since it specifically does not prevent conception.

"Let's say that they use this new condom during intercourse, but for whatver reason one time it does not work properly and has the unintended consequence of preventing conception. Have they sinned because the condom did not work and had the unintended consequence of preventing pregnancy? I don't think they have sinned in this scenario."

It might depend on a couple facts, like if they knew this was a possibility, how likely this possibility was, etc. But if your case as stated is accurate, and the 'condom' was designed specifically not to prevent pregnancy, yet it did through a mistake or a design flaw, I would agree that there is no sin. This is rather like 'nocturnal self-pollution' (lol) which does not engage the will, or if a man were to accidentally ejaculate outside of his wife. Not intended, in fact the opposite is intended.

"If technology has not yet developed and they are left with a regular condom, I do not know if they have sinned if they choose to use it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV from one spouse to anohter, if their intent is not to stop contraception and they would have otherwise used the new condom were it available."

No, this is not the case. Such a couple should only abstain from intercourse. (And this sacrifice would bring them great graces, if they properly disposed themselves to it.) The act itself, which the use of contraceptive devices during intercourse within marriage, remains evil, even if intentions are good. Perhaps their intentions remove their culpability (perhaps), but they do not change the evil nature of the act.

"Sure, you can make some distinctions between the two scenarios, but I think there is at least a decent argument that they are morally equivalent, as long as there is no specific intent to stop procreation, and as long as the use of a condom itself is not wrong in every circumstance. . ."

A decent argument perhaps, but ultimately a wrong one. The couple may not intend that they use contraceptive devices, but they are. For as long as your technology does not exist which would allow us to actually separate disease-prevention from contraception, the condom remains a contraceptive device, and its use during sex remains an evil act. The Church's teaching is pretty well developed on this point, and I do not think there are any loopholes to exploit.

_____

A somewhat lengthy quotation from Veritatis Splendor:

 

77. In order to offer rational criteria for a right moral decision, the theories mentioned above take account of the intention and consequences of human action. Certainly there is need to take into account both the intention — as Jesus forcefully insisted in clear disagreement with the scribes and Pharisees, who prescribed in great detail certain outward practices without paying attention to the heart (cf. Mk 7:20-21; Mt 15:19) — and the goods obtained and the evils avoided as a result of a particular act. Responsibility demands as much. But the consideration of these consequences, and also of intentions, is not sufficient for judging the moral quality of a concrete choice. The weighing of the goods and evils foreseeable as the consequence of an action is not an adequate method for determining whether the choice of that concrete kind of behaviour is "according to its species", or "in itself", morally good or bad, licit or illicit. The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species.

Moreover, everyone recognizes the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of evaluating all the good and evil consequences and effects — defined as pre-moral — of one's own acts: an exhaustive rational calculation is not possible. How then can one go about establishing proportions which depend on a measuring, the criteria of which remain obscure? How could an absolute obligation be justified on the basis of such debatable calculations?

78. The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the "object" rationally chosen by the deliberate will, as is borne out by the insightful analysis, still valid today, made by Saint Thomas.¹²⁶ In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in the perfect good, primordial love. By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person. Consequently, as theCatechism of the Catholic Church teaches, "there are certain specific kinds of behaviour that are always wrong to choose, because choosing them involves a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil".¹²⁷ And Saint Thomas observes that "it often happens that man acts with a good intention, but without spiritual gain, because he lacks a good will. Let us say that someone robs in order to feed the poor: in this case, even though the intention is good, the uprightness of the will is lacking. Consequently, no evil done with a good intention can be excused. 'There are those who say: And why not do evil that good may come? Their condemnation is just' (Rom 3:8)".¹²⁸

The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God, to the One who "alone is good", and thus brings about the perfection of the person. An act is therefore good if its object is in conformity with the good of the person with respect for the goods morally relevant for him. Christian ethics, which pays particular attention to the moral object, does not refuse to consider the inner "teleology" of acting, inasmuch as it is directed to promoting the true good of the person; but it recognizes that it is really pursued only when the essential elements of human nature are respected. The human act, good according to its object, is also capable of being ordered to its ultimate end. That same act then attains its ultimate and decisive perfection when the willactually does order it to God through charity. As the Patron of moral theologians and confessors teaches: "It is not enough to do good works; they need to be done well. For our works to be good and perfect, they must be done for the sole purpose of pleasing God".¹²⁹

 

"Intrinsic evil": it is not licit to do evil that good may come of it (cf. Rom 3:8)

79. One must therefore reject the thesis, characteristic of teleological and proportionalist theories, which holds that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species — its "object" — the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behaviour or specific acts, apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned.

The primary and decisive element for moral judgment is the object of the human act, which establishes whether it is capable of being ordered to the good and to the ultimate end, which is God. This capability is grasped by reason in the very being of man, considered in his integral truth, and therefore in his natural inclinations, his motivations and his finalities, which always have a spiritual dimension as well. It is precisely these which are the contents of the natural law and hence that ordered complex of "personal goods" which serve the "good of the person": the good which is the person himself and his perfection. These are the goods safeguarded by the commandments, which, according to Saint Thomas, contain the whole natural law.¹³⁰

80. Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature "incapable of being ordered" to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church's moral tradition, have been termed "intrinsically evil" (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that "there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object".¹³¹ The Second Vatican Council itself, in discussing the respect due to the human person, gives a number of examples of such acts: "Whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia and voluntary suicide; whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit; whatever is offensive to human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution and trafficking in women and children; degrading conditions of work which treat labourers as mere instruments of profit, and not as free responsible persons: all these and the like are a disgrace, and so long as they infect human civilization they contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer injustice, and they are a negation of the honour due to the Creator".¹³²

With regard to intrinsically evil acts, and in reference to contraceptive practices whereby the conjugal act is intentionally rendered infertile, Pope Paul VI teaches: "Though it is true that sometimes it is lawful to tolerate a lesser moral evil in order to avoid a greater evil or in order to promote a greater good, it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it (cf. Rom 3:8) — in other words, to intend directly something which of its very nature contradicts the moral order, and which must therefore be judged unworthy of man, even though the intention is to protect or promote the welfare of an individual, of a family or of society in general".¹³³

81. In teaching the existence of intrinsically evil acts, the Church accepts the teaching of Sacred Scripture. The Apostle Paul emphatically states: "Do not be deceived: neither the immoral, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor sexual perverts, nor thieves, nor the greedy, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor robbers will inherit the Kingdom of God" (1 Cor 6:9-10).

If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain "irremediably" evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person. "As for acts which are themselves sins (cum iam opera ipsa peccata sunt), Saint Augustine writes, like theft, fornication, blasphemy, who would dare affirm that, by doing them for good motives (causis bonis), they would no longer be sins, or, what is even more absurd, that they would be sins that are justified?".¹³⁴

Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act "subjectively" good or defensible as a choice.

82. Furthermore, an intention is good when it has as its aim the true good of the person in view of his ultimate end. But acts whose object is "not capable of being ordered" to God and "unworthy of the human person" are always and in every case in conflict with that good. Consequently, respect for norms which prohibit such acts and obligesemper et pro semper, that is, without any exception, not only does not inhibit a good intention, but actually represents its basic expression.

The doctrine of the object as a source of morality represents an authentic explicitation of the Biblical morality of the Covenant and of the commandments, of charity and of the virtues. The moral quality of human acting is dependent on this fidelity to the commandments, as an expression of obedience and of love. For this reason — we repeat — the opinion must be rejected as erroneous which maintains that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behaviour or specific acts, without taking into account the intention for which the choice was made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned. Without the rational determination of the morality of human acting as stated above, it would be impossible to affirm the existence of an "objective moral order"¹³⁵ and to establish any particular norm the content of which would be binding without exception. This would be to the detriment of human fraternity and the truth about the good, and would be injurious to ecclesial communion as well.

83. As is evident, in the question of the morality of human acts, and in particular the question of whether there exist intrinsically evil acts, we find ourselves faced with the question of man himself, of his truth and of the moral consequences flowing from that truth. By acknowledging and teaching the existence of intrinsic evil in given human acts, the Church remains faithful to the integral truth about man; she thus respects and promotes man in his dignity and vocation. Consequently, she must reject the theories set forth above, which contradict this truth.

Dear Brothers in the Episcopate, we must not be content merely to warn the faithful about the errors and dangers of certain ethical theories. We must first of all show the inviting splendour of that truth which is Jesus Christ himself. In him, who is the Truth (cf. Jn 14:6), man can understand fully and live perfectly, through his good actions, his vocation to freedom in obedience to the divine law summarized in the commandment of love of God and neighbour. And this is what takes place through the gift of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of truth, of freedom and of love: in him we are enabled to interiorize the law, to receive it and to live it as the motivating force of true personal freedom: "the perfect law, the law of liberty" (Jas 1:25).

 

 

Edited February 20, 2016 by Nihil Obstat

[Spem in alium]

51 minutes ago, Nihil Obstat said:

But avoiding pregnancy within marriage with the use of artificial contraceptive is evil. And according to Lombardi's follow-up, at least as reported by LSN, this is what the Holy Father actually referred to.

Is there an actual quote from the Holy Father, or is it just assumed or considered "most likely" that he meant this? He seems to have a strong history of being taken out of context and his words misappropriated, likely because people have assumed he meant one thing when he really meant another. As I don't know all the facts, and as I don't know the pope's intentions in making those comments, I prefer to give him the benefit of the doubt (and believe he meant avoiding pregnancy by other means) until proven otherwise.

[Maggyie]

5 hours ago, MarysLittleFlower said:

My understanding is that if the pill can cause contraception (simply if couple is not celibate), its not allowed even if the intent is something else. I checked with a priest known for orthodoxy and he confirmed. (I wouldn't advise the pill even to celibate people though cause its very unhealthy to take it and a person may get used to it and have a hard time quitting if they marry). I assume its the same with condoms. If someone has a serious reason to avoid pregnancy or has HIV their only option is periodic continence or complete abstinence (depending on what it is). It may sound harsh ..I fully believe a person can live a full meaningful life being celibate. 

Hmm maybe he meant abstinence? I hope it would be clarified. As we know the Church allows that for sufficient reasons..

That seems to be what I was taught too. What about the comment on Pope Paul VI and rape? 

MLF, priests "known for orthodoxy" don't necessarily know what they are talking about. If an unwanted side effect of a medication is sterility then a couple is not obliged to either forgo treatment or withhold marital relations. Only if the object of taking the medication is sterility, is there a problem.

A good example is treatment for cancer. Many drugs and treatments will render conception impossible (temporarily and often permanently). If someone sought these treatments out for that purpose, that would be wrong. However if it's just a side effect and not the primary purpose a patient is not obliged to sacrifice the marital relationship for the sake of treatment. 

The combination of synthetic hormones used in the Pill is morally neutral. If you go to an nfp doctor with ovarian cysts, endometriosis etc, they will usually give you the exact same hormones, just in a form that is not marketed for contraceptive use. Although they do control the formation of cysts and endometriosis in many cases, their mode of action is the same as the Pill. They inhibit conception, but in this scenario as a side effect only. It comes down to the intention of the patient. 

[MarysLittleFlower]

3 hours ago, Peace said:

I am not so convinced that the use of a condom or other contraceptive means is intrinsically evil. Let's take the case of rape as an example. The Church says that even in the case of rape, once there has been conception, abortion cannot occur. That is because abortion is an intrinsic evil. Can't be done under any circumstances.

But can a rape victim use a contraceptive drug to prevent conception? Can a woman who is being raped ask the rapist to wear a condom? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes" which some people seem to suggest, then I think it is pretty clear that the use of a condom by itself is not intrinsically evil. What makes the use of a condom evil is the specific purpose for which the condom is used - specifcially, the use of a condom by a married couple for the specific purpose of preventing pregnancy.

So can you then make an argument that if the condom is used not to prevent pregnacy, but to prevent the spread of some disease like HIV from one person to another, that the double effect test is satisfied? I think you can make a reasonable argument. For example:

http://marccortez.com/2010/11/23/the-pope-condoms-and-the-principle-of-double-effect/

To determine whether PDE applies to this scenario, we must see if the scenario meets the following conditions:

1. The Nature of the Act: The act in question must be at least a morally neutral act (i.e. it cannot be an intrinsically bad act).
2. Means-End: The bad effect  cannot be the means by which the good effect is accomplished.
3. Right-Intention: The bad effect cannot be that which is intended by the actor.
4. Proportionality: The good effect must be equivalent to or greater than the corresponding bad effect.

And, as I see it, the condom-use scenario meets all four conditions.

1. The Nature of the Act: It seems to me that even for Catholic theologians, condom use is a morally neutral act. In and of itself, using a condom has no moral consequences (e.g. using it as a water balloon). It is one  particular result of using a condom (preventing conception and, consequently, separating the sexual act from its procreative function) that is instrinsically wrong.
2. Means-End: As in most PDE scenarios the good effect and bad effect are inseparable. Wearing a condom during the sexual act (assuming that the condom does not malfunction) necessarily results in both consequences. But, it seems clear that the bad effect in this situation is not the means for accomplishing the good effect – i.e., a person does not seek to separate the sexual act from its intended purposes as a means to preventing the spread of a deadly disease. The two consequences are inseparable, but the one is not the means for accomplishing the other.
3. Right-Intention: This is critical. For this situation to come under PDE, the actor must intend the good effect and not the bad one. So, in this scenario, the person using the condom must intend to stop the spread of a deadly disease and not to prevent procreation.
4. Proportionality: The benefit of preventing the spread of a deadly disease must outweigh the drawback of separating the sexual act from its procreative function. As with most PDE scenarios, there is a strong element of subjectivity in this final step. But, it is certainly not obvious that this scenario violates this condition.

Now, I am not saying that the above analysis is correct. I think you can put forth a good argument that the test is not satisfied as well. But I think the matter is still an open question within the Church. I don't think that there are any dogmatic statements that compel the conclusion that condoms cannot be used as a means to stop the spread of a disease (although many in the Church have suggested this). I don't think there are any papal encyclials that really address the issue head on, either. Humanae vitae was written well before the AIDS outbreak and I don't think it was really written with that modern problem in mind.

Another hypothetical for you - let's say that one spouse has contracted HIV through a blood transfusion and that the other spouse has not yet contracted it. By some miracle of technology, a new condom is created that is a fiddler of sorts. This new condom prevents the HIV virus from being transmitted, while at the same time not preventing contraception. It fiddlers out HIV but does not fiddler semen. Can the couple use the condom? Sure they can. They are using the condom not to prevent contraception, but to prevent the spread of disease. Let's say that they use this new condom during intercourse, but for whatver reason one time it does not work properly and has the unintended consequence of preventing conception. Have they sinned because the condom did not work and had the unintended consequence of preventing pregnancy? I don't think they have sinned in this scenario.

If technology has not yet developed and they are left with a regular condom, I do not know if they have sinned if they choose to use it for the purpose of preventing the transmission of HIV from one spouse to anohter, if their intent is not to stop contraception and they would have otherwise used the new condom were it available.

Sure, you can make some distinctions between the two scenarios, but I think there is at least a decent argument that they are morally equivalent, as long as there is no specific intent to stop procreation, and as long as the use of a condom itself is not wrong in every circumstance. . .

I do think it is kind of an open question for the Church, and perhaps there will be a new encyclical in the future that addresses the question head on . . .

*fiddler not fiddler*

LOL. Why does Phatmass automatically change Fi-L-ter to "Fiddler"?

I think the argument might fail on the first point.. I think...the act has to be morally neutral not the physical objects used in the act. Using a condom as a contraceptive device seems to already be intrinsically evil ?

I mean if it achieves contraception or could 

[Nihil Obstat]

13 minutes ago, Spem in alium said:

Is there an actual quote from the Holy Father, or is it just assumed or considered "most likely" that he meant this? He seems to have a strong history of being taken out of context and his words misappropriated, likely because people have assumed he meant one thing when he really meant another. As I don't know all the facts, and as I don't know the pope's intentions in making those comments, I prefer to give him the benefit of the doubt (and believe he meant avoiding pregnancy by other means) until proven otherwise.

LSN linked to a statement from Lombardi which was in Italian. If I see an English translation of those remarks coming out, I will certainly post it here. However, LSN is not known for fabricating sources. If they are reporting honestly, then Lombardi confirmed that the Pope was indeed speaking about contraception.

[MarysLittleFlower]

7 minutes ago, Maggyie said:

MLF, priests "known for orthodoxy" don't necessarily know what they are talking about. If an unwanted side effect of a medication is sterility then a couple is not obliged to either forgo treatment or withhold marital relations. Only if the object of taking the medication is sterility, is there a problem.

A good example is treatment for cancer. Many drugs and treatments will render conception impossible (temporarily and often permanently). If someone sought these treatments out for that purpose, that would be wrong. However if it's just a side effect and not the primary purpose a patient is not obliged to sacrifice the marital relationship for the sake of treatment. 

The combination of synthetic hormones used in the Pill is morally neutral. If you go to an nfp doctor with ovarian cysts, endometriosis etc, they will usually give you the exact same hormones, just in a form that is not marketed for contraceptive use. Although they do control the formation of cysts and endometriosis in many cases, their mode of action is the same as the Pill. They inhibit conception, but in this scenario as a side effect only. It comes down to the intention of the patient. 

I have heard there are different views on this. With cancer treatment, it doesn't work *by* contraception occurring. That seems to be a possible difficulty.. 

I'm pretty sure my priest is very well educated in these things..  I'll maybe ask for more clarification 

Nihil do you happen to have anything on that? I keep hearing different views on that 

[Spem in alium]

2 minutes ago, Nihil Obstat said:

LSN linked to a statement from Lombardi which was in Italian. If I see an English translation of those remarks coming out, I will certainly post it here. However, LSN is not known for fabricating sources. If they are reporting honestly, then Lombardi confirmed that the Pope was indeed speaking about contraception.

Thank you. It would be good to get a sense also of Fr Lombardi's view and whether he supports the statements on which he is commenting. 

Regardless of what's true, the Holy Father needs prayer.

[Nihil Obstat]

16 minutes ago, MarysLittleFlower said:

I have heard there are different views on this. With cancer treatment, it doesn't work *by* contraception occurring. That seems to be a possible difficulty.. 

I'm pretty sure my priest is very well educated in these things..  I'll maybe ask for more clarification 

Nihil do you happen to have anything on that? I keep hearing different views on that 

If infertility is an unintended consequence of some other treatment, there is no sin. If the 'treatment' actually is contraception, as in the case of using condoms to prevent disease transmission, it is not licit.

In the case of endometriosis, cysts, etc., I would argue that a married woman would have the responsibility to first see if other treatments are available, but if in this case the specific combination of hormones which actively treats the condition has the unintended consequence of infertility, there should be no sin. Unless this combination of hormones is potentially abortifacient, in which case that woman is obligated to abstain for as long as she uses that treatment.

_____

If anyone here can translate reasonably from Italian, please take a look for yourself. 

Of course we all should hope that the Pope did not make such a great mistake. But even if he did, he certainly has ample opportunity to correct it. And he remains pope, even if he does make mistakes.

Edited February 20, 2016 by Nihil Obstat

[MarysLittleFlower]

6 minutes ago, Nihil Obstat said:

If infertility is an unintended consequence of some other treatment, there is no sin. If the 'treatment' actually is contraception, as in the case of using condoms to prevent disease transmission, it is not licit.

In the case of endometriosis, cysts, etc., I would argue that a married woman would have the responsibility to first see if other treatments are available, but if in this case the specific combination of hormones which actively treats the condition has the unintended consequence of infertility, there should be no sin. Unless this combination of hormones is potentially abortifacient, in which case that woman is obligated to abstain for as long as she uses that treatment.

The first paragraph is my understanding too. For the second, I think my priest brought up the pill causing abortion too but he also suggested the couple abstaining during that time. I thought that's because its not like cancer treatment, its actually a contraceptive pill being used. If I misunderstood, I'll check with him.