Atheism as A Consequence of Divine Simplicity

[Spinozist]

For the purposes of this thread, divine simplicity means simply:

Definition of Simplicity: Something is simple if and only if all its intrinsic properties are necessary properties.*

This means that all the intrinsic properties of a simple thing are the identical over all possible worlds. From this definition, it's straight-forward to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. An extrinsic property would be that I believe Aristotle existed. If, in a different possible world, Aristotle never existed and no one thought he existed, then I wouldn't believe Aristotle existed. This property would change from one possible world to another. More so if my knowledge were perfect. My knowledge of and other relations to things outside myself involve extrinsic properties. My self-knowledge and self-relations involve intrinsic properties.

Assumption 1: God is simple.

Assumption 2: God's created everything from nothing.

Argument: If God created everything from nothing, then at the point God created, logically prior to this point, God alone exists, so all God's properties are intrinsic. Therefore, all God's actions, beliefs, God's will, necessarily are the way that they are and cannot be any other way. The result of God's creative activity cannot be explained through itself, so it must be explained through this creative activity, and therefore cannot be any way other than it is.

In conclusion, the world could not have been different than it is, including all the facts of the world, which depend on the divine will from eternity: They follow from other facts about the world and from the divine will, and these other facts follow from still other facts or from the divine will, and so forth, until everything ultimately rests upon the divine will, which, with its logical priority, will be intrinsic.

There are no possible worlds. God could not have made anything different than the way it is.

Divine simplicity implies necessitarianism.

I invite the readers of this thread to comment on two aspects of the argument:

(1) The logical structure of the argument itself. What problems do you see with the argument, given the assumptions and the definition?

*(2) The definition itself. Admittedly, this definition is incomplete. Much more is entailed by simplicity, but I think that this is at least logically entailed by divine simplicity. It may, however, be that other consequences are entailed by divine simplicity that defeat this argument. I'd be interested to find out what these are.

If (1) and (2) are satisfied, I'll continue the argument, to demonstrate that necessitarianism implies monism, of the sort that God and Nature are identical, that there is nothing outside God, and therefore that strong atheism and naturalism are true: the Judeo-Christian God and the supernatural are impossible.

The argument can be altogether avoided in the manner Plantinga and other theists presently understand God: they deny divine simplicity. 

Edited January 3, 2016 by Spinozist

[dairygirl4u2c]

in layman's terms, i think the poster is getting at ockam's razor? i find the opening post hard to understand. but if that's what he's saying, the simplest solution is best. if God can just be, the universe can just be. i'm critical of the idea, cause i think there's too much evidence, not saying its proven, and questions pointing to God or something bigger. 

Edited January 5, 2016 by dairygirl4u2c

[Spinozist]

1 hour ago, dairygirl4u2c said:

in layman's terms, i think the poster is getting at ockam's razor? i find the opening post hard to understand. but if that's what he's saying, the simplest solution is best. if God can just be, the universe can just be. i'm critical of the idea, cause i think there's too much evidence, not saying its proven, and questions pointing to God or something bigger. 

Thanks for the reply, what you say is exactly what I need to know. That's not at all what I'm saying, and that's 100% my own fault. This work needs serious editing for the sake of clarity.

The key part of my post deals with divine simplicity. Catholics and many traditional Protestants believe that God is perfectly simple. This means that God cannot have parts. So God can't have a body. More than that, it means that God can't even have metaphysical parts, like attributes. From a paper by Ryan Mullins on the topic, Divine Simplicity means that:

1) God cannot have any spatial or temporal parts.

2) God cannot have any intrinsic accidental properties.

3) There cannot be any real distinction between one essential property and another in God’s nature.

4) There cannot be a real distinction between essence and existence in God.

One of the most extreme consequences of this view is that God cannot be at all different than he is. All God's properties have to be exactly the same, no matter how different the world is. Another radical consequence of this doctrine is that God isn't a being that exists. God is Being. God is Existence. This article on Strange Notions: http://www.strangenotions.com/cows-quarks-simplicity/ gives a very nice description of Divine Simplicity.

I hope this helps, and I'll keep working to improve my argument, so it can be understandable.

What I'm trying to argue is that, for those who believe in Divine Simplicity, the fact that God cannot be different means that the world cannot be different.

[dairygirl4u2c]

im not super familiar with divine simplicity. im much more familiar with the run of the mill evidence for God v evidence against God. it strikes me with the simplicity stuff that they are forcing themselves into radical conclusions. God might be super simple such that he can't have arms and legs, but if God exists, it's not far fetched to think he can have more attributes than whatever is the most simple. 

[Spinozist]

6 minutes ago, dairygirl4u2c said:

im not super familiar with divine simplicity. im much more familiar with the run of the mill evidence for God v evidence against God. it strikes me with the simplicity stuff that they are forcing themselves into radical conclusions. God might be super simple such that he can't have arms and legs, but if God exists, it's not far fetched to think he can have more attributes than whatever is the most simple. 

That's a good point. I think that's a fair way to take the whole argument, actually. It could either be taken as proof of atheism from divine simplicity, or as a reductio ad absurdum argument against divine simplicity. I'm happy with either.

[dairygirl4u2c]

well to the common ones i find most appealing per God's existence.

-thermodynamics (or general laws of energy if i'm stating thermodynaics wrong) and uncaused cause. energy.... it goes from high to low. our universe is going to the low end. it started at the high end. where did that high end come from? from something other than a higher energy? and the same goes for the uncaused cause. is GOd the uncaused cause? if he is, why can't the uinverse? well, the universe is like a clock that was set to tick. something had to set it.... that's what it looks like. there was nothing then something happened to hte nothingness. that's what it looks like. for energy or the uncaused cause, as far as we can see there was nothing, then something. we can have theoeries about multiple universes etc or an accordian universe but these are just theories. what we see is that it was somehting then nothing.,,, that's our best observation. id say energy and uncaused causes both lend itself to saying there is a God to explain it. 

-Near death experiences. most atheists are no longer atheist after these. it strikes me as the most straightforward explanation to say a person died and went to the after life if that's what they say happened, cause that's what looks like it happened. ive seen atheists who insist the most straightforward explaination is that there is a chemical thing going on. i dont agree. i dont think there's a version of the afterlife inbedded in people's genes, but that's what happens on a common scale. it'd be one thing if only some people experienced it that way, but everyone who has the eperience says the same thing. there's tunnels, people say "it's not your time to die" etc. how is this imbedded in our DNA? how is this common? some people say ketamine gives NDE's. but they dont. they give example which sometimes are like NDEs. so it's not reproducable as far as we know. 

-complexity. look at an eye, or a watch, etc. this is the weakest point but it is evidence nonetheless. i realize evolution and billions of years could cause complexity that we see. 

[dairygirl4u2c]

" It could either be taken as proof of atheism from divine simplicity, or as a reductio ad absurdum argument against divine simplicity. "

i would agree that the idea of divine simplicity isnt likely. as its stated, its is proof of atheism on one hand per ockam's razor. and taken to its extreme shows it is an absurd way to think about God. so divine simplicity isn't likely. 

my complexity point is better stated thusly....

 

but then you could come and point out the counter to christianity at least...

[Spinozist]

I don't think my position is a caricature of God any more than classical theism presents a caricature. If I did misrepresent the doctrine of Divine Simplicity, I'd like to know how.

If the argument accomplishes either:

1. Causing people to reject divine simplicity, or

2. Causing people to reject God altogether, because of divine simplicity,

then the argument's a success. Divine simplicity is a required belief about God for Catholics, so if Catholics read my argument and reject Divine Simplicity, they will have to reject something essential to their Catholic faith, and the argument does what it was made to do.

The effect that an argument similar to this had on me was to cause me to abandon what was left of my Catholic faith and accept Spinoza's God: in other words, to become an atheist.

[dairygirl4u2c]

my first reaction was to question was divine simplicity was doctrine or not. there was some back and forth on some message boards about whether it was... but i did find someone post this

"We firmly believe and openly confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immense, omnipotent, unchangeable, incomprehensible, and ineffable, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; three Persons indeed but one essense, substance, or nature absolutely simple …" — Fourth Council of the Lateran, 1215

protestants are known to reject the idea, some of them. as a none catholic id invite you to consider God from the non catholic perspective. 

but as a former catholic myself like you, id be curious what catholics have to say about the idea. 

[4588686]

On 1/3/2016, 2:25:03, Spinozist said:

For the purposes of this thread, divine simplicity means simply:

Definition of Simplicity: Something is simple if and only if all its intrinsic properties are necessary properties.*

This means that all the intrinsic properties of a simple thing are the identical over all possible worlds. From this definition, it's straight-forward to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. An extrinsic property would be that I believe Aristotle existed. If, in a different possible world, Aristotle never existed and no one thought he existed, then I wouldn't believe Aristotle existed. This property would change from one possible world to another. More so if my knowledge were perfect. My knowledge of and other relations to things outside myself involve extrinsic properties. My self-knowledge and self-relations involve intrinsic properties.

Assumption 1: God is simple.

Assumption 2: God's created everything from nothing.

Argument: If God created everything from nothing, then at the point God created, logically prior to this point, God alone exists, so all God's properties are intrinsic. Therefore, all God's actions, beliefs, God's will, necessarily are the way that they are and cannot be any other way. The result of God's creative activity cannot be explained through itself, so it must be explained through this creative activity, and therefore cannot be any way other than it is.

In conclusion, the world could not have been different than it is, including all the facts of the world, which depend on the divine will from eternity: They follow from other facts about the world and from the divine will, and these other facts follow from still other facts or from the divine will, and so forth, until everything ultimately rests upon the divine will, which, with its logical priority, will be intrinsic.

There are no possible worlds. God could not have made anything different than the way it is.

Divine simplicity implies necessitarianism.

I invite the readers of this thread to comment on two aspects of the argument:

(1) The logical structure of the argument itself. What problems do you see with the argument, given the assumptions and the definition?

*(2) The definition itself. Admittedly, this definition is incomplete. Much more is entailed by simplicity, but I think that this is at least logically entailed by divine simplicity. It may, however, be that other consequences are entailed by divine simplicity that defeat this argument. I'd be interested to find out what these are.

If (1) and (2) are satisfied, I'll continue the argument, to demonstrate that necessitarianism implies monism, of the sort that God and Nature are identical, that there is nothing outside God, and therefore that strong atheism and naturalism are true: the Judeo-Christian God and the supernatural are impossible.

The argument can be altogether avoided in the manner Plantinga and other theists presently understand God: they deny divine simplicity. 

wut

[Not The Philosopher]

Well you've certainly lived up to your namesake.

I think you are blurring the line between logical necessity and metaphysical necessity. It is logically necessary, (for instance) that something cannot be both true and false at the same time. But this doesn't describe anything about the world. It just illustrates what is necessary for you to be talking more than just gibberish. Metaphysical necessity, on the other hand, does say things about the world. It is a way of indicating where an a posteriori explanation must terminate if it is to be complete. The relationship between something metaphysically necessary, and the contingent things that depend upon it is not the same as the relationship between premises and conclusion, but rather similar to the relationship between a bridge and the people standing on the bridge. They couldn't be there without the bridge, but the bridge doesn't somehow imply the people, nor do you gain much insight into the nature of bridges by inferring that those people must be standing on something. But then the bridge must be supported by the land, and the chain of explanation goes on. Saying that the universe, which exists contingently, is dependant on God, who exists absolutely, is an affirmation that the chain of explanation definitively ends somewhere (as opposed to going on infinitely or ending in a brute fact).

Doctrines like the divine simplicity are more apophatic than cataphatic, more about delimiting what God is not, than explaining what God is. They simply (har har) point out that, for something to exist absolutely, the limitations that contingent existences have must be ruled out, so we're left with something that is radically different in kind from everything that contingently exists. This is, again, different from affirming that the relationship between God and creatures is the same as that between premise and conclusion.

Anyway, it's late, and I should consider bed, so I apologize if this isn't clear.

(Of course, it is possible to claim, as spinoza did, that if you could get a 'God's eye' view of the universe you would actually see that everything really is logically necessary (and a single substance with infinite modes, etc.). But since no one actually has this vantage point, this idea is hard to actually argue for, since it kinda relies on your faith that the universe really is this way)

[PhuturePriest]

10 hours ago, Hasan said:

wut

I think you'll all find the following image rather compelling.