Abortion To Save The Live Of The Mother

[Kevin]

This is maybe the silliest red herring I have seen in ages. I will not even bother responding to it.
 

 

Please, explain what you mean. Until very very recently, the Church quite blithely held that all those without Baptism were damned by virtue of Original Sin. If this does not mean "no one can really be held to be innocent" (save perhaps the Virgin) I don't know what it does mean.

 

Also, I have read many similar statements about the issues in the Old Testament, and I tend to agree. I quoted this to show that, when tradition is obviously unreasonable (or maybe just not applicable to contemporary problems) we should break with it.

 

I also wanted to add, just in case, that as contentious as I may be now, I never been any disrespect to you or to the Christianity (indeed, I thank you for your kind solicitude on my behalf when I was experiencing doubt). So I don't mean anything personally.

[Nihil Obstat]

Please, explain what you mean. Until very very recently, the Church quite blithely held that all those without Baptism were damned by virtue of Original Sin. If this does not mean "no one can really be held to be innocent" (save perhaps the Virgin) I don't know what it does mean.

 

Also, I have read many similar statements about the issues in the Old Testament, and I tend to agree. I quoted this to show that, when tradition is obviously unreasonable (or maybe just not applicable to contemporary problems) we should break with it.

 

I also wanted to add, just in case, that as contentious as I may be now, I never been any disrespect to you or to the Christianity (indeed, I thank you for your kind solicitude on my behalf when I was experiencing doubt). So I don't mean anything personally.

 

 

 

Please, explain what you mean. Until very very recently, the Church quite blithely held that all those without Baptism were damned by virtue of Original Sin. If this does not mean "no one can really be held to be innocent" (save perhaps the Virgin) I don't know what it does mean.

 

You have confused personal sin with original sin. They are not the same thing, and must not be treated as such.

 

 

 

Also, I have read many similar statements about the issues in the Old Testament, and I tend to agree. I quoted this to show that, when tradition is obviously unreasonable (or maybe just not applicable to contemporary problems) we should break with it.

 

I see no break with tradition. Indeed you will find me to be among the last people on this site to ever consider breaking with tradition.

 

 

 

I also wanted to add, just in case, that as contentious as I may be now, I never been any disrespect to you or to the Christianity (indeed, I thank you for your kind solicitude on my behalf when I was experiencing doubt). So I don't mean anything personally.

 

Thank you. That is good to know.

[Nihil Obstat]

(I am off to bed now, and may not be able to post again until late tomorrow evening.)

[Kevin]

It is easy. We are not materialists. There is more to life than the material, what we can see and do and touch. Two actions with the same outcome can have radically different moral implications.

 

An innocent human being can never be directly and intentionally killed. Period.

 

So is that a yes? The mother must die in such a scenario?

 

How about, if an innocent (with a brain tumor or something) is about to launch a nuclear strike that will lead to the annihilation of nearly every man woman and child in the world, and the only way to stop him is by killing him. It is, even in such a case, unacceptable to kill him? I might be able to accept this on principle, but I cannot fathom how it can be held to be in keeping with Church history, in which there plenty of cases where the Church was not particularly interested in the lives of innocents as long as it promoted the great good.

[Kevin]

I see no break with tradition. Indeed you will find me to be among the last people on this site to ever consider breaking with tradition.

 

The Church seems to have, for instance, have changed its position on the possibility of unbaptized infants receiving the Beatific Vision, at least from many of Pope Benedict's statements. I feel this is a good thing. I too don't think the Church should break with tradition on most issues.

 

The main problem I have with your argument is that, if the child is already going to die no matter what option is chosen between a) attempted delivery b) removal of the mother's uterus or fallopian tubes c) doing nothing or d) direct abortion, then no option can be called intentionally distinct as far as the life of the child, since they all result in the same thing. When we say we "intend" something, we are inherently speaking about what we mean the outcome to be - so if there is no possible other outcome, there can be said to be no intention one way or another. So if option d provides a means of saving the woman's life, then even if it seems to be an act of direct killing, I still believe it falls under the heading of "unintended effect" since no conceivable intent could have effected another outcome.

 

I doubt this will convince you, but I at least think, even if you disagree with the argument, then you could accept that the Church is doing the faith no favors by publicly excommunicating the mothers of underage rape victims, many of them in deep poverty, who simply don't want their children to die for an abstract principle theological concept like double intention when they in many cases do not even know how to read. At the very least they could just keep their mouths shut about it, or do it it private.

[CatherineM]

BTW, that woman in Ireland did not die because she didn't get an abortion. That was a misstatement that the media source involved quietly retracted. Retractions are often done quietly for some reason.

[Kevin]

That may be so, but in any case, I'm tired of the whole thing. It honestly doesn't even effect me, so I'm just going to be glad I'll probably never have to make such a decision.

 

Also, I hope I didn't come off as dismissive or rude of your response. I do disagree, but I thank you for you comments.

[CatherineM]

<blockquote class='ipsBlockquote'data-author="Kevin" data-cid="2525261" data-time="1355842578" data-date="Today, 07:56 AM"><p>
That may be so, but in any case, I'm tired of the whole thing. It honestly doesn't even effect me, so I'm just going to be glad I'll probably never have to make such a decision.<br />
<br />
Also, I hope I didn't come off as dismissive or rude of your response. I do disagree, but I thank you for you comments.</p></blockquote>

I'm used to being disagreed with since I'm a pro-life Democrat. You are very right to say you will probably never have to make the decision. You and every other human on the planet.

[Lil Red]

With all due respect to the responder, this sounds to me like a lot of Just-So-Story. There was a case in Ireland just a few months ago where this scenario happened and the woman died. If doctors are so unreliable, why do we even bother going to them at all? Why don't we simply rely on prayer to heal every illness we get? Isn't going to a doctor showing we don't trust God?

 

http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/not-one-single-irish-abortion-in-uk-to-8216save-the-life-of-the-mother8217

 

http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/breaking-reporter-who-broke-savita-story-there-may-have-been-no-request-for

 

DUBLIN, December 3, 2012 (LifeSiteNews.com) – Kitty Holland, the Irish Times reporter who broke the story about the death of Savita Halappanavar that launched a global crusade against Ireland’s pro-life laws, has admitted that the story of Mrs. Halappanavar asking for an abortion may have been a little bit “muddled” in the retelling, and there may have been no such request after all.

 

Holland later told the state broadcaster RTE that her coverage in the Irish Times “never suggested” that an abortion might have saved Mrs. Halappanavar’s life.

 

Coleman also queried Holland about discrepancies in her Times report compared to her later reporting in the Observer. After her initial article in the Irish Times on November 14th, Holland three days later wrote in the Observer the disclaimer, “The fact that Savita had been refused a termination was a factor in her death has yet to be established”.

[Kevin]

<blockquote class='ipsBlockquote'data-author="Kevin" data-cid="2525261" data-time="1355842578" data-date="Today, 07:56 AM"><p>
That may be so, but in any case, I'm tired of the whole thing. It honestly doesn't even effect me, so I'm just going to be glad I'll probably never have to make such a decision.<br />
<br />
Also, I hope I didn't come off as dismissive or rude of your response. I do disagree, but I thank you for you comments.</p></blockquote>

I'm used to being disagreed with since I'm a pro-life Democrat. You are very right to say you will probably never have to make the decision. You and every other human on the planet.

 

I'm not completely sure of the import of the last line of your post. If you are suggesting that God alone has the right to judge, I would agree, which I why I think it is really counterproductive for the Church to make the public excommunications it has for scenarios like this.

 

But what I meant was I simply was saying that I am glad I am neither a medical professional nor a potential parent (for the foreseeable future), because if I was put in a scenario where the child had basically no chance for survival (and I do believe doctors can establish this) and the mother of my own child or my patient was almost certain to die if she tried to deliver the child, and removing the uterus or fallopian tube or some other "indirect" method of saving the mother's life was not available, I would undoubtedly advocate a direct abortion, excommunicate myself, and unlike some of the cases I have read about, I would never be able to convince myself I was wrong, that it was worth letting a mother die for a child who could never be born, that 0>1, so I would remain excommunicated for the rest of my life, and I would probably have to become an Anglican or God knows what, which is the last thing I want to do.

 

Perhaps just by thinking this, I've already excommunicated myself, but luckily I'm not a not a South American peasant girl but a reasonably well off, college-educated white guy, so I doubt the Church will take much notice of me.

Edited December 18, 2012 by Kevin

[CatherineM]

I meant what I said. You will never face this scenario, and neither will anyone else. That doesn't mean people won't try to convince someone that the scenario is real. Women do die in childbirth. That's been happening since the dawn of primates. That does not mean an abortion would have saved a single life.

[Papist]

With an abortion, it is certain that a life will die.

 

You cannot do evil, not even to achieve a good.

[Kevin]

With an abortion, it is certain that a life will die.

 

You cannot do evil, not even to achieve a good.

 

I have found a quote from the Standford Encyclopedia on Double Effect that clarifies my position a bit:

 

For example, if the soldier who throws himself on the grenade in order to shield his fellow soldiers from the force of an explosion acts permissibly, and if the permissibility of his action is explained by double effect, then he must not intend to sacrifice his own life in order to save the others, he must merely foresee that his life will end as a side effect of his action. But many have argued that this is an implausible description of the soldier's action and that his action is permissible even if he does intend to cause his own death as a means to save the others. Shelly Kagan points out that if someone else were to shove the soldier on the grenade we would certainly say that that the harm to the soldier was intended by the person who did the shoving. Equally, Kagan argues, we should say that it is intended in this case (p. 145). The same kind of argument can be made for cases of killing in self-defense.

 

Those who take this view can claim that what is often called the proportionality condition associated with double effect is really doing all of the explanatory work: it is because the end is judged to be worthy that the harmful means is considered to be permissibly brought about. Those who reject double effect for this reason may still maintain that there is a morally significant difference between self-sacrifice of this sort and suicide, but that the difference depends on a difference in the agent's motives and ends, not a difference in the means adopted.

 

This kind of criticism about the explanatory reach of the principle of double effect might also be associated with the worry that we will be inclined to describe a harm as a merely foreseen side effect if we believe that it is permissibly brought about in the course of pursuing a good end, and, similarly, we will tend to describe a harm as one that is intended as part of the agent's means if we believe that it is not permissibly brought about in the course of pursuing a good end. Disputes about the permissibility of killing a fetus in order to save the life of a pregnant woman have often been thought to take this form. Those who say that it would be impermissible to perform an abortion to save the life of a pregnant woman say that this is because this would involve intending the death of the fetus. However, if it is also maintained that a hysterectomy may be performed on a pregnant woman with uterine cancer because the death of the fetus would be a merely foreseen side effect of surgery, it is hard to find a principled ground for drawing this distinction that could serve as a guide to moral judgment...

 

In general, the article has many points relating directly to this issue and shows that there are problems with the concept that cannot be easily dismissed.

[Papist]

I have found a quote from the Standford Encyclopedia on Double Effect that clarifies my position a bit:

 

For example, if the soldier who throws himself on the grenade in order to shield his fellow soldiers from the force of an explosion acts permissibly, and if the permissibility of his action is explained by double effect, then he must not intend to sacrifice his own life in order to save the others, he must merely foresee that his life will end as a side effect of his action. But many have argued that this is an implausible description of the soldier's action and that his action is permissible even if he does intend to cause his own death as a means to save the others. Shelly Kagan points out that if someone else were to shove the soldier on the grenade we would certainly say that that the harm to the soldier was intended by the person who did the shoving. Equally, Kagan argues, we should say that it is intended in this case (p. 145). The same kind of argument can be made for cases of killing in self-defense.

 

Those who take this view can claim that what is often called the proportionality condition associated with double effect is really doing all of the explanatory work: it is because the end is judged to be worthy that the harmful means is considered to be permissibly brought about. Those who reject double effect for this reason may still maintain that there is a morally significant difference between self-sacrifice of this sort and suicide, but that the difference depends on a difference in the agent's motives and ends, not a difference in the means adopted.

 

This kind of criticism about the explanatory reach of the principle of double effect might also be associated with the worry that we will be inclined to describe a harm as a merely foreseen side effect if we believe that it is permissibly brought about in the course of pursuing a good end, and, similarly, we will tend to describe a harm as one that is intended as part of the agent's means if we believe that it is not permissibly brought about in the course of pursuing a good end. Disputes about the permissibility of killing a fetus in order to save the life of a pregnant woman have often been thought to take this form. Those who say that it would be impermissible to perform an abortion to save the life of a pregnant woman say that this is because this would involve intending the death of the fetus. However, if it is also maintained that a hysterectomy may be performed on a pregnant woman with uterine cancer because the death of the fetus would be a merely foreseen side effect of surgery, it is hard to find a principled ground for drawing this distinction that could serve as a guide to moral judgment...

 

In general, the article has many points relating directly to this issue and shows that there are problems with the concept that cannot be easily dismissed.

 

The principle of double effect in the Church’s moral tradition teaches that one may perform a good action even if it is foreseen that a bad effect will arise only if four conditions are met: 1) The act itself must be good. 2) The only thing that one can intend is the good act, not the foreseen but unintended bad effect. 3) The good effect cannot arise from the bad effect; otherwise, one would do evil to achieve good. 4) The unintended but foreseen bad effect cannot be disproportionate to the good being performed.

 

In your example, the procedure is a hysterectomy to remove the cancer, not an abortion to kill the baby. The double effect of the hysterectomy is that the baby dies as an effect of that procedure. The primary objective of an abortion is to kill the baby. Killing the baby cannot be the purpose of the procedure. 

[Kevin]

The principle of double effect in the Church’s moral tradition teaches that one may perform a good action even if it is foreseen that a bad effect will arise only if four conditions are met: 1) The act itself must be good. 2) The only thing that one can intend is the good act, not the foreseen but unintended bad effect. 3) The good effect cannot arise from the bad effect; otherwise, one would do evil to achieve good. 4) The unintended but foreseen bad effect cannot be disproportionate to the good being performed.

 

In your example, the procedure is a hysterectomy to remove the cancer, not an abortion to kill the baby. The double effect of the hysterectomy is that the baby dies as an effect of that procedure. The primary objective of an abortion is to kill the baby. Killing the baby cannot be the purpose of the procedure. 

 

Yes, and as you can see from the quote, the principal is highly questionable. I strongly encourage you to read the entire article. I think there is a strong case, and a much stronger case than the contrary, that the supposed difference between a direct abortion and the hysterectomy to remove the cancer is a fiction. Actually, I will just quote a little further:

 

The historical origins of double effect as a tenet of Catholic casuistry might provide a similar explanation for the unity of its applications. If one were to assume that it is absolutely prohibited to cause the death of a human being, then it would not be permissible to kill an aggressor in self-defense, to sacrifice one's life to protect others, to hasten death as a side effect of administering pain-relieving medications, or to endanger non-combatants in warfare. If one were to assume instead that what is absolutely prohibited is to cause the death of a human being intentionally, then these exceptional cases can all be classified as cases of non-intentional killing.

 

Critics of double effect might then claim that a better way of explaining what these cases have in common is to point out that they are exceptions to the prohibition on causing the death of a human being, and that the pattern of justification that they share requires that the agent acts in order to promote a good end and shows adequate respect for the value of human life in so acting. What the critics of double effect emphasize is that the distinction between what is intentional and what is foreseen does not explain the permissibility of these exceptions.

 

T.M. Scanlon (2008) has recently developed this kind of criticism by arguing that the appeal of double effect is, fundamentally, illusory: an agent's intentions are not relevant to the permissibility of an action in the way that the proponents of the principle of double effect would claim, though an agent's intentions are relevant to moral assessments of the way in which the agent deliberated. That an agent intended to bring about a certain harm does not explain why the action was impermissible, but it can explain what is morally faulty about the agent's reasoning in pursuing that line of action.