Orthodoxy Quiz

[truthfinder]

[quote name='kafka' timestamp='1305001184' post='2239508']
combing one's hair is not instrinsically evil. It has a good moral object which is basically to look good and presentable. It can, theoretically, with a good and loving intention enlivened by actual grace-be directed toward God as the final end, just as eating can and just as getting one place to another (transportation) can, etc.

{10:31} Therefore, whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you may do, do everything for the glory of God.

But the act of combing one's hair does not need an actual grace to perform. So it is not in and of itself meritorious, like prayer. It is a good act one can do without actual grace.

That would be my opinion.

Here is another nice quote from Veritatis Splendor:

The human act, good according to its object, is also capable of being ordered to its ultimate end. That same act then attains its ultimate and decisive perfection when the will actually does order it to God through charity. As the Patron of moral theologians and confessors teaches: "It is not enough to do good works; they need to be done well. For our works to be good and perfect, they must be done for the sole purpose of pleasing God". (n. 78)
[/quote]

Thanks, that helps.

[Don John of Austria]

[quote name='kafka' timestamp='1305001184' post='2239508']
combing one's hair is not instrinsically evil. It has a good moral object which is basically to look good and presentable. It can, theoretically, with a good and loving intention enlivened by actual grace-be directed toward God as the final end, just as eating can and just as getting one place to another (transportation) can, etc.

{10:31} Therefore, whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you may do, do everything for the glory of God.

But the act of combing one's hair does not need an actual grace to perform. So it is not in and of itself meritorious, like prayer. It is a good act one can do without actual grace.

That would be my opinion.

Here is another nice quote from Veritatis Splendor:

The human act, good according to its object, is also capable of being ordered to its ultimate end. That same act then attains its ultimate and decisive perfection when the will actually does order it to God through charity. As the Patron of moral theologians and confessors teaches: "It is not enough to do good works; they need to be done well. For our works to be good and perfect, they must be done for the sole purpose of pleasing God". (n. 78)
[/quote]


I would like to see a magestierial document that says there are no morally nuetral act,I submit to the teaching of the Church, but I do not think that this is the teaching of the Church. Turning door knob has no moral value, the end of the act CANNOT retroactively give it moral value. Turning a door knob,whistling absent mindedly,pushing a button, noene of these have moral values.

If this is the eteaching of the Church I would like to see the document which tells us this.


Let me be clear, I object to this philosphically, so I am not protesting a Church teaching, Ijust don't believe this is a Church teaching.

[kafka]

[quote name='TeresaBenedicta' timestamp='1305038854' post='2239636']
One of these days I'll find myself with enough to time discuss number 1 with you, Kafka. I disagree and hold that there are indeed morally neutral acts. But unfortunately I don't foresee having enough time until summer to really get into it.
[/quote]
I'll be long gone.

[quote name='Don John of Austria' timestamp='1305051666' post='2239705']
I would like to see a magestierial document that says there are no morally nuetral act,I submit to the teaching of the Church, but I do not think that this is the teaching of the Church. Turning door knob has no moral value, the end of the act CANNOT retroactively give it moral value. Turning a door knob,whistling absent mindedly,pushing a button, noene of these have moral values.

If this is the eteaching of the Church I would like to see the document which tells us this.


Let me be clear, I object to this philosphically, so I am not protesting a Church teaching, Ijust don't believe this is a Church teaching.
[/quote]
every knowing choice is either good or evil. The Magisterium clearly teaches that every knowing choice has three sources which determine its morality: intention, moral object, circumstances. The Magisterium teaches that all three sources must be positively good for the overall act to be good and this includes the moral objet. A moral object can never be neutral, never, never, never. The Magisterium and Sacred Scripture implicitly teaches that there are no morally neutral objects by explicitly teaching that there are only positively good or negatively evil moral objects. In addition the Magisterium has never explicitly or impliciltly taught that there are morally neutral objects, see Veritatis Splendor, the greatest document on the fundamentals of Moral Theology ever transmitted to the Church. So this is where some speculative theology comes into play. This is clearly an implicit teaching of the Magisterium, an explicit teaching of Sacred Scripture and an explicit teaching of Sacred Tradition, since everything Jesus did and said had objective value.

If one does something like open a door, eat, walk, whistle, push a button, etc. [b]UNKOWNINGLY[/b] then it has no overall value in the eyes of God because it is not a knowingly chosen, [i]not[/i] because the moral object or proximate end has no inherently good value. Acts have overall moral value before God because they are knowingly chosen.

If one needs to get through a door, opening that door is good. It is a good moral object or proximate end, to get from one place to another, it can't be morally neutral. Whistling is in and of itself good, the proximate end is basically entertainment or playing or comfort or music. One can choose to whistle to oneself in order to cheer oneself up and lift up one's own spirit. Doing something like this can theoretically be directed toward God. The only thing that could make whistling an overall bad act is a bad intention and a bad circumstance. But it is not neutral. If it were neutral no sane person would ever choose to whistle. Pushing a button has a good proximate end of starting a mechanism. If pushing a button did not have a good proximate end, then no one would ever push a button. And so on, I'm not going to meditate on these things anymore.

Sometimes moral theologians teach morally neutral acts but they are getting confused with merely acts that are not described with sufficient information to determine the moral object. If the act is described in such a way that its inherent ordering and its moral object cannot be determined, the fault is in the description not in the reality that all acts have either good or evil objects or proximate ends.

If God has to make this clearer through the Magisterium I guess He eventually will, but I dont see any reason for it. Rather I see some moral theologians getting lost in non-essentials and making moral theology into an absurd game of meaningless rubbish.

And this is important for moral theology, because the fact that some people are teaching that there are morally neutral acts is messing up the use of moral principles such as the three fonts of morality, and principle of double effect (which is a unique application of the three fonts of morality.)

So that is my interpretation/opinion of Sacred Scripture and Magisterium.

Edited May 11, 2011 by kafka

[kafka]

hmm, this thread had almost two hundred hits in less than twenty four hours in transmundane.

I should put the word orthodox on all my threads

[bmb144]

11/15....go me! *amused look* I'm not as big a heretic as I thought after all.

[philothea]

[quote name='Don John of Austria' timestamp='1305051666' post='2239705']
I would like to see a magestierial document that says there are no morally nuetral act,I submit to the teaching of the Church, but I do not think that this is the teaching of the Church. Turning door knob has no moral value, the end of the act CANNOT retroactively give it moral value. Turning a door knob,whistling absent mindedly,pushing a button, noene of these have moral values.

If this is the eteaching of the Church I would like to see the document which tells us this.


Let me be clear, I object to this philosphically, so I am not protesting a Church teaching, Ijust don't believe this is a Church teaching.
[/quote]
I think it's just a wording issue. If you substitute "intention" for "act" I believe it's closer to what kafka means.

[kafka]

hmm I'm not sure.

my point is that there are no such thing as morally neutral objects or proximate ends. Every knowingly chosen concrete act is per se, in and of itself, inherently good or evil. The per se or inherency of a concrete act is determined by the object or proximate end of the act. The proximate end, or object is in reality good or evil:

"If the object of the concrete action is not in harmony with the true good of the person, the choice of that action makes our will and ourselves morally evil, thus putting us in conflict with our ultimate end, the supreme good, God himself." (Veritatis Splendor)

objects like whistling, going through a door, humming, combing one's hair, and so on are of very little value, do not need actual graces to perform, are not inherently meritorious, but they are still little goods with some value. And one can knowingly chose to do them (even though one often may do them unknowningly or unconsciously or implicitly).

[b]Example[/b]: one knowingly chooses to make a phone call to Mom. One has called Mom so many times that one's choice is morally directed at the call and not the pushing in of the phone number. One pushes in the phone number unconsciously, so it doesnt fall into the domain of morality, but it is somehow implied and related in the knowing choice morally directed toward the object of phoning Mom. But let us say that Mom got a new number. Then one has to deliberately and directly push in the number with reason because it isnt memorized. So pushing in the number and phoning Mom are a set of moral acts. And both of these are good objects.

Sacred Tradition and Sacred Scripture explicitly teaches the reality that all knowingly chosen objects are good or evil. And this reality can be explicitly drawn from the natural law. It is reasonable.

The Magisterium implicitly teaches that there are no morally neutral objects by explictly teaching that overall acts can only be moral, good, licit, if all three sources of morality: intention, moral object, circumstance must be positively good and by explicitly teaching many times in Veritatis splendor (and other documents) that all objects must be in conformatiy with the good, if not then the object of knowing choice is evil. There is no in between:

"Hence human activity cannot be judged as morally good merely because it is a means for attaining one or another of its goals, or simply because the subject's intention is good. Activity is morally good when it attests to and expresses the voluntary ordering of the person to his ultimate end and the conformity of a concrete action [b]with the human good[/b] as it is acknowledged in its truth by reason. If the object of the concrete action [b]is not in harmony with the true good of the person, the choice of that action makes our will and ourselves morally evil[/b], thus putting us in conflict with our ultimate end, the supreme good, God himself." (Veritatis Splendor)

"This is attested to once more by the question posed by the young man to Jesus: "What good must I do to have eternal life? ". But this ordering to one's ultimate end is not something subjective, dependent solely upon one's intention. It presupposes that such acts are in themselves capable of being ordered to this end, [b]insofar as they are in conformity with the authentic moral good of man[/b], safeguarded by the commandments." (ibid)

Notice he says safeguarded by the commandments. Not all authentic moral goods are contained in the commandments. The commandments are a summation of all authentic moral goods, and the two greatest commandments: love of God, neighbor, self sums up everything. So combing one's hair is an authentic human good albeit of little value, but when all is said and done it is good, it is a little act of love toward oneself, and neighbor (who has to look at you ) that theoretically can be directed toward God as the final end. Saint Paul said everything you do, do for God's glory. Every good object could theoretically be directed toward God with a grace enlivened intention as was the case with Jesus and Mary. But this is something that is fluid, not static, we are suppose to let go of worrying about all these things of little value and focus on purity, on love, on the profound and meaningful and important things. Then these little things get enlivened and become dynamic and free and beautiful before God.

Correct me if I am wrong but I think some people are mistaking the domain of moral theology. If something is not knowingly chosen it falls out of the domain of morality. I guess in a sense one could call that neutral but one shouldnt because then it will just get things confused because there are no such things as morally neutral overall acts or objects:

"The [b]rational[/b] ordering of the human act to the good in its truth and the [b]voluntary[/b] pursuit of that good, [b]known by reason[/b], constitute morality."

"Activity is morally good when it attests to and expresses the [b]voluntary[/b] ordering of the person to his ultimate end and the conformity of a concrete action with the human good as it is acknowledged in its truth by[b] reason[/b]."

"The morality of acts is defined by the relationship of man's [b]freedom[/b] with the authentic good. This good is established, as the eternal law, by Divine Wisdom which orders every being towards its end: this eternal law[b] is known[/b] both by man's natural reason (hence it is "natural law"), and — in an integral and perfect way — by God's supernatural Revelation (hence it is called "divine law")."

"Human acts are moral acts because they express and determine the goodness or evil of the individual who performs them. They do not produce a change merely in the state of affairs outside of man but, to the extent that they are [b]deliberate choices[/b], they give moral definition to the very person who performs them, determining his profound spiritual traits." (all above quotes from Veritatis Splendor)

moral acts proceed from the will and intellect. Deliberate with reason. Knowingly chosen.

if someone 'does' something unconsiously or unknowningly-it falls out of the domain of morality. There is no moral value before God. In other words God does not judge us on what we unknowingly or unconsciously 'do', because these things do not proceed from the interaction of will and intellect. E.g. sleepwalking, sleep eating, humming without knowingly choosing to hum, and so on. So there is never any reason to be scrupulous or even bother with these little things, just let go. And they are not even worth meditating on, but this is a good essential point to be grasped.

This is not a perfect post because it is getting late, but I can continue to clear this up for a while. And I have plenty of more Magisterial quotes and explanations.

Edited May 12, 2011 by kafka

[TeresaBenedicta]

Just a note:

Kafka argues his case well, and he's well studied. But there are moral theologians, in good standing with the Church, who disagree with his analysis. I was taught by an extremely prominent moral theologian who is currently named the Archbishop Harry J. Flynn Endowed Chair for Christian Ethics at the Mount. And he most certainly taught that there are morally neutral acts.

I don't mean to discredit Kafka in the least, but just wanted to say that his interpretation isn't the only one in the Church. There are other, valid, readings of [i]Veritatis Splendor[/i] that do not hold that "the Magisterium teaches there are no morally neutral acts."

I'm no moral theologian, but I have studied moral theology and studied under a great teacher. Once summer roles around and I have time on my hands, I hope to provide some of the arguments contrary to Kafka's interpretation.

[Laudate_Dominum]

kafka is interesting. props dude.

[kafka]

[quote name='TeresaBenedicta' timestamp='1305310106' post='2240929']
Just a note:

Kafka argues his case well, and he's well studied. But there are moral theologians, in good standing with the Church, who disagree with his analysis. I was taught by an extremely prominent moral theologian who is currently named the Archbishop Harry J. Flynn Endowed Chair for Christian Ethics at the Mount. And he most certainly taught that there are morally neutral acts.

I don't mean to discredit Kafka in the least, but just wanted to say that his interpretation isn't the only one in the Church. There are other, valid, readings of [i]Veritatis Splendor[/i] that do not hold that "the Magisterium teaches there are no morally neutral acts."

I'm no moral theologian, but I have studied moral theology and studied under a great teacher. Once summer roles around and I have time on my hands, I hope to provide some of the arguments contrary to Kafka's interpretation.
[/quote]
Germaine Grisez. He is o.k., he has some good teachings, but every point stands or falls on its own merit. I could severely criticisize him for some of his views, e.g. arguing it is o.k. to crush and empty out the skull of a baby in some circumstances

So names and positions and prominence mean nothing. Sacred Tradition, Sacred Scripture, Sacred Magisterium mean everything. For me Sacred Scripture makes it clear. I mean it is always do good, do good, do good. Avoid evil. I could run a list of verses onto eternity which express this. Sacred Scripture explicitly or implicitly teaches no-where that there are morally neutral objects. They are always good and if there is any deprivation in the object, then it is evil. Where there is no deprivation or lack there is only goodness. And that is all. And on top of Sacred Scripture the fact that there are no moral objects is perfectly reasonable and sensible. I'm not going to be here in the summer or ever again, so I am going to be vocal and finish strong, Theresa



Here is where Grisez basically argues for a direct abortion in his The Way of Jesus:

http://www.twotlj.org/G-2-8-D.html
At least in times past, however, and perhaps even today in places where modern medical equipment and skills are unavailable, certain life-saving operations meeting the four conditions would fall among procedures classified by the classical moralists as “direct” killing, since the procedures in question straightaway would lead to the baby’s death. This is the case, for example, if the four conditions are met during the delivery of a baby whose head is too large. Unless the physician does a craniotomy (an operation in which instruments are used to empty and crush the head of the child so that it can be removed from the birth canal), both mother and child eventually will die; but the operation can be performed and the mother saved. With respect to physical causality, craniotomy immediately destroys the baby, and only in this way saves the mother. Thus, not only classical moralists but the magisterium regarded it as “direct” killing: a bad means to a good end.83

I mean what the hell? This is a direct abortion. The object of the medical procedure is the deliberate and direct deprivation of an innocent human person's life. Direct and voluntary killing of an innocent. Very bad teaching. Very bad grasp of the moral object. Shame on him. And Therese Lysaught used this argument to advise the hospital in Pheonix to committ an abortion. Extremely bad.

[TeresaBenedicta]

Not speaking of Grisez. He was basically retired by the time I went through. (Actually, I'm pretty anti-Grisez for the most part, although he's a great man.)

My only point, Kafka, is that there [i]are[/i] other, legitimate interpretations of Sacred Scripture and Veritatis Splendor. It's too bad you won't be here in the summer, I'd have liked to go further into it with you.

Keep going, though! I enjoy reading your thought, even if I do disagree at times.

[kafka]

[quote name='TeresaBenedicta' timestamp='1305320328' post='2241011']
Not speaking of Grisez. He was basically retired by the time I went through. (Actually, I'm pretty anti-Grisez for the most part, although he's a great man.)

My only point, Kafka, is that there [i]are[/i] other, legitimate interpretations of Sacred Scripture and Veritatis Splendor. It's too bad you won't be here in the summer, I'd have liked to go further into it with you.

Keep going, though! I enjoy reading your thought, even if I do disagree at times.
[/quote]
Sorry, bad guess.

But my point still stands about names. Even Shakespeare said it. What is in a name? Saint Peter said God does not respect anyone in Acts. It was a very hard lesson I had to learn about names and prominence and position. Even the best of them can be wrong, even substantially wrong. Whole groups of them can be wrong. The works of these big names can help, and a good teacher can teach you how to think, but in the end it is basically Sacred Tradition, Sacred Scripture, Sacred Magisterium, the natural law, sound-durable reason, and that is it.

One thing about moral theology that I've noticed over the past few years. True moral theology (and there is a lot of false absurdities out there) tends to be very ordered and reasonable, durable and common sensical. The entire natural law is open to reason. It is very close to home, close to the rhythm of human life. Built up on strong foundations. Built to last forever, so to speak. Learn those foundations and one can see through anything. It is subtle and profound, but not vain and overwrought (excessively complex).

I know there are other interpretations, but when I committ to something like this that usually means I have a strong human certitude and then of course I wont budge. Morally neutral objects do not make any sense to me, and I dont think they would make sense to the early Christians, or to the ancients who wrote Sacred Scripture especially the wisdom books, or to a moral construction worker, a farmer, a soldier, a miller, a smith, a King Aragorn (if he existed in real life), etc.

So even though these high intellectuals can go play in the park with all their morally neutral objects, I think they are shortsighted. They are not seeing things through far enough. They are not using their heads like a reasonable worker has too. Instead they are getting lost in their intellectual systems and fantasies. But true moral theology is gold that does not glitter.

Last, I think they are not placing enough weight on Sacred Tradition, Sacred Scripture and Sacred Magisterium.

So that is some advice. I'm just shooting out my last thoughts. I dont like John the Bapstist and Saint Jerome for nothing

Edited May 14, 2011 by kafka

[kafka]

[quote name='kafka' timestamp='1305332431' post='2241099']
The works of these big names can help, and a good teacher can teach you how to think, but in the end it is basically Sacred Tradition, Sacred Scripture, Sacred Magisterium, the natural law, sound-durable reason, and that is it.
[/quote]
Granted God's will, grace and providence. I'm losing it.

[qfnol31]

[quote name='TeresaBenedicta' timestamp='1305038854' post='2239636']
One of these days I'll find myself with enough to time discuss number 1 with you, Kafka. I disagree and hold that there are indeed morally neutral acts. But unfortunately I don't foresee having enough time until summer to really get into it.
[/quote]I know it's almost a year after this thread's life, but I thought this was an interesting enough point to bring back up, if anyone is interested. There were a few points above about whether this is true or not.

I would argue that there are indeed no morally neutral actions when we speak about specific actions themselves. Thomas Aquinas addresses this problem int he Queastiones Disputatae de Malo when he goes into a better distinction of acts than you'll find in the Summa Theologiae. In here he argues that all specific acts must be good or evil, that none are morally neutral.

If you'll permit, I'll explain how this is possible, then you can see if you like the answer or not. TeresaBenedicta is correct to note that many good and faithful Catholic theologians uphold the idea of morally neutral acts, but I would like to point out briefly that this sometimes serves to another end and works on a strange definition of Natural Law. I don't want to get into all the details here, but there has been much ink spilled on this question.

First we must distinguish between human acts and acts of a human. Human acts are those done deliberately, by a choice of the will. This can be anything from brushing hair to killing another person. In any case, these are willful acts. Acts of a human might include stroking a beard, yawning, etc. These are not willful or deliberate actions, but are involuntary. These last ones remain morally neutral for our consideration.

Now when we speak about human acts, we can speak about them in general or in particular (Thomas says genus vs. species, but they mean the same thing). General human acts, such as walking, talking, etc. Can be morally neutral. Thomas actually uses the example of picking up a piece of straw, but I'll stick to the example of brushing one's hair. In general this act is morally neutral. If we talk about specific instances, however, then we must speak about whether it is indeed a good act or not. I'll start with the times that it is not good and work backwards from there. When my wife brushes her hair out of spite for me (to make me wait on her so that I am late - she doesn't, but it's still a good example), then she is acting in an inappropriate manner and for an inappropriate end to brushing her hair and her action is thereby an evil action (albeit a very simple evil, almost silly to call it such). A greater example might be using the computer when you ought to be getting ready for Mass. Using the computer is fine, but once it makes you late for Mass it can be an evil action. Thomas speaks about picking up the piece of straw to spite the person on whose floor you discovered the straw. In each of these cases you can see a level of evil in the intention, such as nastiness or laziness, etc.

Now for these actions when they are not evil. By definition all actions must be directed to some particular end. When our intended end aligns with the proper end of the action (a great example here is coitus, when the proper end is unity of a couple and procreation) AND that action is directed to our final good, then it is a good action. Of course, when brushing one's hair we might not think of our final end at the moment. Yet, in this action there is a particular good sought. My wife might do it to make herself presentable for various reasons. Maybe we're headed to Mass and she knows that being presentable for Mass shows reverence for the Mass, etc. In the Aristotelian/Thomistic frame of mind, all actions must have an end that is desired. So long as each end is in accord with the action's proper end and directs us toward our final, even if not directly, then this action is a good action.

There are a lot of philosophical considerations behind Thomas' determination that all specific actions must be morally good or evil, which we can discuss if you're interested. I don't know if this was helpful to anyone, but it is a passing interest of mine (moral theology in general) and is part of the drive in my studies. I hope I was able to explain at least the reason for the seemingly strange position.